WANA (Apr 11) – On Friday, Trump’s deputy departed for Islamabad to take part in negotiations with Iran. There is still no confirmed news about the Iranian delegation’s departure. However, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, head of the Iranian team, stated in a post this afternoon that two unfulfilled components of the agreement—namely a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of frozen assets—must be implemented before the talks begin.

 

This post suggests that the ceasefire agreement includes provisions that are gradually coming to light. If the U.S. side has accepted that Iran’s frozen assets would be released as part of the ceasefire terms, this in itself indicates Iran’s relatively strong position in the agreement.

 

Of course, this assumes that Washington does not backtrack on this issue, as it has done regarding Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire. It also remains unclear whether this concession was offered merely to persuade Tehran to accept a temporary ceasefire, to facilitate direct negotiations between the two sides, or both.

 

At first glance, these two conditions might suggest that Iran will not travel to Islamabad until they are fulfilled. However, Ghalibaf’s wording—“must be implemented before the start of negotiations”—implies a different scenario: the delegation may indeed travel to Pakistan, likely so, but will refrain from initiating talks until these conditions are met. Even if this interpretation holds, it is technically uncertain whether the release of Iran’s frozen assets can be carried out within such a short timeframe—unless Tehran has already received firm guarantees. In that case, publicizing the issue of frozen assets may serve not only as leverage on the opposing side but also as part of a media strategy—to reinforce a “victory narrative” that Iran secured concessions and did not enter negotiations without its conditions being met.

Iranian people attend a ceremony marking 40 days since the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in Israeli and U.S. strikes, in Tehran, Iran, April 9, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

In any case, assuming the talks do proceed, the central question remains: will an agreement be reached? This is extremely difficult to answer. Even the negotiating parties themselves may not have a clear answer at this stage, let alone outside observers with no access to the details.

 

That said, addressing another question may help clarify the likely outcome: what motivated Trump to pursue and accept a ceasefire? Broadly speaking, two main possibilities can be considered.

 

First, he may be seeking an “honorable exit” from a costly war, framed through dramatic rhetoric such as setting deadlines and threatening to bomb power facilities. Second, he may simply be buying time—either to regroup militarily, deploy new equipment, and mobilize NATO and other actors to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, or to manage the economic consequences of the war, particularly within the United States.

 

If the first scenario is correct, it implies a degree of genuine willingness on Trump’s part to reach a deal. However, this does not mean he would accept every demand from Tehran or fully agree to a comprehensive proposal as it stands.

 

Despite the war failing to achieve its objectives, neither Trump nor even anti-war factions in the U.S. would support what could be perceived as a surrender-like agreement. Under this scenario, any deal would need to allow Trump room to present himself as a “winner”—for instance, through mutually acceptable initiatives on disputed nuclear issues or by repackaging previously discussed economic incentives in a new framework.

 

If, however, the second scenario—buying time for a renewed conflict—is the correct one, then the outlook is clearer: Trump would only accept an agreement that satisfies most of his maximalist demands.

A woman walks on a street after a two-week ceasefire in the Iran war, in Tehran, Iran, April 8, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

In either case, it appears that Trump is using the threat of resuming the war and targeting power infrastructure as leverage to steer negotiations toward a favorable outcome. Iran, on the other hand, is seeking to convert its 40-day resistance into what it sees as a “strategic political victory.”

 

This divergence represents the core challenge for Tehran in the negotiation: whether these opposing approaches can converge into a workable compromise remains highly uncertain.

 

Beyond the failure to achieve its war objectives, perhaps the most significant development so far has been control over the Strait of Hormuz—something that would not have been possible under normal circumstances.

 

This has strengthened Tehran’s hand in negotiations and increased its leverage over the U.S. and its allies. Iran may well view control of the strait as a tangible gain with benefits exceeding those of any potential agreement with Washington.

 

As such, it may adopt a firm stance in the talks—and even in the event of an agreement, it is unlikely to agree, at least easily, to restoring the Strait of Hormuz to its pre-war status.