Grossi’s Duality in the Face of Iranian Diplomacy
WANA (Oct 29) – When Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), recently warned that “if diplomacy fails, there may be a return to the use of force,” his words were not heard in Tehran as a warning — but as an admission. An admission of what had already happened: the moral collapse of an institution that was meant to be an observer, not a partner of power.
A few months earlier, the joint U.S.–Israeli attack on Iranian soil — a twelve-day war that included the bombing of Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow facilities — had already shown how thin the line between diplomacy and military action had become. At that very time, Grossi’s reports to the IAEA Board of Governors provided the pretext for launching those strikes. And now, in a defensive tone, he says: “There is no evidence of bomb-making in Iran.” A statement which, had it been made earlier, might have prevented the war.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, responded sharply to Grossi’s remarks:
“Repeating failed experiences leads only to repeated failure. Iran today is more prepared and more united than ever.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi. Social Media / WANA News Agency
This was not merely a verbal defense. It reflected part of a broader strategy that Tehran calls “diplomacy of dignity and rationality” — a balance between counterpressure and crisis management. Through diplomatic channels with Moscow and Beijing, Iran sent a joint letter to the IAEA reminding that, under Resolution 2231, the Agency no longer has the authority to report on that basis after October 18. In effect, the letter drew a new red line: the snapback mechanism is dead, even if Europe wishes to keep it alive.
Meanwhile, in a lecture at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Grossi displayed a dual face. He stated:
“Iran has not sought to build a bomb and does not intend to… but without a strict inspection regime, trust cannot return.”
These contradictory statements illustrate an Iranian proverb: “He pushes away with his hand, but pulls closer with his foot.”
Even while acknowledging the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, Grossi continued to warn about “the risk of returning to the use of force” — a phrase widely interpreted as a veiled threat. For Iranian diplomats, this inconsistency is more than a slip of the tongue: it shows that the Agency has become part of the pressure equation, not a neutral mediator.
When asked about Israel’s nuclear arsenal, Grossi replied, “The Agency has no mandate to go there.”
Iran, Russia, and China Send Joint Letter to Grossi
WANA (Oct 24) – Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs announced that the permanent representatives of Iran, Russia, and China have sent a joint letter to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi. In the letter, the three countries declared the activation of the so-called “snapback” mechanism […]
For observers in Tehran, that answer exposes the core of the problem: the global inspection system is structurally imbalanced. Israel, with over 200 nuclear warheads, remains beyond any international oversight, while non-nuclear Iran faces inspections and sanctions.
Grossi’s latest warning continues this dual pattern — using the language of diplomacy to legitimize pressure. Yet Tehran, in response, chose not to withdraw from the NPT. Even after the bombings, IAEA inspectors — albeit under restrictions — remained active in Iran. This was a deliberate choice: not retreat, but preservation of legitimacy as leverage.
The central question, however, remains: when “observers” become “actors,” can diplomacy still be trusted?
If diplomacy fails, Iran will remain a player capable of rebuilding its capacities — capacities that, in Grossi’s own words, “cannot be destroyed by bombing, because knowledge cannot be erased.”
Today’s crisis is not merely about centrifuges or technical reports; it is about the balance of power. Rising from the ashes of a twelve-day war, Iran now seeks to rewrite an equation that Grossi and Washington believed was already settled.
