WANA (Oct 19) – On the evening of Saturday, October 18, a number of international media outlets claimed that an American submarine had targeted an LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) tanker in regional waters — a vessel they described as “linked to Iran.”

 

A few hours later, the report began circulating among Persian-language media, though no official body in Iran has so far confirmed either the attack itself or the ownership of the tanker. However, a well-informed source told a domestic outlet that “based on initial tracking data and ownership records, there is no evidence indicating that this tanker belongs to the fleet of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

 

Neither Tehran nor Washington has issued an official statement on the matter. Yet, if the reported incident proves to be true, its implications could go far beyond a routine maritime episode.

 

 

In recent months, there have been growing signs that pressure on Iran’s energy exports has entered a new phase. Unlike previous years, when sanctions mainly targeted crude oil, recent reports suggest that the focus has shifted toward restricting buyers of Iran’s petrochemical and LPG products.

 

The underlying goal appears to be to isolate Iran not only militarily but also economically — particularly in the energy sector, which remains a crucial source of the country’s foreign currency income.

 

Some analysts believe that the United States is now seeking to raise the “transportation risk” for Iran’s customers, effectively discouraging energy trade originating from Iranian ports. If confirmed, this would mark a strategic shift from “financial sanctions” to “physical containment” — a development with potentially serious geopolitical consequences in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

A fire broke out on a liquefied gas carrier off the coast of Yemen. 18 Oct 2025 Social Media / WANA News Agency

A fire broke out on a liquefied gas carrier off the coast of Yemen. 18 Oct 2025 Social Media / WANA News Agency

This moment recalls a historic statement by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the late founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 20, 1987, the United States — which had already decided to protect Kuwaiti tankers in support of Saddam Hussein — announced that two Kuwaiti tankers would be escorted into the Persian Gulf by U.S. warships.

 

Iranian political and military officials asked Khomeini how to respond. His answer was sharp: “If I were in your place, the moment the first American warship entered the Persian Gulf, I would strike it with a missile so that the second one would never dare to follow.”

 

That warning was more than a military reaction — it reflected a strategic truth: every retreat ensures the permanence of foreign presence.

 

Military experts now warn that any U.S. action against vessels connected to Iran, even indirectly, could be viewed by Tehran as crossing a red line. Past experience shows that Iran has sought to maintain a “balance of response” in such situations — whether through cyber operations or indirect maritime actions.

 

 

On the ground — or rather, at sea — Iran retains several levers of influence: from the strategic Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman to indirect capabilities via its regional partners in the Red Sea. Should Washington truly have embarked on a campaign targeting Iran-linked energy shipments, Tehran may consider “symmetrical deterrence” measures in return.

 

Any confrontation along global energy routes, however, risks spiraling out of control. Unlike land conflicts, maritime incidents can quickly draw in multiple actors — from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to China, which remains a key buyer of Iranian LPG.

 

While the details of the alleged incident remain unverified, some analysts suggest that it may represent a “test of reaction” by Washington — an attempt to gauge Iran’s behavior following the reactivation of the “snapback mechanism” and mounting pressure from the IAEA Board of Governors.

 

 

If so, the recent event could be part of a broader pattern of “power signaling” in open waters — reminiscent of Israel’s 2020–2021 attacks on Iranian tankers. At that time, Iran’s indirect retaliations restored the balance, and the assaults ceased.

 

Yet this phase differs from the past in one crucial aspect: this time, the adversary is not Israel, but the United States itself — a country that, through its network of regional allies, can respond to Tehran’s actions across multiple fronts.

 

Even in the absence of official confirmation, the mere recurrence of such narratives carries a message: after five unfruitful rounds of negotiations, Iran and the United States appear once again to be entering a stage where “power” is measured not at the negotiating table, but in the skies and at sea.

 

The question remains: Can deterrence once again fill the void left by diplomacy?