WANA (Nov 21) – Iran’s view of Saudi Arabia is that of an older, wiser brother toward a younger and gullible one — a brother who is easily deceived by outsiders and squanders all his resources in exchange for their empty promises.

 

Iran’s policies over the past decades aimed at distancing this younger brother from the United States, the West, and especially Israel have not been particularly successful. Although Saudi Arabia has now partially accepted that long-term engagement with Iran will bring it more benefits than confrontation, it still believes that, due to its vulnerability in the face of Iran’s regional policies, it must keep the United States on its side.

 

The mid-November 2025 visit of Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, to the United States coincided with the escalation of allegations involving Donald Trump and his ties to a man named Epstein, an agent of the Mossad (Israel’s intelligence service) tasked with compromising American officials. The high-profile trip by bin Salman served as a helping hand to Trump to ease the pressure caused by the Epstein scandal.

 

Some analysts believe that Trump’s obedience to Netanyahu is largely linked to classified information about Trump’s own misconduct — material that had reportedly been transferred to Mossad through Epstein.

 

In addition to the Epstein file, Trump also needed this spectacle to distract from the failure of his tariff-based trade policies with other countries. By once again announcing that Saudi Arabia was preparing to invest hundreds of billions of dollars across various sectors in the United States, Trump sought to silence domestic critics of his economic agenda.

 

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Economy announced last month that the country faces a budget deficit of around $65 billion this year. The main question is this: How can a country with a $65 billion deficit carry out $1 trillion in foreign investment? Does Mohammed bin Salman have separate undisclosed funds at his disposal?

 

Saudi Arabia’s population is one-third that of Iran’s. Its oil sales are at least five times greater than Iran’s, and it has additional sources of revenue — yet it is unable to manage its budget properly. We are not talking about a deficit of one or two billion dollars, but a $65 billion shortfall. Can Saudi Arabia realistically invest abroad while struggling with such a massive deficit at home? What truth is being concealed behind the spectacle staged at the White House?

 

Trump’s insistence on holding this meeting — one that many analysts described as almost comic — was driven by a desire to extract Saudi wealth in any amount and by any means possible. What mattered to Trump, both during his visit to Saudi Arabia and throughout bin Salman’s trip to Washington, was rescuing America’s weakened economy with the money of a nation that has for years been labeled the “Cash Cow” or “Money Tree.”

 

Foad Izadi, a senior foreign policy expert and university professor in Iran, described bin Salman’s recent visit to the United States as one intended to humiliate both Saudi Arabia and the crown prince personally. He asks: “Why is it that when the question arises about which country plays the role of America’s ‘cash cow,’ most of the world immediately thinks of Saudi Arabia and some other Arab states?”

 

Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has never been defined in opposition to Israel’s regional agenda; rather, it has consistently served as a complementary pillar of Israel’s strategy in West Asia.

 

Saudi Arabia neither has the courage to confront Israel, nor does the United States — given its deep influence within the Saudi ruling establishment — allow it to do so.

 

Saudi purchases of American military equipment have not guaranteed the kingdom’s security. If U.S. defensive systems ensured protection for Arab states, Israel would not have been able to attack Qatar without facing consequences.

 

Israel’s overwhelming military superiority over Arab countries demonstrates that massive weapons purchases from the U.S. and the West do not translate into real security. Nevertheless, Iran’s Supreme Leader sees these purchases as beneficial for another time: “I know that these weapons (purchased by Saudi Arabia) will, God-willing, fall into the hands of the Islamic mujahideen in the not-too-distant future,” Ayatollah Khamenei said.

 

During bin Salman’s meeting with Trump, the U.S. president attempted — at least publicly, in front of reporters — to claim that he would balance American military interactions with Israel and Saudi Arabia. But shortly thereafter, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio announced that the United States would maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in the Middle East.

 

Undoubtedly, bin Salman’s trip to the United States will not be without some achievements, but the balance of gains weighs far more heavily in favor of the Americans. Pulling Saudi Arabia further away from Russia, China, and Iran, as well as publicizing the kingdom’s ties with Israel, are among the major outcomes that Tel Aviv secured in the Oval Office through Trump’s mediation.

 

Summary of the assessment of MBS’s trip to the United States:

  • Bin Salman committed to starting normalization talks with Israel in exchange for receiving F-35 jets.

 

  • The United States designated Saudi Arabia as its primary non-NATO ally.

 

  • Saudi Arabia signed a comprehensive security agreement with the United States that includes cooperation on Lebanon.

 

  • Saudi Arabia views the UAE as its most significant rival in behind-the-scenes dealings with Washington.