Does Lebanon View Iran as an Enemy State?
WANA (Dec 23) – In recent weeks, a series of contradictory positions emerging from Beirut and Tehran has pushed a serious question into the media spotlight: Is Lebanon redefining Iran as a “problematic state,” or even a “potential adversary”?
The question arises from clear inconsistencies in official rhetoric—from the harsh remarks of Lebanon’s foreign minister to the subsequent objections raised by the country’s president and prime minister to those same statements.
The Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar, citing sources close to the presidency, reported that both Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam expressed dissatisfaction with the remarks made by Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji—comments that prompted one Lebanese minister to ask bluntly: “Does Lebanon consider Iran an enemy state, that the foreign minister speaks to Tehran in such a tone?”
Aoun’s response was unequivocal: these positions were unilateral and do not reflect the official policy of the Lebanese government.
Rajji: Europe Should Look Beyond the Nuclear File in Talks with Iran
WANA (Dec 16) – Lebanon’s foreign minister said on Tuesday in Brussels that European countries should not confine their dialogue with Iran to the nuclear issue and the ballistic missile program, a stance seen as reflecting Beirut’s interventionist approach toward Iran’s regional policies. According to official sources, Youssef Rajji told a lengthy meeting with […]
One Lebanon, Multiple Voices
This is precisely where the issue begins. Today’s Lebanon does not speak with one voice. On one side stands a foreign minister who, in Brussels and on Al Jazeera, has described Iran’s role as “highly negative” and called for Iran’s nuclear negotiations to be expanded to include so-called “affiliated groups.”
On the other side is Lebanon’s parliamentary speaker, Nabih Berri, who in a meeting with Iran’s ambassador emphasized continued dialogue, the preservation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity, and even the resumption of direct flights between the two countries.
This duality is not accidental. It reflects a deeper fault line in Lebanese politics: the tension between a government seeking to project itself as an independent actor and a political structure that remains unable to manage the Hezbollah equation without Iran.
Nabih Berri, Iranian Ambassador Hold Talks on Lebanon
WANA (Dec 16) – Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri met with Mojtaba Amani, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Lebanon, to review the latest political developments in Lebanon and the region, bilateral relations, and repeated violations by the Israeli regime. During the meeting, the two sides discussed recent political developments, the general […]
In Tehran, these developments are being followed closely.
Mohammad Khajouei, an analyst of Lebanese affairs, argues: “We must avoid a multiplicity of statements regarding Lebanon’s internal developments. One of the factors that has strained Iran–Lebanon relations is precisely this diversity of positions.”
In his view, statements by various Iranian figures—especially when made without sensitivity to Lebanon’s internal dynamics—not only fail to help Hezbollah, but may actually limit its room for maneuver.
Khajouei stresses that Iran’s positions on Lebanon should be articulated exclusively through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He goes further, noting: “Although Hezbollah is our ally, we must state clearly that it alone should decide on internal matters such as disarmament.”
The implication is clear: overly explicit and public Iranian support risks transforming Hezbollah from a Lebanese actor into an international issue.
A billboard with a picture of late Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is displayed during a mourning ceremony for late Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, who were killed in Israeli airstrikes last year, in Tehran, Iran, February 23, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
Drawing Distance, Not Declaring Hostility
Lebanese sensitivities are not unfounded. Joseph Aoun has previously stated plainly: “Lebanon is tired of wars that other countries fight on its soil.”
It is within this context that several recent decisions gain meaning: the rejection of Abbas Araghchi’s invitation to visit Tehran, restrictions on Iranian aircraft landing in Beirut, and even delays in approving Iran’s new ambassador. These moves do not necessarily signal hostility, but rather an attempt to establish distance—distance that Lebanon’s new leadership seeks to demonstrate to Washington, Riyadh, and Tehran alike.
In an analysis, Haaretz wrote: “No matter how much Lebanon may wish otherwise, it cannot remove Iran from the equation. The presence of Hezbollah has made Tehran a central player.”
The same report adds that war or an escalation with Israel could ultimately confer a strategic advantage on Iran—a paradoxical proposition that represents both a threat and an opportunity.
Iran Between Influence and Attrition
In Tehran, this situation is also a source of concern. Following Assad’s fall in Syria, growing criticism in Iraq, and mounting nuclear pressure, the “Lebanon file” has become one of the last remaining pillars of Iran’s regional influence.
Even reports—accurate or not—about potential changes in Hezbollah’s leadership reflect the depth of this anxiety.
Iran now faces a complex dilemma:
- If it distances itself from Hezbollah, its regional influence erodes;
- If it draws too close, it risks pushing the Lebanese state toward confrontation.
The answer to the central question may therefore be this: Lebanon does not view Iran as an enemy, nor as an unconditional ally. Rather, it sees a country whose presence in Lebanese decision-making has become excessive—and one whose role now requires recalibration.
An Iranian man walks next to the stands with the flags of Iran, Hezbollah and Lebanon in a street in Tehran, Iran, October 18, 2024. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS – THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY.
For Iran as well, Lebanon is no longer merely a “resistance front,” but a test of whether it can preserve regional influence through a state-centric and diplomatic logic.
The real knot lies in the overlap of two competing logics: the logic of state-building in Beirut and the logic of regional deterrence in Tehran.
Lebanon is seeking to redefine its foreign and security policy, while Iran—under intense international pressure and security threats—must approach changes in its environment with caution and sensitivity. The current tension is less a sign of enmity than a reflection of this structural misalignment.
The decisive question is whether the two sides can arrive at a shared understanding of Iran’s role and Hezbollah’s place in post-war Lebanon without crossing each other’s red lines—or whether this interpretive gap will gradually harden into a costly political divide.
