WANA (Jun 08) – While nearly 70% of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) resources and budget in 2024 have been concentrated on Iran, the Agency’s recent claim that it cannot verify Iran’s nuclear activities raises serious questions about its credibility and intent.

 

In its latest comprehensive report on Iran, the IAEA alleges that Iran has undermined its ability to conduct effective and efficient safeguards by revoking the designations of experienced inspectors in recent years. However, data shows that as of December 31, 2024, a total of 274 inspectors were employed in operational divisions and the verification office for Iran—125 of whom were specifically stationed in Iran’s Verification Office.

 

Iran’s decision to revoke the designation of certain inspectors last year was a sovereign act in response to a resolution passed by the U.S. and three European states at the IAEA Board of Governors. It cannot be equated with a reduction in the Agency’s capacity or ability to verify Iran’s nuclear facilities. The sheer number and quality of inspectors in Iran make the IAEA’s recent assertion of “inability to verify” completely unfounded and politically motivated.

According to an explanatory note released by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) on the IAEA’s latest safeguards report, Iran is one of only 35 countries implementing the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) without the Additional Protocol. Among the world’s 100 nuclear facilities, only 21 are located in Iran. Yet of the 682 inspections conducted among these 35 countries, 493 were in Iran alone. Likewise, of the 224 Design Information Verification (DIV) activities, 144 took place in Iran—more than half.

 

Furthermore, out of a total of 1,895 inspector-days spent across those 35 CSA-implementing countries, 1,260 days—around 70%—were spent in Iran. This underscores the degree to which the IAEA’s manpower, time, and financial resources are being directed at Iran.

 

Financial data paints a similar picture: out of the IAEA’s €39 million regular budget for 2024, more than €22 million has been allocated to activities in Iran alone. Additionally, over €4 million from the Agency’s €28 million extrabudgetary (voluntary contributions) have also been devoted to operations in Iran.

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, attended an exhibition showcasing Iran’s latest achievements in nuclear technology at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) on April 17, 2025. Social media/ WANA News Agency

Political Pressures Behind the Scenes?

Given this scale of engagement, if such an extensive inspection record and cooperation from Iran do not qualify as “constructive engagement,” then what does?

 

The IAEA has never reported any diversion or irregularities in Iran’s nuclear material or activities under safeguards over the past two decades. This suggests that Iran has continuously met its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. Yet, instead of acknowledging this, the IAEA—under growing political pressure—has recently shifted its focus to issues that were already resolved during the 2015 JCPOA negotiations.

 

If this isn’t a politically driven approach influenced by certain countries, then what is?

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Eslami attend a news conference in Tehran

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Eslami attend a news conference in Tehran, Iran, November 14, 2024. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

The Agency’s treatment of Iran, despite such high levels of cooperation, has deeply disappointed Iranian officials. In its latest report, the IAEA described Iran’s cooperation as “less than satisfactory,” a term widely seen as ungrateful and politically charged. This has only reinforced the perception that the IAEA—rather than upholding its professional and technical mandate—is increasingly serving as an instrument of certain states’ political agendas.

 

One of the main sources of this tension is the unrealistic expectation that Iran should go beyond its legal obligations, especially after the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and failed to honor its commitments. This approach blurs the line between Iran’s safeguards obligations and its voluntary commitments under the JCPOA, leading to an inaccurate and unfair portrayal of Iran’s nuclear activities.

 

More troubling is the IAEA’s inclusion of these JCPOA-related demands in its safeguards reports, which gives them the false appearance of being legally binding under international safeguards. This conflation carries significant risks for Iran’s future engagement with the Agency and undermines the integrity of the IAEA’s own reporting standards.