WANA (Oct 15) – Ali Ozamayi, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, who succeeded Tangsiri in the post, has a modest demeanor and a bold spirit. Forces under his command have carried out an unprecedented escalation in the post-war period in recent days by attacking three supertankers and two container ships. Following these attacks, it is no longer possible to claim that the Strait of Hormuz is open.

 

Iranian officials have used the terms “smuggling” and “covert passage” to describe the traffic that has passed through the Strait of Hormuz over the past several months, referring to conduct that occurs even across the smallest and most heavily secured borders and areas. One of the targeted supertankers belongs to Saudi Arabia, and part of the vessel was engulfed in flames. Following Yemen’s attacks on Saudi ships and ports in the Red Sea, as well as an attack on the Petroline oil pipeline, which transports oil from eastern Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, the Saudis once again headed toward the Persian Gulf despite the risks. Their attempt, however, failed.

 

A scenario had previously been discussed in which the United States intended to organize a convoy of Saudi supertankers and use any attack against them as a pretext for escalating tensions.

 

Alongside this scenario, another possibility was considered: demonstrating a willingness to escalate tensions in order to pressure Iran into inaction, allowing the supertankers to pass and enabling Washington to cite their passage as proof that the Strait of Hormuz remained open. What ultimately happened was Iran’s response and the expansion of the blockade from oil tankers to container ships.

 

 

This move also shifts the attention of the United States and the Saudi government away from Yemen toward northern and eastern Saudi Arabia. If tensions escalate with Iran, Iraqi resistance groups could also enter the conflict, leaving little room for significant action against Yemen.

 

However, military action against Iran is no simple matter either. Although aerial refueling aircraft have been deployed at Al Udeid Air Base, a resumption of hostilities would clearly render bases in the southern Persian Gulf inoperable. Jordan’s air base has also sustained several decisive blows since the war, while the attack on Aqaba sent a strong message to Tel Aviv.

 

At sea, US naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier strike group, were initially pushed back from distances of 200–300 kilometers to 400–500 kilometers from the Iranian coast. They are now positioned 700–800 kilometers away. This distance affects their operational capabilities, particularly their ability to strike targets deep inside Iran. Although the United States is seeking to activate the option of a ground offensive, its operational capacity for airstrikes has been constrained.

Key Points:

1. The value of supertankers and their cargoes

Supertankers carry an average of two million barrels of oil, a volume exceeding the daily output of the world’s 11th-, 12th- and 13th-largest oil producers. In 2025, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Norway each produced approximately 1.8 million barrels per day. It should be noted that oil-producing countries consume all or part of their own output.

 

Among oil-exporting countries, a cargo of this size is comparable to Brazil’s exports, making it larger than the oil exports of Iran, Kuwait and Nigeria.

 

One way to understand the scale of this volume is to calculate how many tanker trucks would be needed to transport it. Depending on the model, each tanker truck can carry approximately 21,000 to 42,000 liters. Since one standard barrel of oil contains 159 liters, two million barrels amount to 318 million liters. Transporting this volume would require 15,142 trucks with a capacity of 21,000 liters each, or 7,571 trucks with a capacity of 42,000 liters each.

 

At an assumed average price of $100 per barrel, the cargo would be worth $200 million. If a price of $150 per barrel in the physical market were used as the benchmark, its value would rise to $300 million.

 

The supertanker itself is also worth a substantial amount, often comparable to the value of its cargo. This issue warrants separate examination given the extraordinary developments in the global market.

Naval Mines. Social media /WANA News Agency

2. Rising supertanker prices and changing policies among Gulf states

Repeated attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Black Sea have pushed secondhand tanker prices above those of new vessels. In recent weeks, several supertankers built in 2016 and now approximately 10 years old have been sold for $150 million, while new vessels are priced at around $135 million.

 

However, there is no such thing as an off-the-shelf, non-custom-built supertanker sitting in a dealership or showroom waiting for a buyer, as is the case with newly manufactured cars. Supertankers are built only after an order has been placed, and the ordering process is generally time-consuming.

 

As a result, delivery contracts extending five to 10 years are common in the supertanker market. If a company agrees to sell a vessel ordered years earlier to meet its own needs before taking delivery, an uncommon occurrence, the price can exceed $135 million.

 

A new tanker belonging to Greek billionaire George Prokopiou, owner of Dynacom, was sold for $200 million under a “prompt delivery” arrangement. Another supertanker scheduled for delivery in October has been priced at $169 million.

 

Alexander Saverys, CEO of Belgian shipping company CMB.Tech, which also operates in the Persian Gulf, said: “Fifty years from now, when we talk about 2026, we will remember this period. This is truly extraordinary. I don’t think I will ever see a market like this again in my lifetime. This is a once-in-a-generation event.”

 

In addition to the destruction of numerous tankers in 2026 and the stranding of many others behind the Strait of Hormuz, another significant factor is driving up demand and, consequently, prices.

 

Private companies exercise considerable caution during conflicts. This has prompted Gulf states, including Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, to move toward direct ownership of tankers in an effort to reduce their dependence on these companies and the restrictions arising from their decisions.

 

Previously, governments and oil buyers could readily charter tankers. However, rising risks, insurance premiums and charter rates have pushed these governments toward purchasing supertankers outright so that the vessels can operate under direct state management. This policy can also reduce dependence on the charter market, although direct ownership does not, by itself, eliminate insurance or other operating costs.

 

Shipping costs have risen to such levels that operating a supertanker for six months can cost $100 million. This figure is equivalent to 74 percent of the purchase price of a tanker or approximately 50–60 percent of the price of a new vessel available for prompt delivery. In other words, shipping costs over a period of less than or around one year can equal the purchase price of the vessel itself.

 

This indicates that the Gulf states’ shift in policy follows an economic rationale. Undermining this approach would require addressing the factors that have made it economically attractive.

 

 

3. Oil transportation strategies and Iran’s options for countering them

Gulf states have an economic rationale for purchasing tankers, based on the expectation of recovering their investment within a few months. These vessels can also be deployed rapidly in global markets without the need for reassessments, new agreements with shipping companies or reviews of contractual clauses related to changing circumstances that could halt their operations during a crisis.

 

However, because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, these tankers cannot enter or leave freely. Arab states, with the UAE playing a leading role, have therefore resorted to a complex operation to move their oil.

 

Instead of loading oil directly onto supertankers, the cargo is first transferred onto old, small and worn-out vessels. These ships pass through the strait and transfer their cargo to supertankers waiting outside it.

 

This method offers several advantages to the governments involved. Smaller vessels are more difficult to detect and target. For example, instead of using one drone to disable a supertanker, five to 10 drones would be needed to target the same number of smaller ships, each carrying only a fraction of a supertanker’s cargo.

 

Because of their smaller size and proximity to the coast, these vessels are less likely to be detected. Identifying and striking them requires greater equipment resources and operational focus. At the same time, their worn condition and smaller cargo capacity mean that each vessel is worth considerably less than a supertanker.

 

To reverse the economic logic of this strategy, Iran gradually increased the frequency of its attacks, targeting several vessels each day. However, high oil prices and the Gulf states’ need to sell their cargoes under virtually any circumstances meant that this approach did not prove effective in the short term.

 

This was significant because the UAE, relying on this method, refused to accept the Iran-Oman agreement on arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz and encouraged other states to follow suit. Emirati officials also signaled to Washington that oil could be transported without an agreement with Iran. This was one factor that encouraged President Donald Trump to adopt more hardline political positions and actions.

 

Iran faced three options. The first was to continue targeting smaller vessels for several months until the strategy eventually produced results. However, this process could have extended beyond the US elections and weakened Iran’s ability to sustain a war of attrition.

 

Like the United States, Iran is also under pressure from the naval blockade. The situation has become a contest of endurance, with each side seeking to outlast the other.

 

Against this backdrop, two other options were considered. One was to target oil production facilities and pipelines. The other was to attack supertankers outside the strait that receive oil transferred from smaller vessels.

 

Attacks on production facilities and pipelines carried risks because they involved striking a country’s territory. They would also deprive the other side of recovery time and could provoke anger and a more forceful response. Nevertheless, this approach has also been pursued to some extent by Yemen and Iraqi resistance groups.

 

By contrast, targeting tankers outside the territorial waters and territory of regional states was considered a more flexible option than directly attacking those countries.

People drive past a billboard about the Strait of Hormuz, on a building in Tehran, Iran, September 16, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

4. The Persian Gulf’s dependence on supertankers for energy exports

Russian oil and gas exports to China, as well as similar Canadian exports to the United States, can be transported through pipelines. Norway and the United Kingdom can also supply domestic and European markets using smaller tankers. In the Persian Gulf, however, large vessels are more important because reaching East Asian markets requires long ocean voyages.

 

The region’s dependence on supertankers, combined with its high export volumes, the distance to consumer markets and changing buyers, makes these vessels effective targets for disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and keeping prices elevated.

 

Attacks on supertankers can disrupt exports from the region, drive up vessel prices and further increase transportation costs.

 

5. The political and media impact of attacks on supertankers

Attacks on supertankers generate significant media attention because of the high value of their cargoes and the extensive fires that can result. Such attacks send a message to the international community and public opinion that the Strait of Hormuz is closed and that Trump’s statements about its being open should not be trusted.

6. Damage to container ships and the expansion of the confrontation

Singapore has announced that two Singapore-flagged container ships were damaged in the Strait of Hormuz on October 13 and 14. Singapore attributes the damage to projectiles, while the IRGC Navy has reported that a non-compliant vessel was damaged after striking a naval mine.

 

Singapore’s account points to a deliberate attack, whereas Iran’s account attributes the damage to a violation of restrictions and passage through a prohibited area.

 

Regardless of the disagreement over the cause of the incidents, damage to container ships has significant implications. Previous attacks have largely focused on oil tankers, although the volume of shipping traffic through the strait has reportedly remained below 10 percent even under the most favorable conditions.

 

Damage to container ships could indicate an expansion of the range of targets from oil tankers and military vessels to other types of ships. This development raises two possibilities. The first is extensive mine-laying intended to completely block maritime traffic. The second is the selective targeting of container ships to counter the US naval blockade against Iran, which encompasses the movement of all types of vessels.

 

 

7. The naval blockade and the contest of attrition

The United States’ objective in imposing a naval blockade on Iran is to break the country’s domestic resilience and force it to surrender or prepare the ground for a subsequent military offensive. Both scenarios involve either changing the nature of Iran’s political system or physically overthrowing it.

 

Some observers believe Venezuela had the option of surrendering, but that Washington is focused solely on rapid regime overthrow and partition in Iran because of the country’s considerable strength, capabilities and potential for recovery.

 

In response, Iran is pursuing a strategy of placing the Arab states along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf under pressure. These countries are important to the United States and the global economy, and they are also seen as part of the process that encouraged Washington to go to war and impose a blockade on Iran.

 

Pressure on Arab states through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, combined with the activities of Iraqi resistance groups and Yemen on the northern front, daily attacks on Saudi infrastructure and occasional but significant attacks on the UAE, has accelerated the erosion of these states’ resilience.

 

The issue goes beyond financial losses. Economic instability in these countries could lead to domestic unrest and create conditions for attacks by resistance groups from outside their borders, mirroring the scenario envisioned for Iran.

 

8. US military equipment transfers aboard container ships

Reports indicate that the United States continues to transfer military equipment to the Persian Gulf aboard container ships. This could also be cited as a factor used to justify attacks on such vessels.