WANA (Jul 16) – In recent days, numerous reports have surfaced in the media about the possible activation of the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism. From the standpoint of international law, the snapback mechanism in the nuclear deal (JCPOA) is a highly unusual tool. Although Iran’s former foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, initially denied the existence of such a mechanism, it is now widely acknowledged. Iran’s current foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has even equated the activation of this mechanism with a military strike.

 

If the snapback is triggered and no resolution is passed to stop it, the provisions of prior UN Security Council resolutions against Iran will automatically be reinstated. One of the main concerns within Iran is the potential economic fallout and how to manage it. A closer look at the content of those earlier sanctions shows they mainly targeted individuals and entities tied to Iran’s military and nuclear programs, and did not directly affect sectors like oil investment, crude exports, banking relations, or the Central Bank.

 

A review of the sanctioned entities listed in Resolutions 1737 (2006) through 1929 (2010) reveals that oil sales, related activities, or broad banking ties were not central elements of those sanctions. In other words, the scope of Security Council sanctions was significantly narrower than the current unilateral U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran. This distinction has also been acknowledged recently by Richard Nephew.

 

Snapback Mechanism

Snapback Mechanism: A Comprehensive Overview

WANA (Jan 14) – October 2025 marks a crucial milestone in global diplomatic equations, as UN Resolution 2231 expires and all related sanctions on Iran are officially lifted. However, the European members of the JCPOA—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—have already escalated tensions by threatening to activate the “Snapback” mechanism.   During a Security Council […]

Read More...

 

Given the more targeted nature of the UN sanctions, their reimposition would not necessarily increase the perceived risk of economic engagement with Iran in any significant way. In practical terms, this means Iran’s foreign economic relations are unlikely to undergo a major shift. However, some argue that even if the direct economic impact is limited, the psychological atmosphere could stir inflationary expectations. This phenomenon was evident when U.S. sanctions returned under Donald Trump—despite the overestimated practical impact, the psychological climate caused currency market volatility.

 

An analysis of the situation suggests that much of the negative psychological impact stemmed from domestic exaggeration. In particular, JCPOA supporters inside Iran often overstated the importance of the UN resolutions to bolster the perceived value of the agreement, claiming that the snapback would severely reduce oil exports. These assertions—including some by Zarif on state TV—were misleading, but due to public trust in these figures, they had real influence.

 

According to the author, this situation is manageable. With proper planning, the psychological atmosphere can be controlled. The Central Bank and Ministry of Economic Affairs are expected to play a central role in this effort.

Nuclear deal negotiators pose for a photo at the UN building in Vienna, Austria.

As a first step, Iran’s Central Bank can provide expert analysis to clarify the actual scope of the snapback sanctions for decision-makers and economic stakeholders. Raising awareness about the relatively limited impact of UN sanctions—especially in comparison to existing U.S. measures—is essential, even if it means confronting domestic political factions that benefit from exaggerating the threat.

 

Furthermore, the Central Bank can mitigate psychological effects through targeted foreign exchange interventions. Since the reimposition of the UN resolutions will not directly affect Iran’s primary sources of foreign currency—especially oil exports—the Bank can use minimal policy tools to prevent a surge in exchange rates.

 

In conclusion, it can be argued that if the Iranian government has the will and a coherent strategy, it can manage the potential fallout from the snapback mechanism and prevent it from becoming another tool of pressure against the Iranian people.