The Fear Rooted in Iran’s Power
WANA (Feb 23) – In recent months, the prospect of war with Iran has turned into a wide-ranging political, media, and strategic debate in the United States and Israel, encompassing governments, elites, and public opinion alike.
Within this context, the recent meeting in Washington between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu ended without a clear conclusion or final decision, despite extensive media speculation.
This strategic deadlock coincided with remarks by John Mearsheimer, the prominent American political scientist, who stated unequivocally that neither the United States nor Israel possesses an effective military strategy for achieving a rapid victory over Iran—and that, in reality, no viable strategy for winning such a war exists at all.
According to Mearsheimer, Trump is well aware that even a prolonged war would not guarantee success, a realization that has gradually pushed him away from the military option.
This assessment is reflected in Trump’s recent rhetoric. In recent days, he has spoken less about the deployment of aircraft carriers or military aircraft to the region and more about the necessity of successful negotiations with Iran.
Yet the demands raised in these talks are largely the same objectives whose realization through war has already proven deeply uncertain, casting doubt on their achievability through military pressure as well.
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At the level of public opinion, American society shows a high degree of concern about the possibility of another war with Iran. Between early January and early February, at least three credible nationwide polls were conducted on this issue, all indicating strong opposition to military action.
The results suggest that only about 18 to 28 percent of Americans support a military strike against Iran, while an overwhelming majority oppose it. This stands in stark contrast to 2003, when more than 70 percent of Americans supported the invasion of Iraq, highlighting a fundamental shift in public attitudes toward costly wars in the Middle East.
Alongside public opposition, anti-war momentum has also intensified in the U.S. Congress. Several members of Congress have openly stated their opposition to escalating tensions with Iran, emphasizing that the president does not have the constitutional authority to declare war without congressional approval.
Legislative initiatives are even being advanced to reaffirm Congress’s exclusive power to authorize war and to prevent the United States from entering yet another military conflict in the Middle East. These developments indicate that resistance to war with Iran has moved beyond public sentiment and into the formal structures of power.
Doubts are not confined to Congress and public opinion; they have also penetrated Trump’s inner circle. Media reports suggest that he has yet to make a final decision on Iran and continues to consult advisers and allies while weighing multiple options.
Former U.S. officials have acknowledged that while both sides are militarily prepared, they are equally aware that initiating a war could unleash uncontrollable consequences.
Washington’s primary concern is Iran’s response—one expected to be extensive, severe, and impossible to calculate in advance—potentially targeting U.S. forces, bases, and interests, as well as those of its allies, across a radius of several thousand kilometers.
People walk past an anti-US billboard on a street in Tehran, Iran, February 17, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
The roots of this fear and indecision lie in Iran’s material and intangible power. Western analysts increasingly acknowledge that Iran is now in a stronger strategic position than in the past, a reality that has directly shaped U.S. and Israeli calculations.
As Mearsheimer has argued, a war with Iran is fundamentally unwinnable. Trump thus finds himself trapped: launching an attack could severely undermine his domestic political standing, while backing down would make him appear weak.
One of Washington’s core dilemmas is that Iran has prepared itself for what it views as a decisive, final confrontation and appears unwilling to settle for anything less than outright victory. This stands in sharp contrast to Trump’s psychological and strategic approach, which is built on intimidation and extracting concessions without paying a significant cost.
Another major contradiction is that the United States lacks a credible solution for countering the inevitable impact of Iran’s missile and multi-layered strike capabilities, even as Trump’s declared doctrine rests on the idea of a swift, limited, and low-casualty war. These contradictions have significantly complicated decision-making on Iran.
Military experts further emphasize that even U.S. aircraft carriers—despite their layered defensive systems and extensive protection by escort vessels—remain vulnerable to Iran’s diverse and multi-dimensional military designs. Long-range strikes, subsurface weapons, and combined land–sea launch capabilities seriously challenge the technological advantages of the U.S. Navy. Damage to, or the loss of, even a single aircraft carrier could carry enormous human, psychological, and political consequences for Washington.
Given that U.S. military bases across the region—and even beyond—are directly within range of Iran’s missile and naval capabilities, and considering Iran’s ability to project these threats into open oceans, there is effectively no safe exit from the consequences of war for the United States.
Under such conditions, Trump appears to be focusing less on overt military options “on the table” and more on hidden or indirect pathways that might allow for a less costly and more face-saving exit from this strategic impasse.
In conclusion, U.S. reluctance to engage in war with Iran cannot be explained solely by public opposition or congressional resistance. At its core, this hesitation is driven by Iran’s deterrent power—power that has transformed war into a high-cost, high-risk option with no clear prospect of victory, leaving American decision-makers mired in fear and strategic uncertainty.
The Likelihood of a Military Attack on Iran
WANA (Feb 21) – Recent developments in relations between Iran and the United States have entered a phase that can no longer be described merely as political pressure or diplomatic bargaining. The setting of deadlines, the presentation of unacceptable demands, ambiguity surrounding the course of negotiations, and the simultaneous emphasis on the military option […]
