How Telegram Aids Street Unrest in Iran

WANA (Jan 01) – During the recent days’ gatherings in Iran, Persian-speaking Telegram users have encountered a strange phenomenon: the widespread display of advertisements in official and news channels whose content directly calls for unrest, street mobilization, and the dissemination of edited clips from protests. This development reveals complex layers of a media war.

Forced ads; Telegram Beyond Channel Managers’ Control

Many users were confused when seeing these messages in reputable Persian-language news channels. In reality, this content is injected by Telegram itself, without the consent of channel administrators.

Tasnim’s response (a conservative news agency affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) to its audience: “Recently, Telegram’s sponsored section has been publishing messages without the involvement of this media outlet that are not approved and are in complete contradiction with Tasnim News Agency’s policies.”

According to Iranian users, these ads appear via both proxies and VPNs, regardless of connection method. Analysts say the ads exploit recent labor and economic protests (currency fluctuations and rising prices) to divert people’s livelihood demands toward security-related confrontations.

From Google Ads To Telegram

This is not the first time international platforms have used their advertising infrastructure to target Iran. Investigations show that before Telegram, Google (Google Ads) had also turned into a “silent weapon” against Iran.

At sensitive moments like these, and even during the 12-day war, advertising algorithms across various applications were configured to push provocative content and instructions on confronting security forces to the top of Iranian users’ search results.

Google Ads: From Marketing Tool to Silent Weapon in Iran

WANA (Jul 13) – Amid escalating media warfare, Google Ads—once a common tool for digital marketing—has reportedly transformed into a silent weapon for espionage, recruitment, and psychological operations targeting the Iranian public, according to domestic media sources and cyber experts.   In recent days, many Iranian digital businesses have expressed concern over disruptions and restrictions […]

13 July 2025 Read More...

A system ostensibly designed for business purposes effectively served “destabilization” projects, so that any Iranian user seeking news or everyday information would unknowingly encounter content directed by foreign think tanks.

Israel’s Security Net Under The Guise Of Advertising

Beyond political advertising, evidence and statements by Iranian officials indicate that Israeli intelligence services (the Mossad) have directly used online ads to recruit spies and terrorists. According to published reports, some infiltrators and spies arrested and executed by Iranian security agencies in recent years were first recruited by clicking on a “job advertisement” or “commercial ad” by Google ads.

By precisely analyzing user data, the Mossad displays targeted ads to individuals with specific expertise and traps them. What is happening today on Telegram may be a new version of the same “digital recruitment” and “security trap,” this time appearing as street mobilization calls.

Israel Recruited Executed Spy Through Google Ads

WANA (Aug 20) – An informed source has disclosed that some of the spies arrested in Iran following the Israeli regime’s recent incursion were recruited through Google Ads campaigns.   According to the source, advertisements designed to attract spies, displayed within various applications, were delivered via the Google Ads service, with Israel directly involved in […]

20 August 2025 Read More...

The “Occupation From Within” Strategy: A Hebrew Version For Iran

Behind these ads and mobilization channels lies a clear political strategy. Hebrew-language media and analysts close to Israel’s security institutions have repeatedly stated: “Keep Iran busy from within; then deliver the military strike.”

Menashe Amir (an analyst close to the Mossad) explicitly stated on television that the expansion of street protests is a “prelude and prerequisite” for a military attack on Iran. Naftali Bennett, Israel’s former prime minister, also addressed Iranians in a video, speaking deceptively about “change.”

The reality is that for Tel Aviv, protests are not ordinary movements but a gateway to lowering the cost of foreign attack. Internal instability weakens national defense—exactly what the enemy seeks.

Tehran Faces Protests Amid Sharp Currency Volatility. Social media/ WANA News Agency

A Nanny More Caring Than A Mother

Benjamin Netanyahu has also recently made sympathetic remarks, speaking of the “talent of the Iranian people” and a “stolen future.” By comparing GDP figures, he tries to present himself as empathetic toward people’s livelihoods.

In Persian culture, there is a saying, “A nanny more caring than the mother,” referring to someone who has no emotional or blood tie to a child yet claims greater concern than the child’s own mother, somewhat similar to the proverb “To be more Catholic than the Pope.” Netanyahu’s claims fit this proverb precisely.

The evidence? A glance at his record in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria is enough. Someone who, through medical and military blockades, has caused the starvation and killing of thousands of women and children in the region cannot genuinely be concerned about the welfare and livelihoods of the Iranian people. This compassion is merely a mask for pursuing the goal of the “destruction of Iran.”

Tehran daily life on December 30, 2025

30 December 2025 Read More...

A Double-Edged Sword And A Security Loophole

Alongside this media war, Iran’s communications infrastructure faces a serious challenge. With around 80% of people using VPNs to access platforms like Telegram, a de facto security highway has been created for the infiltration of harmful content.

Sattar Hashemi, the Minister of Communications, recently warned: “Excessive use of VPNs has caused serious anti-security problems. Restrictions have become problematic for the country from a security perspective, and this claim has strong scientific and technical foundations.”

When a large share of a country’s internet traffic passes through unofficial routes (VPNs), platforms like Telegram can easily deliver targeted ads deep into users’ phones without any filtering or oversight, placing calls for “unrest” alongside everyday news.

Tehran Protests as Tehran–Tel Aviv Tensions Peak

WANA (DEC 30) – Tehran’s Grand Bazaar witnessed a protest gathering yesterday, beginning at around 11:30 a.m. near Hafez Bridge and the Alaeddin Shopping Center in central Tehran. The demonstration later spread to Chaharsou, Lalehzar, Istanbul Square, and parts of Jomhouri Street. The number of protesters is estimated at 200-300.   Protesters cited sharp fluctuations […]

30 December 2025 Read More...

Ultimately, what is happening today on Telegram is not merely a commercial activity; it is the instrumental use of a platform to implement plans that may have been designed in Tel Aviv think tanks.

Awareness of content sources (even when seen in reputable channels) and understanding the difference between “civil protest” and “foreign-directed mobilization calls” are now essential in both Iran’s virtual and real spaces.