WANA (May 02) – Before the war imposed on Iran by the United states and Israel, which began on February 28, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz largely remained a latent capability.

 

Many analysts and observers, both in Iran and globally, acknowledged Iran’s geopolitical position, yet did not expect this capacity to ever become an operational tool.

 

The prevailing assumption was that the costs of such a move would be so high that Tehran would never resort to using this lever in practice. It is said that Netanyahu relied on this very assumption in persuading Trump to take military action against Iran.

 

However, the recent war fundamentally altered this equation. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the early days of the conflict demonstrated that what had previously been seen as a theoretical threat could, in fact, be executed.

 

 

Now, two months into the war, and following Iran’s extensive and calculated control over this critical global waterway—and the consolidation of that control—global perceptions of the Strait are beginning to shift.

 

Although the United States and some of its allies continue to emphasize a return to the previous status quo, in practice many international actors have concluded that the “post-war Hormuz” will not be the same as it was before.

 

A sharp decline in shipping traffic, an unprecedented surge in energy prices, and efforts by governments and companies to accommodate Iran’s position all point to a lasting shift in how this passage is perceived globally.

 

The United States’ resistance to accepting this reality also stems from deeper strategic considerations.

A man holds a picture of the late Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on a street in Tehran, Iran, April 12, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

In effect, acknowledging that Iran has turned the Strait of Hormuz into a practical and effective lever would amount to admitting a strategic failure—one that has not only fallen short of achieving Washington’s stated war objectives, but has also strengthened Iran’s position compared to before the war.

 

Washington’s insistence on the Strait’s international status and its rejection of any form of Iranian control can be understood as an attempt to prevent the consolidation of a new regional and global reality.

 

That said, the core issue goes beyond whether the Strait is currently closed. The key point is the shift in perceptions of capability.

 

Iran has now demonstrated not only that it is capable of closing the Strait, but also that such an action, if deemed necessary, could be repeated multiple times at relatively low cost.

 

In other words, what matters is the “ability” to close the Strait—not necessarily keeping it closed.