WANA (Mar 04) – An assessment of political and battlefield developments suggests that, for structural reasons, the United States lacks the capacity to sustain a prolonged war with Iran.

 

This limitation is shaped by three main factors: domestic political costs within the U.S.; the economic consequences of war—particularly rising global oil prices and their impact on the American economy; and the direct military costs of sustained conflict.

 

At this stage, all three pressures appear to have intensified for Donald Trump, and the signs are increasingly visible. On the domestic front, he has yet to present a convincing justification for initiating war with Iran—especially given the financial and human costs already incurred.

 

During a recent government briefing with senators, the reactions were telling. Figures such as Elizabeth Warren, Chris Van Hollen, and Don Beyer emphasized two common points: the alleged illegality of Trump’s action and the absence of a clear plan or defined endgame for the war. Their remarks highlight the president’s difficulty in persuading America’s political establishment.

 

Over time, this dynamic could escalate exponentially. “Time” is a variable that cannot be concealed. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the pressure from domestic opponents will become. Trump, who once positioned himself as a critic of “endless and costly wars,” now faces that very narrative as a source of criticism against his Iran policy.

People gather to mourn after Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in Israeli and U.S. strikes on Saturday, in Tehran, Iran, March 1, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

On the economic front, maritime transport and energy security have emerged as central concerns. The announced decision to escort oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz is widely seen as a response to disruptions in oil flows.

 

Critics argue that such a move could significantly increase direct U.S. costs while exposing American naval forces to greater operational risks in the region.

 

Another measure involves designing an alternative mechanism to ensure oil tankers, after some insurance firms reportedly declined coverage due to heightened regional risks. However, questions have been raised regarding the financial capacity of the institution tasked with implementing this plan.

 

Regarding direct war expenditures, the United States Department of Defense has announced a request for an additional $50 billion in funding.

 

Estimates suggest that more than $2 billion has already been spent since the start of hostilities—a figure expected to rise, given the costs of replacing military equipment and rebuilding damaged infrastructure. Several high-value U.S. assets in the region have reportedly sustained significant damage.

A graffiti on a wall reads” Down with the U.S.A”, after Israel said it launched a pre-emptive attack against Iran, in Tehran, Iran, February 28, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Internationally, tensions have also surfaced between Trump and certain European allies. Countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain have shown limited willingness to align themselves with Washington.

 

Even trade-related threats appear not to have altered Madrid’s position—an issue that could add to Washington’s international political costs.

 

In overall assessment, it appears that the United States and Israel may have miscalculated battlefield realities, while Iran has managed to shift the operational balance to Washington’s disadvantage.

 

This outcome is attributed, on one hand, to domestic cohesion and public mobilization within Iran, and on the other, to the preparedness and operational capability of its armed forces, which have delivered targeted and effective responses despite sustained attacks.

 

From this perspective, Iran’s central strategy for achieving victory is framed as the imposition of strategic costs on its adversary—a process that could solidify as the war lengthens. In this view, the conflict would continue until a point is reached where the future regional order can be shaped without American presence.