IAEA Report and a Strategic Warning for Iran
WANA (Nov 18) – The recent report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s nuclear program—released just ten days before the Board of Governors meeting—contains repeated allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet the significance of the report lies in two key points: first, that these accusations pave the way for the adoption of a resolution against Iran in the upcoming Board session; and second, that the Iranian nuclear issue—even after the U.S. bombing of the Natanz and Isfahan facilities—remains framed as a major security threat.
The report states that Iran is the only NPT member state holding a stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, and that such material could enable Iran to build a nuclear weapon in a short period of time. It also claims that the Agency is unable to verify the presence or absence of enriched uranium. The report implicitly suggests that Iran’s 60% enriched uranium stockpile may not have been damaged during the bombings of Natanz and Isfahan, and further signals that Iran could rapidly move toward building a nuclear weapon. Earlier, Director General Grossi had also expressed concern in an interview about the deadlock in negotiations with Iran.
Arak nuclear facility after the U.S. strike. Social media/ WANA News Agency
This report must be viewed as a new turning point in Iran–West relations for several reasons:
1. Despite U.S. and Israeli claims that the “nuclear dawn” has turned into a “nuclear dusk” after the 12-day war, the new report asserts that Iran could quickly obtain a bomb, thereby keeping the “Iranian threat” alive within international security discourse.
2. The report provides the necessary basis for the adoption of an anti-Iran resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors, and it is expected that such a resolution will be issued against Iran on 21 November 2025.
3. The resolution on 21 November would serve as a prelude to referring Iran’s nuclear file to the UN Security Council in the coming months—mirroring the path taken in 2006, which resulted in six Chapter VII resolutions against Iran between 2006 and 2010. All six Chapter VII resolutions have now been reinstated through the snapback mechanism.
The New Draft Resolution Against Iran Is Repetitive and Aimed at Political Pressure
WANA (Nov 16) – The Vice President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) criticized the efforts of the European troika to pass a new resolution against Iran at the upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, calling the move “repetitive, political, and rooted in unilateralism.” Speaking to reporters on […]
4. Although a referral to the Security Council will almost certainly face a veto from Russia and China, it would nonetheless provide the United States with a pretext—through broad interpretation of the reinstated resolutions, the IAEA report, and claims of threats to international peace and security—to justify initiating military action against Iran and presenting it as legitimate to global public opinion.
5. If the Security Council referral is not accompanied by U.S. military action, it will nonetheless significantly increase the political and economic costs for countries friendly to Iran.
6. Israel’s attack on Iran on 13 June 2025 occurred only days after the IAEA report raised these same allegations. Therefore, the Board of Governors resolution on 21 November—even before any referral to the Security Council—could provide justification for U.S. or Israeli military action against Iran.
People attend an anti-Israeli protest following the Israeli strikes on Iran, in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
7. The current discourse of Israeli leaders clearly indicates the following:
- They consider Iran weakened after the 12-day war;
- They believe leaving Iran unchecked would allow the resistance axis to regain strength;
- They see a new military strike on Iran as a “final blow”;
- They view “zero threat” from Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis as dependent on “zero threat” from Iran;
- And they believe achieving “zero threat” from Iran requires political regime change in Iran.
8. The rhetoric of Trump administration officials also reflects a belief that Iran has emerged significantly weakened after the war, and that Tehran seeks merely to buy time to increase its resilience over the next three years, hoping to outlast Trump’s term without entering a new war with Israel and the U.S.
Based on this assessment, the Trump administration appears to have concluded that Iran must not be given time and is now weighing two options: either a U.S.-favored agreement or a renewed war.
Consequences of the IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolution Against Iran
WANA (Nov 17) – As three European countries and the United States push for the adoption of an anti-Iran resolution at this week’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting, Iran has warned that such a move would prompt a reassessment of its policies regarding both the agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty […]
9. Iran’s nuclear ambiguity strategy, which was in place before the 12-day war, continues afterward as well. Under current conditions, this ambiguity could unintentionally accelerate the path to war, effectively aligning—though unwillingly—with U.S. and Israeli objectives.
10. It appears that the Islamic Republic must treat the new IAEA report as the beginning of a major military and political threat, requiring a fundamental reassessment of its nuclear ambiguity doctrine.
