WANA (Sep 15) – Iran’s nuclear program and negotiations with Western powers remain hotly contested inside the country. The recent agreement signed between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Egypt has its supporters, but it also faces intense criticism.

 

Critics argue that the negotiating team, led by Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, is failing to operate transparently. They warn that the deal risks becoming a repeat of the 2015 nuclear accord (the JCPOA), which they believe brought “nothing” for Iran. Hamid Rasaee, a member of parliament and long-time critic of both the JCPOA and the new deal with the IAEA, declared: “The stages of the JCPOA are repeating themselves.” After a recent closed-door parliamentary session with the foreign minister, Rasaee voiced concerns: “Today I read the text of the agreement with the IAEA… unfortunately, like the JCPOA, the text suffers from ambiguity and is open to interpretation and misuse.” He posted these remarks on X.

 

Some politicians in Tehran go further, calling for harsh measures against IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, whom they accuse of issuing misleading reports on Iran’s nuclear activities. They claim that such reports became the pretext for Israel and the United States to attack Iran.

 

Tehran maintains that the IAEA has engaged in espionage against its nuclear program, passing “secret data” to Israeli and American security services that was later used in the assassination of Iranian scientists and sabotage operations.

 

Iranian officials insist that Grossi himself is chiefly responsible for these actions and holds direct accountability for the sabotage, assassinations, and the Israeli strike against Iran in June 2025.

 

Distrust toward the IAEA is hardly new, though it is younger than Iran’s entrenched mistrust of the United States, Israel, and the three European powers—Britain, France, and Germany. The EU3 are currently seeking to trigger the “snapback” mechanism against Iran, while Tehran has warned that such a move would mean the end of cooperation not only with the Europeans but also with the IAEA. In a pointed message on X, Abbas Araghchi cautioned that invoking snapback would backfire on the West:

“It is not just that the E3 has no legal, political, or moral entitlement to invoke ‘snapback’, and that even if they did, ‘use or lose it’ doesn’t work. It’s that the correct expression for the EU3’s dilemma is ‘use it and lose it’. Or better yet, ‘use it and lose it all.'”

 

Negotiations with the United States, the European Union, and the IAEA are faltering but have not reached complete deadlock. The current state of play can be summarized as follows:

 

  •  Direct talks with Washington are suspended, but messages continue to be exchanged through intermediaries.
  •  Iran will not back down from its red lines: enrichment activities, compensation for damages, and guarantees against future attacks.
  •  The Europeans have initiated discussions with Iran regarding snapback, but no final outcome has been reached.
  •  The E3 know that invoking snapback would end their role as mediators. Behind the scenes, they are reluctant to activate the mechanism on September 28.

 

Additional points shaping the dispute:

  •  The West sees snapback as a way to weaken Iran’s domestic cohesion and lay the groundwork for future Israeli action.
  •  Iran aims to terminate UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and normalize its nuclear program, while the West insists on keeping this tool of leverage.
  •  Following U.S. and Israeli strikes, Tehran has undertaken a serious reassessment of its cooperation with the IAEA and implementation of safeguards.
  •  The recent deal with the IAEA is viewed in Tehran as part of a strategy to manage Israeli threats and buy time.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi meets with Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in Tehran

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi meets with Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in Tehran, Iran, November 14, 2024. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) approved the agreement and does not contradict parliamentary law.

  •  At present, the IAEA will not receive access to damaged facilities or nuclear material.
  •  Any Iranian steps to implement the agreement are conditioned on the snapback mechanism not being triggered on September 28.
  •  Each step of cooperation must be approved by the SNSC and comply with parliament’s legislation.

People walk past a billboard with a picture of nuclear scientists killed in Israeli strikes and Iranian centrifuges, on a street in Tehran, Iran, August 29, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Highlights from the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee’s session with the foreign minister:

  •  It was confirmed that the SNSC has authorized the agreement with the IAEA.
  •  For now, the IAEA will not be granted access.
  •  With this agreement, the snapback mechanism will not be activated on September 28.
  •  Iran’s Supreme National Security Council must approve any future cooperation with the IAEA in full compliance with parliamentary law.