Islamabad’s MOU Enforcement Challenge in the Face of Israel
WANA (Jun 20) – Article 1 (Iran- U.S. MoU) discusses the end of the war. The text has properly considered this and emphasized the following points: that military operations must cease; it has factored in the distinction between military operations and war.
It has emphasized the halting of any war or military operation, and it has also insisted upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. Furthermore, the permanent end of the war has been emphasized in the final agreement.
However, what needs to be pointed out here is the issue of implementing this clause, or, in other words, ensuring the implementation of this clause. This issue is highly complex and intricate.
The reason for this is that this article involves not only the United States itself—which is not trustworthy and does not fulfill its commitments—but also the Israeli regime, whose situation is far worse than that of the United States.
Seven Key Messages from Iran’s Supreme Leader’s Remarks on the MoU with the U.S.
WANA (Jun 19) – A few hours after the signing of a 14-point memorandum of understanding between the presidents of Iran and the United States, Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, responded to the development in a message addressed to the Iranian nation. In his statement, while […]
Experience has also shown Iran that this regime does not adhere to any constraints or commitments. During sixty days of negotiations and Iran’s ceasefire, we witnessed that the Israeli regime considered itself exempt from this matter and carried out continuous attacks against Lebanon. It launched a major attack on day one and continued targeting southern Lebanon.
On April 8, Iran insisted on a political agreement, meaning it did not conduct field operations. Just as on April 8, Khatibzadeh, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that the mediator requested us not to do this, Iran saw that the Israeli regime did not stop, showed no adherence to our interpretation of the ceasefire, and did not view itself within this framework.
The United States did nothing specific in this matter either. The attacks on Beirut stopped, but in southern Lebanon, serious attacks continued.
If this behavior continues, which I believe it will due to its repetition, Iran’s transparent behavior and approach to politics, negotiation, and diplomacy suggest that the Israeli regime, with US cooperation and green light, will likely violate this clause.
Now, the important question is: as Islamic Iran, knowing that the guarantee of implementation lies in its own capability and power and that the United States and the Israeli regime cannot be trusted, what behavior are we going to adopt against the violation of this clause?
Any Violation of Commitments Will Be the Responsibility of the United States
WANA (Jun 19) – Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi held a telephone conversation on Friday with Mohammad Ishaq Dar to discuss the latest developments in the ongoing diplomatic process, as well as a number of bilateral issues. During the call, Araghchi expressed appreciation for Pakistan’s efforts, initiatives, and constructive role in advancing diplomatic […]
This is an important question. If the behavioral pattern implemented from April 8 until now is to continue, it means that the Israeli regime will continuously violate this clause, and we will approach this matter with extreme caution; out of three violations of the red line, Iran only responded to one, and we will follow this same pattern in the future. This is a serious concern.
This clause is appropriate textually but faces implementation challenges, with the guarantee of execution crucial. In my opinion, given our experience, Iran may face a “tension trap,” where violating this clause could force Iran into a dilemma debated within Iran: enter the tension trap or not.
Not entering could mean further damage to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the people of southern Lebanon—especially the Shiites of southern Lebanon. Given the existing track record, this concern is a real one.
I hope that the guarantee for implementing this clause will be Iran’s armed forces, in the sense that fingers remain active on the trigger, and there is full readiness to respond to even a single instance of this clause being violated by the Israeli regime. Which means they should respond automatically, without the need for decision-making at the political level.
A formula must be determined right now, and Iran’s armed forces must act based on that formula: if a violation occurs, a response must be given in a balanced manner, so that equilibrium—and in a sense, the equation that is ostensibly spoken of in this text—prevails. This is a major challenge in this clause, which is extra-textual and heavily dependent on the execution of the text.
People hold Hezbollah flags during a rally in Tehran, Iran, June 1, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
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Despite a ceasefire on Friday afternoon, Israeli airstrikes and shelling continued across southern Lebanon. It is reported that Israeli artillery targeted Kfar Remen, an airstrike on Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa, and bombardment of Kfar Jouz.
Israeli attacks persist even as authorities acknowledge the ceasefire. An official told Channel 13: “We are currently in a state of ceasefire; if Hezbollah does not attack us, we do not consider it a state of war.”
Before the ceasefire, Netanyahu’s orders led to over 150 bombing targets in southern Lebanon between Friday morning and the truce, killing at least 18 Lebanese.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian digitally signed the memorandum of understanding (MoU) ending the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States in the early hours of Thursday, June 18, 2026. The agreement entered into force simultaneously with the signature of U.S. President Donald Trump.
