Will Israel Attack Turkey? Analysis of war scenarios
WANA (Sep 16) – Following Israel’s airstrike on Doha, Qatar, and growing concerns about the widening scope of the crisis, regional analysts have shifted their attention to Turkey. Could Ankara become the next destination of Israeli adventurism, or will geopolitical and economic constraints prevent such a scenario?
After Israel’s airstrike on Doha—intended to eliminate Hamas leaders—some regional media outlets and analysts began raising the possibility of an attack on Turkey. This line of thought argues that Israel has crossed all red lines over the past two years in its confrontation with both the Palestinians and regional states. On one front, it seeks the complete occupation of Gaza through what critics describe as genocide; on another, it has struck countries that support the Palestinian resistance—including Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and now Qatar—in an attempt to crush the movement once and for all.
From this perspective, after Iran and Qatar, Turkey could be next. The reasoning is that these three countries play complementary roles in supporting Hamas: Iran provides arms and logistics, Qatar offers financial backing, and Turkey extends political support on the international stage. Now that two Hamas hosts have been targeted, the third may also come under pressure, leaving Hamas leaders with no safe haven and forcing them to concede to Israel’s demands.
An image of the blast site in Qatar. Social media / WANA News Agency
Is Turkey Concerned About an Israeli Attack?
Within Turkey, some analysts and media outlets have expressed concern over the possibility of an Israeli strike. In May 2024, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, speaking in parliament in support of Hamas, warned: “Israel is an evil state. If this terrorist state is not stopped, sooner or later, under the illusion of the Promised Land, it will set its sights on Anatolia as well. Hamas in Gaza stands on the front line of Anatolia.”
Such rhetoric has recently gained traction in Turkish media circles. In this context, Ömer Çelik, spokesperson for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), declared: “Turkey is an independent and powerful country. Throughout history, those who have threatened us have always received their response. Threats mean nothing to us. The Republic of Turkey is not an enemy of any country. We have the capacity and resources to deliver any necessary response to those who display hostility toward Turkey.”
Nevertheless, despite the political tensions, Ankara’s suspension of direct trade with Tel Aviv, and the unprecedented deterioration in relations, the author argues that direct conflict between the two sides is unlikely under current circumstances. Both Ankara and Tel Aviv face constraints that act as deterrents.
Meeting between Erdoğan and Benjamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, 19 September 2023. Social media / WANA News Agency
Israel’s Constraints
From Israel’s perspective, Turkey differs significantly from Qatar and Iran:
Over 40% of Israel’s oil imports arrive via Turkey. This crude originates in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, is shipped through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline to Turkish ports, and from there transported by sea to Israel. In the past, some smuggled oil from Iraq’s Kurdistan region also reached Israel through Turkish companies. Any direct conflict would allow Turkey to disrupt these supplies at great cost to Israel.
Although Turkey has cut direct trade with Israel, transactions continue indirectly through third countries such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Bulgaria. Much of this trade involves food and steel—commodities that would be difficult for Israel to replace quickly.
Turkey’s military power far exceeds that of Qatar, raising the risks of escalation for Israel.
The two countries have maintained a security memorandum since the 1960s and, until the October 7 war, had been gradually strengthening strategic ties. It is widely expected that relations could normalize again after the war, particularly if Israel undergoes a leadership change.
Unlike Qatar, Turkey is a NATO member. Under the alliance’s charter, an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. This gives Ankara a stronger deterrent position. The precedent of Turkey downing a Russian bomber in 2015 illustrates its willingness to act under NATO cover.
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Turkey’s Constraints
On the other hand, Turkey has never launched a military campaign in its republican history without either an alliance or tacit approval from Western powers. The 1974 Cyprus war was conducted under a treaty with Britain and Greece; incursions into northern Iraq were carried out under a security agreement with Saddam Hussein against the PKK and later expanded; and the offensives in northern Syria were coordinated with both Russia and the U.S., taking advantage of Damascus’s weakened control. An attack on Israel fits none of these precedents.
Despite strong anti-Israeli sentiment in Turkish society, Ankara’s leaders have little appetite for war, given the heavy political and economic costs. The Israeli lobby in the U.S. is powerful, and Turkey has no desire to openly confront it. Israel is widely regarded as the West’s outpost in the Middle East, and Erdoğan’s Turkey does not seek a deep rupture with the West. Moreover, Turkey’s economy remains fragile, and war could push it into deeper crisis. With the possibility of early elections before 2028, Erdoğan cannot risk worsening public dissatisfaction and jeopardizing his political survival.
To reduce the likelihood of Israeli attacks, Ankara may restrict the presence or activity of Hamas leaders on Turkish soil—much as it once did with Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figures. Such measures could deprive Tel Aviv of a pretext.
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The evidence suggests that while Israel has emerged as a threat to nearly every country in the region, the likelihood of a direct strike on Turkey—despite Ankara’s political support for Hamas and anti-Israeli rhetoric—is lower than against Iran or even Qatar.
Field and political data indicate that although Turkey is exposed to Israeli verbal and psychological threats because of its political and international backing of Hamas, multiple constraints make the prospect of open confrontation highly unlikely in the short term.
On one side, Israel’s dependence on Turkish oil routes, the volume of indirect trade, and past security cooperation act as strong deterrents. On the other, Turkey’s NATO membership and regional influence make any potential attack prohibitively costly.
Conversely, Turkey’s own economic vulnerabilities, fear of the U.S. pro-Israel lobby, and domestic political calculations prevent Ankara from pursuing open conflict. Instead, Turkey is more likely to pursue a strategy of threat management rather than escalation.
In sum, while rhetoric in the media and political discourse remains heated, an Israeli military strike on Turkey appears highly improbable under current conditions, serving more as a tool of psychological pressure and deterrence. However, sabotage operations or interference in Turkey’s internal affairs by Israel cannot be entirely ruled out.
