WANA (Apr 18) – An hour ago, it was announced that the Strait of Hormuz has returned to its previous status. The spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters stated explicitly:

 

“Due to American bad faith and the continuation of maritime piracy, control of the Strait of Hormuz has returned to its previous state, and this strait is under the intense management and control of the Armed Forces.”

 

This sentence marked the end of an intensive 24-hour process—a process that began with a tweet, continued with a wave of claims, and ultimately concluded with the full reinstatement of restrictions.

 

The story began when Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, announced: “Following the declaration of a ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage of all commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz is declared completely free for the remainder of the ceasefire period.”

 

At first glance, this sentence had a clear meaning: the Strait has opened. However, what became clear later was something else entirely.

 

Official details revealed that this “reopening” was, in fact, a strictly controlled model:

  • Only commercial vessels
  • Only through the designated route
  • Only with full coordination
  • And with a total ban on military vessels

 

An Iranian military official also clarified this stance: “The transit of military vessels through the Strait of Hormuz remains prohibited.”

 

In reality, the Strait had not been opened—rather, it had been activated, and even then, under strict management and Iranian conditions.

 

The reality is that the story of the opening of the Strait of Hormuz was designed to be “conditional” from the very beginning. From the first day of the ceasefire, it was intended that the passage of ships would be carried out in a limited manner, under supervision, through specific routes, and with the payment of tolls. However, this plan had a prerequisite: the ceasefire had to be implemented on all fronts. This occurred almost everywhere—except Lebanon.

A man holds a picture of the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on a street in Tehran, Iran, April 12, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

The continuation of the conflict in Lebanon and the Israeli attacks on that country halted the entire equation, and despite the announcement of the ceasefire, the Strait did not open.

 

Behind the scenes, diplomacy moved simultaneously with the field. Consultations continued, messages were exchanged, and ultimately, the threat of military action was placed on the table. An informed Iranian military source described the situation as follows:

 

“Iran had decided to attack Israel at 8:00 PM last night (before the Lebanon ceasefire was announced) if the commitment was not fulfilled, and all preparations had been made.”

 

A few hours later, a ceasefire was announced in Lebanon. And one day later, the Strait opened.

 

This sequence is more important than any other analysis. Not merely because of the events themselves, but because of the message it conveys: the order of events was not accidental.

 

Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian, one of the members present at the ceasefire negotiations in Islamabad, explained this same logic upon announcing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz: “With the acceptance of the ceasefire in Lebanon, some commercial ships will be allowed to pass upon payment of tolls.”

 

In other words, the reopening was not a concession, but part of a phased design.

 

At this very point, Donald Trump created a different image with a series of consecutive messages:

  • “Iran has agreed that it will never close the Strait again.”
  • “Iran’s Strait is completely open.”
  • “The Strait of Hormuz is completely open and ready for full trade and passage, but the naval blockade, as far as Iran is concerned, will continue with full force until our deal with Iran is 100% complete.”
  • “The mines have been cleared by Iran, with the help of the United States.”
  • “This agreement is in no way related to Lebanon.”

 

Apparently, these claims, rather than being a coherent narrative, were an attempt to construct an “achievement” at the media level.

 

 

The problem, however, was this: this narrative neither matched the announced details nor the actual sequence of events.

 

If the Strait was “completely open,” why was passage still declared limited?

 

If the agreement was “independent,” why was it tied exactly to the Lebanon ceasefire?

 

Simultaneously, within Iran, with the announcement of the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, public opinion and the media atmosphere were shocked.

 

The initial perception of the “opening of the Strait” caused a segment of public opinion to interpret the decision as a retreat.

 

In the meantime, some narratives—relying on those same external claims—tried to solidify this image, while the actual data had not yet been fully seen.

 

In response to this atmosphere, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized: “The opening and closing of the Strait of Hormuz does not happen in cyberspace; Iran is the decider of this important matter.”

 

At the same time, military officials also emphasized the same initial framework: full control, limited passage, and the continuation of prohibitions.

 

Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf also wrote in this regard: “The field determines whether the Strait is open or closed and its regulations, not social networks.” In his message, he emphasized that in the past few hours, Trump has made seven claims in his messages, and all seven of them are lies.

 

 

But the most important part of the story unfolded where these two paths—the field and the narrative—met.

 

With the continuation of what was termed “blockade” and “maritime piracy,” which stood in contradiction to the framework of the agreement, the limited model was also no longer sustainable.

 

The result was a complete return to the previous status, and Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters announced:

 

“Until the United States ends its interference with the complete freedom of movement for vessels from origin Iran to destination and from destination to origin Iran, the status of the Strait of Hormuz will be strictly controlled and will remain in its previous state.”

 

What occurred during these 24 hours followed a clear pattern:

 

Iran opened the Strait in a limited manner based on a specific condition (the Lebanon ceasefire).

 

Trump attempted to narrate this situation as a “complete reopening.”

 

And ultimately, with the continuation of contradictory behaviors, even that limited model was halted.

 

Amidst this, one point stands out above all else: the Strait of Hormuz is no longer just a passageway—it is a tool. A tool that is in Iran’s hands and:

Opens with the “fulfillment of a condition.”

Closes with the “violation of a condition.”

Not with tweets, and not with claims.