WANA (Dec 21) – Iran’s foreign policy has, for years, remained suspended between two opposing visions. On one side stands the ambition to confront and aggressively transcend the existing global order; on the other, a more pragmatic vision that calls for rational adaptation to that order—even if it is perceived as unfair.

 

Neither path has been decisively chosen. The result is a prolonged and exhausting condition that has placed Iran’s economy, diplomacy, and society in a constant cycle of uncertainty—a condition best described as strategic ambiguity.

 

Within Iran’s policy-making environment, two dominant perspectives face each other. One camp argues that the only viable way out of sustained external pressure is the adoption of a more radical posture and the strengthening of deterrence, potentially even moving toward the nuclear threshold.

 

The opposing view maintains that challenging the global order is neither feasible nor cost-effective, and that Iran must engage with international realities in a more pragmatic and calculated manner. The core problem, however, is not the existence of these competing views, but the governing system’s inability to choose one and translate it into a coherent, long-term strategy.

 

 

This strategic suspension is most visible in Iran’s relationship with the United States. For Iran, the U.S. is not merely another country or a conventional rival. It is an actor with unique geopolitical, institutional, and economic characteristics, holding a distinct position within the international system.

 

As such, it cannot simply be removed from Iran’s strategic calculations. Even if America’s relative decline is acknowledged, the pace and consequences of that decline do not align with Iran’s immediate needs, nor does it necessarily promise greater regional or global stability.

 

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between Iran and the United States have gradually shifted from indirect political confrontation to more direct forms of engagement—from maritime clashes and military incidents to major regional developments such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

 

Yet throughout this trajectory, a fundamental weakness has remained evident: the absence of a comprehensive plan. There has been no clearly defined long-term resistance strategy, no complementary economic policy to absorb the costs, and no credible exit strategy from high-risk situations.

 

 

This strategic vacuum has prevented Iran from transforming its security and field-level achievements into durable political and diplomatic gains. History repeatedly shows that even military victories, if not followed by an intelligent and managed peace, can ultimately erode national power.

 

At various points, Iran had opportunities to lower the level of confrontation and shift tensions into less costly arenas, but the necessary institutional capacity and strategic mindset for such transitions were lacking.

 

On the other side, the U.S. political system itself operates on a structured logic of threat construction—one deeply embedded in the country’s military–industrial–security complex.

 

In this context, Iran is not merely facing a powerful economy, but a structural military and security advantage. Washington’s shift from covert measures to overt military actions signals a change in the level of confrontation—one that demands serious attention in Tehran’s strategic calculations.

An Iranian man holds a newspaper with a cover photo of Iran and U.S. flags on a street in Tehran, Iran, on April 19, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS – THIS PICTURE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY

Two persistent analytical errors have further deepened the stalemate: the romanticized, heroic myth-making surrounding confrontation with the United States, and an excessive reliance on international law.

 

In practice, international law without strategic leverage has limited impact, and diplomacy without a clearly defined foreign policy framework risks becoming little more than a symbolic exercise.

 

Exiting this condition requires, first and foremost, a domestic consensus on the necessity of changing course. Without genuine internal dialogue and systemic agreement, no sustainable strategy can emerge.

Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Steve Witkoff, the head of the U.S. negotiation team. Social media/ WANA News Agency

Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Steve Witkoff, the head of the U.S. negotiation team. Social media/ WANA News Agency

At the same time, policymakers must recognize that diplomacy is inherently a long-term process, requiring patience, coherence, and continuity. Within this framework, practical steps—such as increasing readiness for negotiations, improving engagement with international institutions, sending calibrated diplomatic signals, and activating formal and informal communication channels—could form part of a new strategic trajectory.

 

Ultimately, Iran’s central foreign policy challenge is not a lack of options, but an inability to choose. Strategic choices inevitably carry costs, but indecision is the most expensive option of all—leading to the gradual and continuous erosion of national power.

 

Reassessing the path taken should not be seen as a sign of weakness, but as an indicator of institutional maturity—provided the decision-making system is capable of confronting realities honestly and addressing fundamental questions without fear.