WANA (May 28- Zraidi Siham & Amir Mohammad Esmaeili ) For the last decades, China’s presence in West Asia has been defined by its economic pragmatism—focused on trade, infrastructure, and above all, energy security. While energy ties may have truly paved the way for further diverse commercial relations, yet the wary dragon intentions in the region now extend far beyond energy and business exchanges. As regional conflicts persist and Western security involvements appear more selective, China is beginning to reshape its role not as a competitor to the U.S. but as a cooperative responsible player in the evolving regional security architecture.

 

China has adopted a more comprehensive approach to the security in West Asia, exemplified by its diplomatic mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the introduction of the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Characterized by new initiatives, international institutions and partnerships, China is marching with a steady gait, playing as a mediator between the two countries that upheld one of the longest tensions (Iran and Saudi Arabia) in the region. China is certainly positioning itself steadily and gaining more trust on its side.

 

China’s New Approach to West Asian Security

China’s evolving security concept in West Asia is a masterclass in diplomatic gymnastics, equal parts economic realism, strategic caution, and peacemaking. As it tiptoes into the region’s fiery chessboard, Beijing touts political dialogue and mediation not as lofty ideals but as strategic assets to expand influence without intervening to domestic issues. As China’s role in West Asia has long been anchored in economic pragmatism, particularly energy security and infrastructure development, a closer examination of China’s strategic trajectory over the past decade reveals a calculated shift towards deeper security engagement.

 

While Western powers tend to stomp in with grand declarations and gunboats, China sashays in with trade deals and friendly summits, subtly asserting itself as the alternative adult in the room. At the heart of this shift lies the Global Security Initiative (GSI) unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2022, China’s vision for a new security paradigm rooted in sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity[1],  which echoes to the five principles of peaceful coexistence as it promotes for peaceful development[2] and all the GSI principles in a direct way. Yes, it’s a diplomatic flavor of “don’t call us, we’ll call you,” but it works. China’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 is the crown jewel of its regional overtures, an event which, though facilitated by years of groundwork by Oman and Iraq, allowed Beijing to sweep in last-minute like the suave hero at a geopolitical prom[3], in the West Asia, this vision translates into support for regional security dialogues, promotion of inclusive multilateralism, and a gradual but tangible willingness to mediate conflicts. As many tries to assonate, China isn’t trying to replace the U.S, it’s just throwing a different kind of party and inviting everyone disillusioned with the old one.

 

Despite its traditionally political profile, China is now systematically upgrading its regional partnerships. It has established comprehensive strategic partnerships with key actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, while promoting dialogue platforms like the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF)[4]. These initiatives serve dual purposes: reducing reliance on Western-centric security mechanisms and promoting Chinese-style multilateralism based on mutual non-interference and economic interdependence.

 

Nevertheless, China’s approach remains cautious. It refrains from military entanglements or unilateral interventions, preferring “quasi-mediation diplomacy” and multilateral peacekeeping through the United Nations[5], eschewing partnership entanglements for what Sun Degang calls “selective governance” and “bottom-up diplomacy”[6]. Joining Julia Gurol amplifying, China’s role in the region is best understood as complementary to existing actors like the EU, focusing on infrastructure, state resilience, and conflict mitigation rather than regime change or ideological exportation[7].

Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to resume diplomatic relations in a deal brokered by China, ending seven years of estrangement. Majid Asgaripour / WANA News Agency

Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to resume diplomatic relations in a deal brokered by China, marking the end of a seven-year estrangement. Majid Asgaripour / WANA News Agency

Institutionalization and China’s Security Engagement

The backbone of China’s institutional involvement in West Asia rests on bilateral strategic partnerships, multilateral security institutions, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), now cross-pollinating with the three Global Initiatives (GSI), this reconfiguration champions a security paradigm based on mutual respect, non-interference, and indivisible security. As the strategic relevance of Western-led security frameworks such as NATO continues to erode in the Global South, China has skillfully positioned itself as a principal architect of an alternative, multipolar security landscape. This evolution has found its most potent expression in the expansion of BRICS+, a transformation in which Beijing has played a pivotal role. The inclusion of major West Asian actors, namely Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, into the BRICS constellation is not merely symbolic. It is a structural recalibration of global governance. These states bring not only considerable energy assets and geostrategic influence but also a growing appetite for security cooperation unshackled from Western conditionalities. In doing so, China positioned itself not as a hegemon-in-waiting, but as a stabilizer offering credible alternatives to zero-sum security politics.

 

China’s diplomatic doctrine of institutional engagement has solidified through multilevel mechanisms like the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), where security is increasingly prioritized alongside economic cooperation 5. CASCF summits now integrate counterterrorism training, police cooperation, and discussions on cyber and data governance, indicating a sophisticated pivot to hard-security adjacent institutional roles[8].

The Presidents of Iran and China met in Russia during the BRICS summit on October 23, 2024.. President PR / WANA News Agency

Chinese Latest Mediation Efforts in West Asia

China’s early ventures into conflict mediation were tentative. In the Syrian civil war, China consistently called for a “Syrian-led political solution” and supported international peace frameworks such as the Geneva and Vienna talks. These efforts reflected Beijing’s preference for “constructive conflict management” over military involvement—aligning with what some scholars[9] describe as a careful extension of diplomacy under China’s strict non-intervention framework.

 

Beijing’s next major entry into West Asian mediation came through its symbolic initiatives on the Palestinian cause. In 2013, Xi Jinping introduced a Four-Point Peace Proposal, calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, economic development as a stabilizer, and multilateral support[10]. This evolved into a Five-Point Plan in 2017, reaffirming China’s commitment to a two-state solution and creating a tripartite dialogue mechanism between China, Israel, and Palestine. While not transformative in outcomes, these proposals were well received among Arab states, framing China as a neutral and consistent supporter of Palestinian rights and regional equity[11].

 

China’s real diplomatic coming-of-age in the region was the Iran–Saudi Arabia normalization deal in March 2023. After years of backchannel discussions supported by Iraq and Oman, China took the lead quietly hosting trilateral security dialogues in Beijing. With Wang Yi presiding over the talks, the deal pledged a return to diplomatic relations, mutual respect for sovereignty, and the reactivation of the 1998 and 2001 cooperation agreements[12]. This moment was not only a diplomatic victory but also an ideological alternative to Western hegemony. Importantly, the success of the 2023 deal was not random, it was built on earlier Chinese support for the Baghdad Dialogue Process between Saudi Arabia and Iran (2021–2022)[13]. China publicly endorsed Iraq’s efforts, offering rhetorical and diplomatic support without dominating the narrative. This hands-off yet supportive approach was part of a larger strategy to embed China as a long-term guarantor of peace without becoming a security provider[14].

 

Meanwhile, Beijing continued to engage the Palestinian file more assertively. During the 2023 Israel–Hamas conflict, China refused to condemn Hamas, reinforcing its neutral posture while calling for an immediate ceasefire and a revival of the two-state solution under international law[15]. By hosting Arab League and the OIC emergency consultations in Beijing and advocating for a “larger, more authoritative” peace conference, China presented itself as a voice of the Global South, balancing principle with pragmatism[16]. In April 2024, China hosted an important meeting between Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah in Beijing, signaling a shift from symbolic support to active diplomatic facilitation. The talks focused on promoting Palestinian unity and advancing a broader, inclusive peace process, with China positioning itself as a neutral platform for intra-Palestinian dialogue[17].

 

China’s mediation efforts in West Asia have evolved through a series of strategic stages: symbolic proposal, selective engagement, supportive observer, and full-fledged mediator. By maintaining an unwavering commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and now advancing its Global Security Initiative, China has offered the region a compelling, post-Western vision of conflict resolution; one that is cooperative, credible, and calibrated.

 

Conclusion

China is not storming into West Asia as a conqueror, nor tiptoeing in as a passive outsider, it is curating influence with a velvet touch and iron resolve. What began as a purely economic relationship has evolved into a sophisticated strategy of diplomatic engagement, institutional infiltration, and symbolic peace stewardship. Beijing has carefully chosen its moments, balancing between mediation and neutrality, visibility and restraint. From its peaceful quiet role in Syria and steady proposals on Palestine to its decisive orchestration of the Saudi–Iran deal and Fatah–Hamas dialogue, China is no longer just a bystander in the region’s security story, it is scripting its own chapter, reframing of what global leadership looks like in a post-unipolar world. Through initiatives like the Global Security Initiative, partnerships like BRICS+, and forums like CASCF, China is building a peace framework that trades in trust, sovereignty, and development, not troops and conditionalities. Whether this approach will yield lasting peace or merely polished optics remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: China isn’t just in the room; it’s rearranging the furniture!

Zraidi Siham (Researcher and PhD Candidate, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University)

Amir Mohammad Esmaeili (Researcher and PhD Candidate, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University)

 

 

 

References

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[2] Yue, H., & Mei, S. (2025). China’s Peaceful Diplomacy in the Middle East in the New Era and the US’s Perception and Challenges to It. Scholars Journal of Economics, Business and Management, 12(4), 98–104.
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[4] Murphy, D. (2024). Written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
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[7] Gurol, J. (2020). The Role of the EU and China in the Security Architecture of the Middle East. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2020.1728969
[8] Rózsa, E. N. (2021). China’s Interests in the Middle East and North Africa. Mediterranean Yearbook
[9] Chaziza, M. (2018). China’s Mediation Efforts in the Middle East and North Africa
[10] E-IR. (2021). China’s Increasing Influence in the Middle East
[11] UCSD China Focus. (2024). Kingdom in the Middle: China as Mediator. https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2024/08/15/kingdom-in-the-middle-china-as-an-international-mediator-2024-china-focus-essay-contest-runner-up/
[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2023). Joint Trilateral Statement by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the People’s Republic of China.
[13] Peace Diplomacy (2023). China’s Facilitation of Iran–Saudi Reconciliation.
[14] Global Times. (2024). China’s Mediation Gains Momentum.  https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1316445.shtml
[15] Middle East Institute. (2023). China’s Approach to Mediation in the Middle East. https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-approach-mediation-middle-east-between-conflict-resolution-and-conflict
[16] Australian Outlook – International Affairs. (2024). The Deep Foundations of China’s Mediator Role in the Middle East. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-deep-foundations-of-chinas-mediator-role-in-the-middle-east/
[17] Al Jazeera (2023). China-brokered Saudi-Iran Deal: What You Need to Know