WANA (Jun 29) – The recent U.S. strikes on locations in southern Iran, carried out under the pretext of responding to an attack on a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz that was attempting to use an alternative passage through the waterway, were far more than a limited military action or an isolated incident.

 

Rather, they should be understood as tangible evidence of a new phase in the relationship between war, ceasefire, and temporary agreements—a phase in which the cessation of hostilities does not signify the end of the conflict but instead marks its temporary transfer from direct military confrontation to more complex arenas of pressure, strategic rebalancing, and the redesign of power dynamics.

 

From this perspective, these strikes were the first of their kind since the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, but they are unlikely to be the last.

 

More than anything else, they expose the fragility of the current situation and the existing understanding, demonstrating that the military option has not been removed from the table. Instead, it continues to be regarded as an instrument for exerting pressure and reshaping the regional balance of power.

 

Why Did the United States Strike Iran Again?

The US Violates the Understanding on Multiple Fronts; What is Iran’s Next Move?

WANA (Jun 28) – Recent US actions in attacking Iran, the issue of Lebanon, and the release of frozen assets violated several clauses of the initial understanding. Tehran also responded to the hostile US actions on the field.   Clause 1 of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the […]

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Developments over the past few days, both in southern Lebanon and in the Strait of Hormuz, reinforce the reality that the suspension of hostilities—at least at this stage—should not be mistaken for a transition to peace. What is emerging is an intermediate state: a pause designed to manage tensions, recalibrate strategic balances, and shape new geopolitical realities. Within this framework, efforts to establish an alternative maritime corridor are effectively aimed at altering the geopolitics of the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz and neutralizing one of Iran’s most significant strategic levers.

 

It appears that the United States halted the war primarily because of the far-reaching consequences of a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the necessity of reopening the waterway, and domestic political priorities. In exchange for the reopening of the Strait, Washington reportedly granted a number of concessions in the Islamabad Memorandum that were largely favorable to Iran.

 

Since then, taking advantage of the relative military calm and the absence of active warfare, the United States—working alongside several countries and the International Maritime Organization—has sought to establish and legitimize an alternative shipping route.

 

This initiative was also pursued during the conflict itself, but persistent attacks and commercial shipping companies’ reluctance to use the proposed route under wartime conditions prevented any meaningful progress. Now, with the Strait officially reopened and relative stability restored, Washington has once again begun testing the viability of this alternative passage.

A man holds a picture of the late Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on a street in Tehran, Iran, April 12, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

In this context, Oman assumes particular importance. As one of the two littoral states bordering the Strait of Hormuz—and the country through whose territorial waters the proposed alternative route would pass—Muscat’s cooperation carries significant legal and international implications that could create new challenges for Tehran.

 

A waterway over which Iran has consistently argued that only Iran and Oman possess sovereign rights could now become a point of contention between two countries that have traditionally maintained close and friendly relations.

 

At the same time, it should not be overlooked that Tehran’s strong diplomatic focus on Oman—through repeated negotiations, high-level delegations, and discussions of bilateral arrangements for managing the Strait of Hormuz—has placed Muscat increasingly under Washington’s scrutiny and both overt and covert pressure.

 

The pressure became so pronounced that President Donald Trump publicly threatened military action against Oman. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to expect Muscat to withstand these pressures indefinitely, and it may ultimately conclude that aligning with Washington is preferable to becoming embroiled in a direct confrontation.

An Iranian woman walks past an anti-Israeli mural in Tehran, Iran, June 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Seen from this perspective, last night’s U.S. strikes were intended to demonstrate Washington’s determination to establish and consolidate the new shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz, ultimately transforming the Strait from one of Iran’s greatest strategic advantages into a source of pressure and vulnerability.

 

In other words, under the current ceasefire and temporary agreement, the apparent objective of the United States and Israel is to contain Iran by gradually reshaping its geopolitical environment and eroding its regional and global strategic advantages—from Lebanon all the way to the Strait of Hormuz.

 

In short, negotiations over the issues related to a final agreement have not yet begun. The implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding itself is already facing numerous obstacles and conflicting interpretations, while the prospect of renewed military confrontation once again hangs over the region. In the coming days and weeks, both the future of the memorandum and the negotiations toward a final agreement are likely to be heavily influenced by developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.

 

For now, however, Washington appears intent on altering the strategic landscape of the Strait of Hormuz before substantive negotiations with Tehran over a final agreement begin. Its objective is to strip Iran of—or at least significantly weaken—its most important source of strategic leverage, thereby reducing Tehran’s bargaining power at the negotiating table and limiting its ability to secure maximum concessions.

 

The question now is where this latest contest of wills in the Strait of Hormuz will ultimately lead.