WANA (Mar 06) – In the years leading up to the military operation in Ukraine, when Vladimir Putin repeatedly declared from official podiums that Russia would not tolerate NATO’s eastward expansion, many dismissed the warning as a bluff. History, however, proved otherwise.

 

The roots of the Russia–Ukraine conflict can largely be traced to this geopolitical logic: Ukraine, relying on Western promises, was pursuing NATO membership—effectively bringing a military alliance that Moscow views as hostile directly to Russia’s borders.

 

Moscow did not communicate this red line behind closed doors or only within internal political circles. It stated it openly and loudly. Russian officials repeatedly warned that any expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure around Russia would be treated as a direct threat to the country’s national security.

 

Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, emphasized in one such statement that the deployment of Western troops and military facilities would be regarded as an intervention posing a direct threat to Russia’s security.

 

In the same context, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that if NATO were to station nuclear weapons in Estonia, Russia’s own nuclear arsenal would target the country in response. At the same time, he stressed that Russia did not seek to threaten Europe, but rather to guarantee its own security.

 

This approach reflects what is often described in international relations as “active deterrence”—not passivity, not retreat, but the explicit definition of costs for the opposing side, shaping the strategic environment in such a way that the adversary would think twice before even considering an attack.

 

Iranians Lose Faith in Benefits of Diplomacy with U.S.

WANA (Feb 26) – As a third round of indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the United States gets underway, voices from the streets of Tehran reflect a mix of cautious hope, deep skepticism, and a firm emphasis on defending national sovereignty. Their reactions, gathered as diplomatic efforts intensify in Geneva, offer a snapshot of […]

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From this perspective, the Islamic Republic of Iran now finds itself in a comparable situation. West Asia has become a theatre shaped by long-term U.S. strategic planning.

 

The deployment of American military bases in Iraq, Syria, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula has been widely interpreted as part of a broader effort to encircle Iran and maintain constant pressure on Tehran.

 

Forces stationed thousands of kilometres from U.S. territory, yet positioned close to Iran’s borders, carry little defensive or peace-oriented justification; their presence is inherently strategic and coercive in nature.

 

Seen through this lens, if Iran’s armed forces and diplomatic institutions act in a way that leads Washington to believe it can continue maintaining its regional bases despite facing serious costs, such a perception could weaken deterrence and potentially encourage further pressure or escalation.

 

In such circumstances, silence—or reliance on diplomacy alone—may not be sufficient. The Russian experience suggests that major powers tend to engage seriously at the negotiating table only when the costs of confrontation become tangible and credible.

A sign in tribute to Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is displayed on a street, after he was killed in Israeli and U.S. strikes on Saturday, in Tehran, Iran, March 4, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Within this framework, Iran would be expected to send a clear message to Washington and its allies: any military deployment in neighbouring countries, any ceasefire that serves merely as cover for regrouping forces in the region, and any move that threatens Iran’s security could provoke a firm response.

 

By this logic, deterrence becomes effective only when the costs of conflict are concrete and measurable for the opposing side. According to this view, a ceasefire would only be meaningful when the American military presence in the region effectively loses its operational purpose.

 

Within the framework of realpolitik, such a position is not necessarily a threat but rather an attempt to define national security in rational terms.

 

A country that fails to make the costs of war clear to its adversaries may inadvertently signal weakness.

 

Conversely, Iran—with its missile capabilities, its network of regional partners, and decades of experience resisting external pressure—possesses tools that could make such deterrence credible and sustainable.