WANA (May 05) – Recent developments over the past two months indicate that the Strait of Hormuz has increasingly become a critical and non-negotiable element in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategic doctrine—positioning it alongside the country’s missile and nuclear capabilities.

 

Since the early days of the conflict and the closure of this vital waterway, Tehran has made it clear that the status of the Strait of Hormuz will not return to its pre-war conditions. Following the failure of various strategies—including regime-change efforts and attempts to undermine Iran’s missile capabilities—the reopening of this strategic passage has become one of the United States’ primary objectives in the conflict.

 

Iran’s declared policy regarding the strait has followed a clear framework: during times of war and heightened tension, the waterway remains closed, while in the post-conflict phase, maritime traffic would only be permitted under the supervision of Iran’s armed forces and through mechanisms such as security-based transit fees.

 

On the other side, statements from U.S. officials—particularly the American president—have shown significant fluctuation over this period. Initial claims of reopening the strait and calls for international assistance, including from Europe and China, were followed by contradictory statements minimizing its importance. These were later replaced by renewed threats and aggressive rhetoric, including the use of military options targeting infrastructure, in an effort to force a change in the situation.

 

The Ability to Close Hormuz Changes Everything

WANA (May 02) – Before the war imposed on Iran by the United states and Israel, which began on February 28, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz largely remained a latent capability.   Many analysts and observers, both in Iran and globally, acknowledged Iran’s geopolitical position, yet did not expect this capacity to […]

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Following the ceasefire phase, Washington attempted to leverage diplomatic pressure in negotiations to secure the reopening of the strait. However, the deadlock in talks reportedly led to the consideration of a maritime blockade strategy, under the assumption that Iran would be compelled to concede.

 

Most recently, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it would ensure the safe passage of oil tankers through the strait, deploying two warships to support this mission. Despite these claims, reports from the field suggest that the operational impact has been limited.

 

During the latest incident, one oil tanker attempting unauthorized passage was reportedly struck, while two others were forced to turn back. At the same time, approximately 600 vessels are currently waiting for transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Although some U.S. media outlets have claimed that a limited number of tankers successfully passed, even if verified, such incidents do not alter the broader reality of Iran’s continued control over the waterway.

 

Overall, the trajectory of developments over the past two months suggests that none of the available tools—military threats, infrastructure pressure, diplomatic negotiations, or alternative proposals such as “free passage initiatives”—have succeeded in altering Iran’s position regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

 

Accordingly, the strait appears to be increasingly defined, alongside Iran’s missile power and nuclear industry, as one of the country’s core strategic assets—one that Tehran insists it will not relinquish under any form of pressure.