WANA (Oct 24) – Lebanese sources have reported a series of Israeli airstrikes on eastern Lebanon, targeting multiple sites near the towns of Shmesthar and Nabi Sheet in the Beqaa province. Meanwhile, Israel’s Army Radio claimed that the Israeli military struck “Hezbollah-affiliated targets in the Beqaa Valley,” while Israel Hayom wrote that the purpose of the strikes was “to destroy a Hezbollah facility producing precision-guided missiles.”

 

According to Israel’s Channel 12, five Israeli fighter jets participated in the operation, hitting 16 military targets across the Beqaa and northern Lebanon. Lebanon’s Ministry of Health confirmed the deaths of two civilians and several injuries, while local sources warned the toll could rise.

 

These attacks mark the latest escalation in a chain of tensions that have turned the post-ceasefire calm in Gaza into a silence before the storm. Reports from Sky News Arabia and Kan News suggest that Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm, coupled with Israel’s dissatisfaction with the Lebanese government, has raised the likelihood of a broader confrontation to its highest level in years.

In this atmosphere, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told Al Mayadeen TV: “Diplomatic efforts with Israel have proven fruitless, and Tel Aviv’s injustices continue. The resistance plays a decisive role in preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, and we remain committed to developing respectful relations with Iran and the Arab world.”

 

This statement reflects a delicate balancing act in a multi-layered equation: a country oscillating between Washington’s pressure, Tel Aviv’s threats, and Hezbollah’s deep influence. Under such conditions, Beirut’s relationship with Tehran is less an ideological choice than a mechanism of survival.

 

In Tehran, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei described Israel’s latest strikes as “a terrorist crime,” warning that: “The impunity of the Zionist regime, empowered by full U.S. support, has led to repeated violations of the ceasefire and now poses a serious threat to regional security.”

 

 

Yet beyond these official responses lies Tehran’s deeper concern: the gradual shift in the deterrence map along its northern frontier. With Hezbollah weakened by the previous war and its recovery progressing slowly, every blow to Lebanon is seen in Tehran as damage to its “first defensive layer.” From Iran’s perspective, Hezbollah is not merely an ally — it is an extension of its national security architecture, whose collapse would open the gate to direct pressure on Iran itself.

 

Viewed through that lens, Israel’s escalation in Lebanon — coinciding with the deadlock in nuclear talks and Europe’s activation of the “snapback mechanism” — appears anything but coincidental. To Tehran, it is a coordinated, multi-front pressure campaign: one that casts Europe as a “reasonable mediator” while allowing Washington to squeeze Iran indirectly through Lebanon, without waging open war.

 

Nevertheless, Tehran has refrained from emotional responses. Its endorsement of the Gaza ceasefire proposal and calls for Israel’s international prosecution have been interpreted in Washington as signs of “calculated flexibility.” It was in this context that Donald Trump remarked: “I’ve received reports that Iran is seeking to build a nuclear weapon, but I know they don’t have the capability right now.”

 

 

On the surface, that sounded like a warning; beneath it, it reflected Washington’s recalibrated understanding of Iran’s behavior — acknowledging its deterrent threshold without crossing it. U.S. strategists know that a full-scale attack on Hezbollah could draw Iran directly into the battlefield — and Tehran wants precisely that perception to hold.

 

As international relations scholar Saber Golanbari observes, “Despite its tactical gains, Israel has failed to achieve a decisive strategic victory. The survival of Hamas and Hezbollah, alongside the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program, keeps the Middle East in a state of ambiguity and suspended tension that could erupt into a new conflict at any moment.”

 

 

From Tehran’s viewpoint, this ambiguity — while risky — also offers an opportunity: a chance to redefine Iran’s role in the regional security equation. The Islamic Republic is now positioning itself not merely as a sponsor of resistance, but as an actor capable of shifting the trajectory of war or peace across multiple fronts simultaneously.

 

Ultimately, Iran’s deterrence today is defined not only by its missiles and drones, but by the enemy’s perception of the cost of war.

 

Yet the key question remains:

If Tel Aviv decides to expand the war in Lebanon, will Iran continue its policy of “patient deterrence” — or, this time, will it step beyond observation and enter the stage itself?