Is Washington Replaying the Iraq Playbook Against Iran?
WANA (Jan 29) – Among political analysts, this question has always been raised as to which model the United States follows in confronting Iran: the model of the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya?
The reality is that although there are general similarities among these experiences, what makes the current situation more complex is the nature of the ongoing hybrid war, a war designed not on the basis of a pre-fabricated template, but rather around Iran’s specific vulnerabilities. In other words, this model is less transferable to other countries and is instead calibrated to Iran’s particular social, political, and economic characteristics.
Nevertheless, it appears that at the present juncture, the dominant view in the calculations of some decision-making circles in the West is closer to the Iraq model.
Trump to Iran: Massive U.S. Armada Nears, ‘Time Is Running Out’
WANA (Jan 28) – The U.S. president, Donald Trump, has once again threatened Iran and has called on Iran to come back to the negotiation table. In a post on his Social media platform, Truth Social, he wrote: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran. It is moving quickly, with great power, enthusiasm, and […]
Within this framework, it is assessed that developments in the year 2025 against actors aligned with Iran in the region, and ultimately the military attack by Israel and the United States on Iran and the 12-day war in June 2025, served a function similar to that of the First Persian Gulf War; a war that, after the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, led to the imposition of a wide range of economic, political, and security pressures on Baghdad.
In the Iraqi experience, these pressures gradually eroded the country’s economy and ultimately led to a mechanism such as “Oil for Food”; a path in which Saddam Hussein’s government was compelled to relinquish part of its military capability, including missile capacities.
In the current situation, following the 12-day war against Iran in June 2025, signs have emerged of efforts to intensify Iran’s comprehensive attrition, ranging from heightened economic and social pressures to attempts to incite internal unrest and the maintenance of a controlled level of military threat.
What Is Trump’s Objective Behind Deploying Forces to the Region?
WANA (Jan 24) – Even as the U.S. president speaks of Washington’s readiness to engage in talks with Tehran, he has announced the deployment of a large naval force to the Middle East, while simultaneously placing secondary sanctions and threats against Iran’s trading partners back on the table. Trump has been explicit: “We’re sending […]
At the same time, proposals centred on restricting or dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as reducing its regional role, continue to remain on the table as a political option. However, equating Iran with Ba’athist Iraq overlooks the fundamental differences between the two experiences.
First, from the perspective of political structure, there are significant distinctions between the two systems. The Islamic Republic of Iran possesses a hybrid structure that combines elected and unelected institutions; a system that, in terms of political participation, power mechanisms, and domestic legitimacy, differs substantially from Saddam Hussein’s centralized authoritarian regime.
Second, in the First Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi army suffered a severe and one-sided blow and lost a significant portion of its military capabilities, while the opposing coalition effectively paid no serious strategic cost. However, in the 12-day war of June 2025, despite the infliction of considerable damage on Iran, the opposing side was not without cost.
Aside from developments related to the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, none of the main components of the network of forces aligned with Iran, nor Iran’s armed forces, experienced complete collapse. Even after repairing the damage and re-adjusting their field deployment, they returned to a level of operational stability.
Third, efforts to cut off the lifelines of Iran’s economy and create livelihood pressure with the aim of pushing the country toward a situation similar to “Oil for Food” have already been tested. The experience of economic pressures and unrest in 2019 demonstrated that this path does not necessarily lead to the outcome expected by its designers.
Moreover, Iran’s economic capacities—in terms of diversification, infrastructure, and crisis-management experience—are not comparable to the heavily oil-dependent Iraqi economy of the 1990s; a fact that became evident during periods such as the COVID-19 pandemic or in the course of the 12-day war.
Fourth, some analyses suggest that the architects of pressure seek to turn recent terrorist incidents in Iran into a context similar to Iraq’s post-1991 Persian Gulf War developments; a period in which internal uprisings, particularly in Shiite-populated areas, led to the erosion of social capital and the international standing of Iraq’s government at the time, and were later used as one of the grounds for renewed foreign intervention.
However, the experience of recent years has shown that Western intelligence agencies’ assessments of Iranian society’s reactions have repeatedly been accompanied by errors and miscalculations.
Gaddafi: A Gullible Leader Turned Victim
WANA (Feb 18) – On January 30, 2025, Iran’s Supreme Leader addressed the Air Force commanders, warning about the “bitter experience of trusting America.” This phrase quickly went viral among Iranians on social media. In response, the WANA News Agency is launching a series of articles highlighting other nations’ bitter experiences with trusting the […]
Fifth, in Iran’s current power configuration, the assumption of the voluntary surrender of strategic instruments of power or internal disarmament resembles a politically optimistic assumption rather than a practical scenario.
Sixth, the time gap between the First and Second Persian Gulf Wars was more than a decade, a period that made it possible to sustain pressure, achieve gradual attrition, and prepare global public opinion.
Under current conditions, given the intense geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalries at the global level, it appears that such a broad time window is not available to the United States and its allies; a point that is also confirmed by the speed and instability of some recent actions.
Finally, the experience of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow shows that developments in Iraq were the result of a combination of complex intelligence planning, specific internal conditions, and that country’s unique regional environment.
Repeating the same model against an actor that is aware of the logic of this scenario and has itself undergone a prolonged experience of confronting similar pressures will not necessarily lead to the same outcome.
