WANA (Apr 25) – In the course of Iran’s negotiations with the United States, securing serious guarantees to prevent another unilateral U.S. withdrawal from any agreement is an undeniable necessity for Iran. Since it is likely that Washington will condition the implementation of the deal on congressional approval, Iran can adopt the same logic and make the implementation dependent on the approval of its own parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, thereby maintaining a deterrent in case of any potential U.S. backtracking.

 

One of the key aspects in the indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington is how the U.S. presents its demands—usually in a slow, incremental manner. Therefore, the Iranian negotiating team must remain vigilant to prevent these demands from piling up and avoid allowing the process to spiral out of control.

 

In the early stages of the talks, the U.S. tends to focus on its more basic and seemingly reasonable demands to win initial approval from the Iranian side, only to introduce more excessive demands later on. This approach requires careful step-by-step evaluation of each of Washington’s demands.

 

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA (2015 nuclear deal) underscored the need for greater caution on critical issues such as Iran’s nuclear stockpiles. In the past, discussions included removing these materials from Iran and storing them elsewhere. If such a move is to be considered again, issues such as ownership, access, and the return of invested resources must be clearly defined in advance.

 

If the Iranian negotiating team decides not to transfer nuclear stockpiles abroad, that could be seen as a positive step. However, if such a transfer becomes unavoidable, its costs and benefits must be clearly spelled out. The JCPOA had set enrichment limits at 3.67% and capped uranium reserves at 300 kilograms—figures that now need to be reassessed based on Iran’s actual fuel needs and nuclear program.

 

Another issue that surfaced during the previous agreement was access to SWIFT and the limitations surrounding it. Although formal access was granted, in practice, Iran was unable to benefit from it economically. The absence of access to financial channels like the U-turn mechanism meant Iran’s international transactions continued to face serious obstacles.

 

Therefore, if a new agreement is to be reached, Iran’s right to engage in financial transactions with non-U.S. countries must be recognized. Any economic benefit must be grounded in real, practical access to global financial networks. The U.S. tends to be especially rigid on this matter, making it a key issue that must be seriously addressed in negotiations.

The U.S. Must Offer Concrete Guarantees in Any Deal

On the matter of guarantees, the deal must be structured in a way that prevents the U.S. from easily withdrawing again. One effective approach would be to seek approval of the agreement in the U.S. Congress, making any reversal more difficult for Washington.

 

At the same time, the issue of the “snapback” mechanism should not be overlooked. Contrary to popular belief, the snapback is not solely in the hands of the U.S.; in fact, each of the three European countries—France, Germany, and the UK—can independently trigger it. This detail is often ignored in analyses, even though European countries, despite some disagreements with the U.S. (on tariffs or the war in Ukraine, for example), still retain the ability to activate the snapback mechanism.

 

If this mechanism is triggered, previous sanctions will automatically return, and other countries will find it much harder to defy them. Thus, any new agreement must include clear provisions on how to deal with such a scenario. The U.S. may try to appear uninvolved, but the snapback tool remains within the reach of its European allies.

 

As for the lifting of sanctions, the Trump era offers an important lesson: his administration didn’t impose entirely new sanctions when it exited the JCPOA—it simply stopped extending previous suspensions. This highlights the need for guarantees that go beyond the authority of any single administration. If congressional approval is not feasible, there must be some equivalent mechanism in place.

 

Since the U.S. frequently defers final decisions on such deals to Congress, Iran can apply the same approach by conditioning the deal’s implementation on approval by its own parliament. This strategy can serve as a powerful bargaining chip in securing Iran’s interests.