Behind the Scenes of Target Selection: What Locations is Iran Seeking to Destroy?
WANA (Jul 17) – An analysis of the locations targeted by Iran in the new waves of attacks reveals that a new military approach has been adopted. This approach prioritizes command and threat centers over mere equipment.
One of the most important questions following the recent missile and drone operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran is: on what basis were the targets selected?
An examination of the data provided by official sources indicates that rather than focusing on the “tools of aggression,” the operation command prioritized the “origin of aggression” and the nodes of command, guidance, and support; an approach referred to in military literature as attacking Operational Centers of Gravity.
In modern warfare, destroying a single drone or fighter jet offers limited operational value, but disabling the base, command and control center, or the infrastructure that generates and directs the mission leaves a far wider operational impact.
For this reason, targeting the origins of aggression and command and support centers yields a higher return than engaging with isolated equipment.
Iran Says It Targeted U.S. Bases in Kuwait and Bahrain
WANA (Jul 16) – Iran’s Army announced that U.S. military facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain were targeted in the tenth phase of its “Thunderbolt” operation. According to a statement released by the Army’s Public Relations Office, Arash drones struck radar systems, Patriot air defense systems, and fuel storage facilities at the U.S. military’s Ali […]
The Case of Bahrain
For instance, in the attack on Bandar Abbas, intelligence assessments indicated that the invading unmanned surface vessel had entered the operation via the Bahrain axis.
Therefore, the command, control, and support centers of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain—which manage a portion of the region’s air and naval missions—were identified as one of the primary nodes generating the threat. Consequently, the damage inflicted on the command and control centers of this complex can be analyzed within this exact framework.
The Case of Kuwait
Another example is Kuwait, which in recent years has become an important hub for the deployment of MQ-9 Reaper drones; drones that, in addition to reconnaissance missions, play a role in controlling and monitoring sea lines of communication and the Strait of Hormuz.
According to available information, following the recent ceasefire, around 20 of these drones were stationed in Kuwait. Later, despite being relocated by the US military, a portion of them were once again targeted and destroyed by Iran. Such bases are not merely drone deployment sites, but are considered part of the region’s intelligence, surveillance, and command network.
Jordan and Aerial Infrastructure
Jordan has become one of the critical points of origin for fighter jet sorties and the execution of air missions. The country’s geographical location provides suitable access for conducting aerial operations in the region, and for this reason, infrastructure related to air missions holds a special place in operational calculations.
IRGC Announces Destruction of U.S. Radar Facilities in Oman Region
WANA (Jul 17) – The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that its naval forces targeted and destroyed two key radar installations in the Oman region during an early morning operation. The strikes were carried out at dawn as part of the 13th wave of “Operation Nasr 2” and were dedicated to the residents […]
Radar Networks and Air Defense: High-Value Targets
Alongside airbases, the radar and air defense network is also among the top priorities. To reach its target, any missile or drone operation must bypass early warning networks, detection and interception systems, air defense command centers, and interceptor systems; therefore, weakening this network increases the probability of success for subsequent operations.
Air defense systems are among the most valuable strategic assets of any armed forces. Long-range radars, early warning systems, and layered interceptor systems—beyond their high cost of procurement and deployment—have a far longer cycle of production, training, integration, and replacement compared to most combat equipment.
Hence, damage to a radar or air defense network does not merely mean the loss of a few pieces of equipment; rather, it can reduce the detection, interception, and defense capabilities of a region for a long period. For this reason, these systems are always categorized as High-Value Targets (HVTs).
In summary, rather than being based on the destruction of enemy equipment, the targeting pattern of recent operations has focused on disabling the chain of threat generation, command, guidance, reconnaissance, and support.
In other words, the logic governing these operations has been the destruction of the “origin of the threat”; an approach that, in network-centric warfare, proves more effective than targeting isolated equipment.
