WANA (Jun 19) – Assessments suggest that launching new negotiations before the initial provisions of the Islamabad Agreement are fully implemented could create significant challenges.

 

Under the first clause of the Islamabad Agreement between Iran and the United States, military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, are expected to cease, while Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be guaranteed.

 

The continuation of Israeli military strikes in Lebanon and the absence of clear guarantees regarding Lebanon’s territorial integrity have raised questions about whether the commitments outlined in the agreement’s first clause have actually entered the implementation phase. Reports indicate that Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon have continued even after the agreement was signed, fueling concerns about the extent to which the initial stage of the deal is being carried out.

 

Meanwhile, Clause 13 of the agreement states that negotiations on a final Iran–U.S. settlement can only begin after the implementation of Clauses 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11 has commenced.

 

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From this perspective, as long as there is no tangible progress on the Lebanon file and the conditions outlined in Clause 1 remain unmet, moving forward with negotiations on a final agreement would be difficult to reconcile with the framework and requirements of the deal itself.

 

Iranian officials and members of the negotiating team have repeatedly stated in recent weeks that both the explicit provisions of the agreement and any potentially ambiguous areas subject to interpretation will be pursued in line with Iran’s interests and those of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” with no intention of retreating from those positions.

 

Effective implementation is viewed as critical because failure to fulfill clear commitments could also influence how other provisions of the agreement are interpreted and applied. In this view, the success or failure of the deal will depend less on the text itself than on the willingness of the parties to honor and implement their commitments in practice.

 

Against this backdrop, there is a perception that Iran still retains a range of options. These could include suspending or postponing future negotiations, reimposing restrictions affecting the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, or employing other deterrent measures if the agreement is not implemented as expected. A combination of these options is also considered possible.

 

Within the same framework, a full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz while Israeli attacks continue and the situation in Lebanon remains unresolved is viewed by proponents of this approach as potentially reducing existing sources of leverage. Consequently, any decision regarding the strait is seen as closely linked to developments on the ground in Lebanon and to the degree of compliance demonstrated by the other side.

A woman holds a Hezbollah flag during a rally in support of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran June 4, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

It is also argued that if the agreement is to succeed, Washington must play a more effective role in preventing the continuation of Israeli military operations. According to this view, Iran’s decisions will be based less on political rhetoric and more on realities on the ground and the extent to which commitments are fulfilled.

 

Some assessments describe the Islamabad Agreement as a significant turning point in recent developments and stress the importance of closely monitoring its implementation. From this standpoint, delays, ambiguities, or disputes over interpretation could affect future developments, making continuous oversight of the agreement’s execution particularly important.

 

At the same time, confidence in the negotiation process is not regarded as a substitute for strict monitoring of compliance. This is especially true given the long-standing history of mistrust and disputes between the parties.

 

In such an environment, expanding negotiations to cover additional issues is viewed as premature. According to this assessment, introducing new items to the agenda before the implementation of the agreement’s initial provisions—particularly those related to Lebanon—has been clarified could further complicate the negotiating process.

 

In this context, speculation has emerged regarding the Iranian negotiating team’s apparent reluctance to hold a proposed meeting in Geneva on Friday. However, no official trip or meeting in Geneva has been formally confirmed so far.