Latest Status of the Snapback and Negotiations
WANA (Sep 21) – The “snapback” file has entered a new stage—one marked by threats and warnings on the one hand, and partial diplomatic exchanges and negotiations on the other—creating one of the most tense atmospheres yet for the future of the JCPOA and Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The diplomatic landscape suggests that both sides are moving on slippery ground, where any hasty decision could lead to more serious confrontations.
1. Continuation of Negotiations in New York
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, accompanied by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, is scheduled to leave for New York on Tuesday. The Supreme National Security Council of Iran has decided that talks on the snapback issue should continue in New York.
Some reports indicate that Araghchi may hold a meeting with Witkoff, and that Iran has presented a proposal to the Americans for postponing the implementation of the snapback. The outcome of this initiative will depend on Washington’s response.
Pezeshkian to Address UN General Assembly on Wednesday
WANA (Sep 21) – Iran’s President will travel to New York on Tuesday after attending the opening ceremony of the new school year in Tehran, senior political adviser Mahdi Sanai announced on the social media platform X. According to Sanai, the President is scheduled to deliver a speech at the United Nations General Assembly […]
2. Warning on Cutting Cooperation with the IAEA
At the same time, the recent move by the three European countries at the UN Security Council to reinstate sanctions against Iran has provoked anger within Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
Having earlier sought to repair ties with the IAEA by signing a new memorandum of understanding in Cairo, Iran has now warned that activation of the snapback would mean the end of its cooperation with the Agency.
This position followed the failure on September 19 of a resolution to extend the suspension of six Security Council resolutions against Iran—a process initiated by the Europeans’ letter of August 28.
Finalization of Iran-IAEA Understanding. Social media / WANA News Agency
3. U.S. Messages and Iran’s Distrust
Meanwhile, the United States has also sent messages to Tehran. However, Iran’s experience of U.S.-Israeli cooperation during the 12-day war—at a time when indirect talks with Washington were taking place—has left Tehran unwilling to place trust in a new negotiating path.
In response to Western media reports alleging direct contact between him and Witkoff, Araghchi stressed: “No direct contact or conversation has taken place between Iran and the United States.”
He explained that only when necessary, messages are exchanged between the two sides, either directly or through intermediaries, adding that the recent report of a direct conversation was “false.”
This deep trust deficit is seen as the main obstacle to any resumption of diplomacy.
Iran’s FM Denies Direct Talks with Witkoff
WANA (Sep 20) – Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi has dismissed reports by some Western media claiming that he held direct talks with Steve Witkoff, the U.S. President’s special envoy. In an interview with a domestic news agency, Araghchi stated: “No direct contact or conversation has taken place between Iran and the United […]
4. Iran’s Possible Responses, Including Withdrawal from the NPT
In recent months, Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that Iran has prepared strong responses should the snapback be finalized, including withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In this regard, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson has pointed out that if Parliament votes for withdrawal, the government would have no legal authority to prevent it.
Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, also described withdrawal from the NPT as Iran’s “minimum and first option” in response to the reimposition of UN sanctions.
Thus, the option of leaving the NPT is explicitly on the table, even though its implementation could carry heavy consequences for Iran internationally—from deeper isolation to the likelihood of harsher sanctions.
As it stands, the four main axes—continuation of negotiations in New York, the warning on ending cooperation with the IAEA, the exchange of U.S. messages amid Iranian distrust, and Tehran’s hardline options—together illustrate that the snapback crisis is at a critical juncture.
The future of this issue depends directly on whether the parties can build some level of mutual trust, or whether the course will move toward a scenario of full sanctions reimposition and Iran’s potential withdrawal from international frameworks.
