WANA (May 02) – Over the past two years, Netanyahu has consistently threatened Iran, but his recent remarks about the “total destruction” of Iran’s nuclear facilities and uranium enrichment centers were more direct than ever—arguably unprecedented.

 

These threats came just a day after the explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas, Iran, which makes them all the more noteworthy. However, to fully understand Netanyahu’s statements, it’s essential to consider the contexts behind them.

 

These threats can be analyzed within two main frameworks: internal Israeli politics and the ongoing Iran-U.S. negotiations. Regarding the first, it appears that the Iran-U.S. talks have increasingly become part of Israel’s domestic political battleground.

 

Since the start of the negotiations, Netanyahu has been under fierce criticism from his opponents, who often mock him and portray the Trump-era diplomacy between Iran and the U.S. as a failure of his policies.

Recently, opposition leader Yair Lapid called Netanyahu a “coward” and accused him of blocking his own plan last October to strike Iran’s oil facilities. Lapid has also called for the declaration of five conditions for handling Iran’s nuclear file.

 

Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett—currently seen as having a better chance than Netanyahu in upcoming elections—criticized Netanyahu’s Iran strategy as “empty slogans” and reminded him of Menachem Begin’s doctrine: attack and destroy the nuclear programs of enemies.

 

As the negotiations progressed, so did the intensity of criticism, to which Netanyahu responded in three key ways. First, by “leaking” information to American media suggesting he had a plan to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, but Trump had blocked it. This leak served both domestic purposes and strategic signaling in the negotiations, implying Netanyahu was serious about destroying Iran’s nuclear program, and the lack of action was due to Trump’s opposition.

 

The second response came via an official statement from Netanyahu’s office, reaffirming his commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb. The statement claimed that Netanyahu had led many overt and covert operations against Iran’s nuclear program, which had set it back nearly a decade.

 

The third tactic—his recent unprecedented threats—was likely aimed at reinforcing the perception of his seriousness in dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions amidst growing domestic pressure.

 

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Beyond Israeli political dynamics, these threats can’t be separated from the context of Iran-U.S. negotiations. Two possible scenarios explain Netanyahu’s position:

 

1. He may be trying to pressure Trump into sticking to Israel’s key demand in the talks: the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program.

 

2. Alternatively, it may be part of a coordinated “good cop, bad cop” strategy between Netanyahu and Trump. In this scenario, Netanyahu plays the irrational aggressor, which Trump can then leverage to pressure Iran in negotiations—sending a message that if Iran doesn’t comply, Israel might be given the green light to strike.

 

However, given Netanyahu’s current political situation and his fear of Trump’s retaliation, it’s unlikely he would deliberately provoke Trump. So, it seems these threats are more part of a coordinated tactic than pressure on Trump. Netanyahu knows that any strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities without U.S. support and coordination is not realistically feasible—and Trump knows that too. Thus, threatening to destroy Iran’s facilities doesn’t necessarily pressure Trump.

 

Netanyahu’s goal seems more about dragging the U.S. into any potential confrontation with Iran than initiating an Israeli strike alone. Israel’s internal political situation is currently more favorable for such an operation. Unlike the Gaza conflict—where Netanyahu faces opposition demanding an end in exchange for the release of hostages—an attack on Iran has broader domestic consensus, with even more hardline stances from Netanyahu’s rivals.

 

In short, while Netanyahu’s threats must be taken seriously as if an attack could happen tomorrow, Israel’s likely strategy remains focused on sabotage operations alongside ongoing negotiations.