Iranian Analyst: Signing the MOU Won’t End the Deep Divide Between Tehran and Washington
WANA (Jun 17) – The war that the United States and Israel initiated against Iran on February 28 resulted in numerous deaths and billions of dollars in damages, without producing any notable achievements for either the United States or Israel.
The United States and Israel, who had previously failed to overthrow the Iranian government through political and media gambling, entered the war this time in a bigger gamble. The greatest finding of this war can perhaps be that, realising the fact that the military power of the United States and Israel was smaller than was exaggerated, and the military power of Iran was greater than was imagined.
This war made oil more expensive, closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupted global trade, and created numerous problems for the world. The chaos on the battlefield and the political pressures increased so much that Trump had no choice but to accept Iran’s conditions and declare a ceasefire.
The memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US is set to be officially signed in Switzerland on Friday, June 19, 2026. Many questions remain about this memorandum.
To answer these questions, WANA News Agency went to Dr Saeed Ajorlou, a university professor, political analyst, and member of the media team for the Iran-US negotiations.
WANA: What are the key elements of this Memorandum of Understanding?
Ajorlou: This memorandum of understanding is fundamentally focused on ending the war. It has been negotiated within a wartime framework and should not be viewed as a normalization agreement or a final settlement. Rather, it provides a framework for dialogue over the next 60 days.
The process could unfold in four phases. The first phase is the cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon. The second phase involves confidence-building measures and concrete steps, such as lifting blockades, releasing frozen funds, and granting oil waivers. These measures would pave the way for the third phase: negotiations on sanctions relief and the nuclear issue.
If we reach the fourth phase—the final agreement and its implementation—the memorandum could evolve into a binding agreement backed by a UN Security Council resolution. Such an outcome could also lead to Iran’s removal from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. From our perspective, this memorandum represents the beginning of the end of the war.
WANA: Is the 60-day timeframe sufficient to resolve the outstanding issues?
Ajorlou: If the United States recognizes Iran’s nuclear rights, is prepared to lift sanctions in accordance with the text, and accepts a step-by-step reciprocal process, then 60 days should be enough.
However, if the necessary political and strategic willingness is absent, even two or three times that period may not be sufficient. Ultimately, success depends on the intentions and commitment of the other side.
If they implement the agreement in good faith, Iran will respond accordingly. If they deviate from the memorandum, Iran will also respond appropriately. The timeline is therefore less important than the political will to move forward.
WANA: Which issues are likely to be the most difficult to resolve?
Ajorlou: Sanctions will be one of the most complex issues. They are multilayered, and past experience—particularly with the nuclear agreement of the previous decade—demonstrated that the United States failed to fulfill many of its sanctions-related commitments.
The issue of reversibility is especially important. Iran implemented its obligations, while the other side ultimately returned to its previous position. There are also complications involving Congress, primary and secondary sanctions, and the need to remove Iran’s file from Chapter VII so that it is treated as a normal international issue rather than a security threat.
The nuclear issue is equally complex because Iran’s rights must be formally recognized. These are likely to be the two central topics of the negotiations.
In addition, reconstruction and development will require extensive discussions covering technical, economic, financial, and banking matters.
If this understanding is implemented, ending the conflict—particularly in Lebanon—will become a major priority. On the issue of blockades, it is worth noting that certain commitments were implemented before Iran took corresponding steps.
This helped address a longstanding public concern that Iran often fulfils its obligations immediately while receiving promised benefits only later. In this instance, that perception was at least partially avoided.
WANA: How could this agreement affect Iran’s economic outlook?
Ajorlou: The reality is that neither this memorandum of understanding nor any eventual final agreement is a magic solution. It will not resolve all of Iran’s economic challenges overnight, and viewing it that way would be a mistake.
The international environment has changed significantly. The world in which an agreement with the West alone could generate substantial economic gains no longer exists. Europe faces its own challenges, China’s global role has expanded, and the geopolitical landscape has become increasingly complex.
Iran must therefore pursue a balanced foreign policy while also addressing domestic issues. Administrative reforms, improvements in governance, and more effective executive institutions remain essential. At the same time, relations with Eastern powers should be strengthened and institutionalized, while opportunities for cooperation with neighboring countries should continue to be pursued.
Over the past several years, Iran has invested heavily in its neighborhood policy. Regional actors are increasingly recognizing that sustainable security cannot be achieved without Iran’s participation. Dialogue with neighboring states has continued, and there is potential for further cooperation if the political will exists.
Ultimately, economic improvement requires a combination of external engagement, domestic reforms, and strategic planning. Tying the country’s entire economic future to this memorandum would be unrealistic. The agreement may create opportunities, but solving Iran’s economic problems depends largely on domestic decision-making and long-term policy choices.
WANA: Why have some members of parliament and segments of the public criticized the agreement?
Ajorlou: Many critics believe the agreement does not fully reflect the sacrifices made during the conflict. Public expectations remain high, and many people believe Iran deserves greater concessions.
It would be incorrect to interpret criticism as a sign of exhaustion or surrender. The prevailing sentiment among many supporters of the system is that Iran entered these negotiations from a position of resilience rather than weakness.
There is also a widespread belief that Iran must remain prepared for all scenarios. If the other side fails to honor its commitments and returns to a confrontational approach, many expect Iran to respond accordingly. As a result, public opinion remains vigilant and highly sensitive to the issue of compliance.
The Iranian public was not merely observing the conflict from a distance; many see themselves as having been directly involved in the national effort. Consequently, they continue to closely monitor both the diplomatic process and developments on the ground.
WANA: Who within Iran opposes the agreement, and what are their main concerns?
Ajorlou: We are not dealing with a text based on the other side’s promise-keeping; we are dealing with a text that knows it is negotiating with an enemy, and it is a text written with an enemy in mind. Therefore, this perfidy and the dark history the other side has are fully taken into account in this text.
Consequently, we are dealing with a step-by-step approach based on mutual benefit and reversibility in this text. Therefore, criticisms are natural and nothing strange; various groups have the right to criticize, and the public has the right to criticize.
But generally speaking, these criticisms have been formed, and the general response that can be given is that this text is a respectable and presentable document that reflects the people’s resistance over these more than 100 days and nights. Therefore, it is a dignified text, although implementation is different from the text and has its own process, which Iran must pursue to ensure proper and effective execution.”
WANA: How influential is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran’s decision-making process?
Ajorlou: Representatives of the armed forces, including the IRGC, participate in key decision-making bodies such as the Supreme National Security Council and other coordinating committees. Decisions are reached through consensus rather than competition between institutions.
The notion that diplomats and military officials are fundamentally at odds with one another is largely a media narrative. In practice, there is significant coordination between political, diplomatic, and military institutions.
The negotiating team views developments on the battlefield as strengthening its diplomatic position rather than undermining it. Senior military officials have repeatedly emphasized that diplomacy, public support, and military preparedness operate together as components of a unified national strategy.
In my view, this level of coordination is one of the strengths of the Islamic Republic’s decision-making structure.
WANA: In recent years, there have been significant protests in the Kurdish regions of Iran. Do you believe ethnic minorities face discrimination or political pressure?
Ajorlou: Iran is a diverse country, and representatives of different ethnic backgrounds occupy positions at the highest levels of government. The current president, for example, has both Azerbaijani and Kurdish roots.
The official view is that Iran’s ethnic communities are integral parts of a single national identity. While external actors have often attempted to exploit ethnic issues and encourage separatist tendencies, these efforts have largely failed to gain broad public support.
During periods of heightened tension and conflict, many expected separatist movements to become more active, particularly in western Iran. However, those expectations were not realized, and the overwhelming majority of citizens continued to identify strongly with the Iranian nation.
Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, Lurs, and other ethnic groups see themselves first and foremost as Iranians. The experience of recent conflicts demonstrated, in the view of many officials, that national unity remains one of Iran’s strongest assets.
People walk on a street in Tehran, Iran, June 14, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
WANA: Will Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf personally travel to Switzerland to sign the memorandum?
Ajorlou: At this stage, no final decision has been made regarding either the format of the signing ceremony or the individual who will formally sign the memorandum. Discussions are still ongoing in Tehran and among the intermediaries involved in the process.
That said, some form of diplomatic engagement may become necessary as negotiations move into the next phase. The implementation of the memorandum and the establishment of specialized working groups will require extensive discussions.
These working groups will likely focus on key issues such as sanctions relief and the nuclear file. If confidence-building measures are successfully implemented and negotiations proceed as envisioned, meetings in European venues—including Switzerland—remain a possibility.
For now, however, the details surrounding the signing process have not been finalized.
WANA: Why have some critics opposed the possibility of Mr Qalibaf making such a trip?
Ajorlou: Their primary concern is symbolic rather than procedural. Some believe that a highly publicized image of Iranian and American officials signing an agreement could be interpreted as signaling the end of longstanding hostilities between the two countries.
Given the history of tensions, conflict, and the loss of senior military and political figures, some segments of society view such symbolism with caution. Their objections stem from those sensitivities rather than from opposition to diplomacy itself.
Mr Qalibaf is fully aware of these concerns and will undoubtedly take them into account in any decisions regarding the process.
WANA: Iran insisted on including Hezbollah and Lebanon in the framework of the agreement. Does this indicate that Tehran will continue providing support to Hezbollah?
Ajorlou: We consider Hezbollah a part of our own national defense. I believe the number of Hezbollah martyrs in this nearly 100-day war has reached about 4,000. This means that those who used to say, “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran,” should know today that in Lebanon, about 4,000 people have been martyred for the security of Iran, and Iran’s security is inseparable from the security of Hezbollah and Lebanon.
Therefore, there is a connection. Can we confirm that this connection exists, but support is not provided in various aspects? Furthermore, they are independent forces—the martyred leader also stated that the resistance front operates independently and is independent itself. However, there is this inspiring role of Iran, and this meaningful connection will continue to exist.
Iran made great efforts, in the Islamabad understanding—the Islamabad paper—from the first day to the fortieth day, which was effectively the declaration of the ceasefire, until today, the 106th or 107th day, to continue this, both on the battlefield, in diplomatic documents, and on the streets; You see that the Hezbollah flag is still placed next to the flag of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, Hezbollah is part of this interconnected resistance front, and Iran’s support for it will continue.
WANA: Why has Iran’s Supreme Leader not publicly commented on the agreement?
Ajorlou: The memorandum has been approved through the established mechanisms of the Supreme National Security Council and reflects a consensus reached within that institution. It is therefore proceeding through the normal decision-making process.
If the Supreme Leader determines that a public statement is necessary, he may provide guidance that clarifies broader strategic objectives and policy directions. Whether such a message is issued remains his decision.
It is important to note, however, that claims suggesting the agreement was imposed on the leadership are inaccurate. The process has unfolded within Iran’s established sovereign institutions.
The negotiating team is also careful not to place unnecessary political burdens on the Supreme Leader. Its role is to operate within the policy framework established by the leadership and relevant state institutions. Any future guidance will naturally be incorporated into the process.
For now, the memorandum has not yet been formally signed, and developments in the coming days will determine the next steps.
WANA: Why has the full text of the agreement not yet been released for public review?
Ajorlou: We would welcome publication of the protocol governing the negotiations between Iran, the United States, and the intermediaries involved in the process. However, the intermediaries have reportedly requested that the text not be released at this stage, and all parties are adhering to that understanding.
The delay should not be interpreted as a reluctance to publish the document. From our perspective, the text reflects Iran’s interests and the demands of the Iranian people. Therefore, there is no concern about public scrutiny once the appropriate time for publication arrives.
Has the War Ended?!
WANA (Jun 16) – The stated objective of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States is to bring an end to the conflict on all fronts, including Lebanon. Attention is now focused more than anywhere else on Lebanon, where it will become clear whether Israel is prepared to halt military operations. […]
