WANA (Sep 29) – Hossein Shariatmadari, chief of Kayhan Newspaper and a conservative journalist, has recommended to the Iranian Parliament that: “Now that we are not withdrawing from the NPT, pass a three‑urgency single‑article bill so that we do not admit IAEA inspectors.”

 

Hossein Shariatmadari wrote in Kayhan newspaper:

“After the Security Council’s action on Friday night, it is to be expected that the honourable members of Parliament submit the mentioned proposal with the designation of “three‑urgency” and approve it as a single‑article law.

 

1‑ In the United Nations Security Council meeting on Friday night, the draft resolution of China and Russia to postpone the “snapback” did not obtain a vote! The Security Council emphasised the implementation of the snapback mechanism.

 

On our side of the story, the honorable officials responsible for the nuclear negotiations have emphasized suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and have not accepted withdrawal from the NPT — which, according to Article 10 of the NPT, is our definite and legal right (!) — so much so that recently Mr. Pezeshkian declared at a press conference with foreign journalists in the United States: “Even if Security Council sanctions are activated again, Iran does not intend to withdraw from the NPT”! Why?! Leave that aside! But it is also necessary to point this out.

 

2‑ Article 10 of the NPT states: “Each State Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. In such a case, it shall give notice of its withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the withdrawing State Party regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.”

 

Now the question is whether twenty‑two years of extortionate challenge by America and Europe and the failure of the other parties to fulfil their obligations, and especially the U.S. military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, are not undeniable examples of endangering the interests and national sovereignty of our country?! If they are — and they are — why shouldn’t we make use of the legal possibility of withdrawing from the NPT?!

 

And now, since the honourable officials are unwilling to use the legal right to withdraw from the NPT, at least let them implement the proposal we mentioned so that they will have at least exercised part of our country’s legal rights. Read on!

 

3‑ Our country’s accession to the said treaty (and many other treaties) consisted of two parts: “signing the treaty” and “ratifying” it. Article 10 of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contains two separate paragraphs. The first paragraph is the one we referred to, and its subject is the permission to withdraw from the treaty if it conflicts with the member state’s national interests and sovereignty; and in the second paragraph it is stated:

 

“Twenty‑five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Any decision in this connection shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.” Iran signed the treaty on January 01, 1970 (the Pahlavi era) and twenty‑five years later (the Islamic Revolution era) ratified accession to the treaty (two separate acts of signing and ratification).

 

4‑ Now that the honourable officials are unwilling to withdraw from the NPT, we can — and it is our legal right to — rescind the “ratification” while continuing the signature of the treaty. The result is that by signing the treaty we have accepted its spirit, which is “not to produce nuclear weapons,” but we have not accepted and have repudiated the safeguards that arise from ratification of the treaty.

 

In other words, we have accepted that we are not seeking to produce nuclear weapons (the spirit of the treaty), but because we have withdrawn our ratification, we have no obligation to accept safeguards and the presence of inspectors in our country. In this situation, our emphasis remains on preventing the diversion of our nuclear program toward the production of atomic weapons, but because we have withdrawn accession (ratification), we have the slightest obligation toward implementing safeguards and the presence of inspectors in our country

 

5‑ Using this solution is an accepted procedure in international law, which some other countries have used and continue to use in facing treaties. For example, the Russian government, in relation to the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty (CTBT), has accepted the signing of the treaty — that is, its spirit of banning nuclear tests — but does not consider itself bound by its provisions and its safeguards, which include protection and monitoring.

 

6‑ In July of this year the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) passed a bill that became law and was communicated by the government, which stated: “The government is obliged, immediately after the passage of this law, to suspend any cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (the Atomic Agency) until the following conditions are achieved,” and the two mentioned conditions were:

 

“First — obtaining assurance of full respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and especially ensuring the security of nuclear sites and scientists, as determined by the Supreme National Security Council.

 

Second — obtaining assurance of full respect for the inherent rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran in enjoying all the rights enshrined in Article (4) of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, especially uranium enrichment, as determined by the Supreme National Security Council.”

 

Never mind that neither of these two conditions was realised, and contrary to expectation and despite the explicit text of that law, the suspension of cooperation with the Agency did not last long (!) and was downgraded from a legal status to mere rhetoric (!). A regrettable occurrence that cannot be justified by any rational logic or recognised legal procedure!

 

7‑ Now, after the United Nations Security Council action on Friday night, it is to be expected that the honourable representatives of Parliament approve the mentioned proposal with the designation of three‑urgency as a single‑article law. It should be said right here that, contrary to the widespread psychological operations that the enemy’s media and their domestic stooges have launched, the implementation of the snapback mechanism does not cause much change in the economic arena or an increase in sanctions.

 

The sanctions have not gone away to return (!), but none of the hostile acts of the enemy should go unanswered, and the response to the enemy’s practical and vindictive actions is not propaganda. The formula of response in such cases is “zadi‑zarbati, zarbatī nush kon” (literally: “you struck a strike, drink the strike” — in other words, a striking, forceful countermeasure).”