WANA (Feb 09) – Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, Iran’s Minister of Defense, traveled to the Republic of Azerbaijan at the head of a delegation and met with President Ilham Aliyev to discuss bilateral and regional issues.

 

During the meeting, Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan has always taken into account the strengthening of Iran’s stability and security. Expressing concern over the regional security situation, he emphasized: “Within the framework of sincere and brotherly relations, we will not allow any threat from the Republic of Azerbaijan to be directed at the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

 

Although Iranian defense ministers have visited Baku numerous times during the nearly three decades of Azerbaijan’s independence, this trip differs from previous ones in several respects. It may be somewhat comparable to the visit of then–Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan to Baku in April 2015.

 

General Nasirzadeh’s visit took place precisely at a moment when tensions and the likelihood of military confrontation between Iran, the United States, and the Israeli regime have reached their highest level in recent years. Naturally, at such a time—when military commanders are preoccupied with managing a potential battlefield—undertaking such a visit signals objectives that are less openly discussed.

 

The trip comes under circumstances in which, since June 2025, the Republic of Azerbaijan—beyond numerous anti-Iranian measures—has, on two occasions, demonstrated the true nature of its anti-Iranian posture, irrespective of its declared policies:

Iranian Defense Minister Arrives in Baku. Social media / WANA News Agency

First, during the 12-day military aggression by the Israeli regime against Iran, Azerbaijan reportedly provided not only its land and maritime space but also several drone and air bases—particularly those near the shared border—for attacks on Iran, especially targeting the northwest and Tehran.

 

The volume of Israeli drone incursions from Azerbaijani airspace into Iran was reportedly so high that few Iranian or Azerbaijani border residents failed to witness them with the naked eye. Alongside this hostile partnership, Azerbaijan refrained from condemning the military aggression until the final day of the war.

 

At the level of foreign minister, it merely expressed concern, using the Israeli term “military operation.” Simultaneously, while amassing military forces along the border, Baku allegedly awaited the fulfillment of the Israeli regime’s promise of Iran’s collapse and the next phase of the enemy’s plan—namely, playing a role in Iran’s fragmentation.

 

Second, during the protests that followed—events which, according to the text, escalated into violent unrest on January 8–9 due to U.S. and Israeli intervention and the deployment of terrorist groups—the government in Baku again refrained from condemning the unrest or the alleged plot to fragment Iran. Azerbaijani media outlets, in line with Israeli media, were accused of distorting and blackening developments inside Iran.

 

Following Baku’s alleged participation in the 12-day war and Azerbaijan’s transformation into part of the Israeli battlefront against Iran’s existence, and amid rising national demands in Iran for an effective response to what were described as Baku’s betrayals, a campaign emerged aimed at whitewashing Azerbaijan’s image by denying its role in the conflict. Three complementary actors, inside and outside the country, were said to be involved:

 

  • The Israeli regime, which even prior to the 12-day war had reportedly conducted drills—under the cover of the Azerbaijani army—simulating strikes on Iranian radar sites in the northwest, assured Baku that all radars had been destroyed and that Tehran therefore lacked documentation proving Azerbaijan’s participation in the attacks.

 

  • Ilham Aliyev, in a meeting with Iran’s ambassador in Baku, reportedly went on the offensive—relying on Israeli assurances—and described Tehran’s claims about Israeli use of Azerbaijani territory as “fabrications,” demanding evidence. The same stance was reportedly taken in talks with other Iranian officials.

 

  • A third element, described as an ethnic lobby betraying the noble Azerbaijani identity within Iran, amplified the denial campaign in the media. It falsely claimed that during the 12-day war, Aliyev had asked Israel not to target Iran’s Azerbaijani-populated regions with missiles. Meanwhile, what was described as a structural layer of infiltrators within state institutions allegedly cited a lack of radar documentation and argued that opening a new front against Azerbaijan would be unwise—thus attempting to block public demands in Iran for a response. This was said to be despite the fact that Azerbaijan had effectively become part of the Israeli battlefield against Iran, with many blows delivered through that channel.

 

Over time, however, as more evidence allegedly emerged regarding Baku’s hostile involvement in the 12-day war, and as Iran’s defense doctrine reportedly shifted from a defensive to an offensive and regional posture in anticipation of future conflict, Iran’s approach toward regional allies of the Israeli regime—both to the north and south—has undergone fundamental change.

 

Iran’s Supreme Leader: If the U.S. Starts a War, It Will Be Regional

WANA (Feb 01) – The Supreme Leader of Iran stated: The United States should know that if it starts a war, this time it will be a regional war.   Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, said in today’s meeting with a large group of people regarding recent U.S. threats: That they […]

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The Supreme Leader’s warning that the United States should understand that if it starts a war, “this time it will be a regional war,” carries a clear message for countries that, by betraying Islamic ideals, have become strategic military, energy, transit, and commercial assets for the Israeli regime—while simultaneously creating valuable opportunities for Tehran in any forthcoming conflict.

 

Despite diplomatic rhetoric of friendship and neighborliness, Baku’s leaders likely understand better than anyone the hostile role attributed to them against Iran. This may explain Azerbaijan’s continued closure of its land borders with Iran and President Aliyev’s avoidance of Iranian airspace during his recent trip to the United Arab Emirates, choosing instead a longer route outside Iranian airspace.

 

In this context, the Iranian military delegation’s visit to Baku is highly significant. During his April 2015 trip—shortly after an Israeli Hermes drone launched from Nakhchivan entered Iranian territory and was downed en route to Natanz—then–Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan warned Aliyev. At the time, Azerbaijan’s defense minister claimed the action had been carried out by “guests” (Israelis) without Baku’s knowledge, and the matter ended with Aliyev’s apology.

 

This time, however, mere apologies, feigned ignorance, or demands for proof may not suffice. Baku’s apparent belief that the Israeli regime or another country could, in a future war, prevent Iran from exercising what it considers its legitimate right to respond to the sources and allies of military aggression resembles the mindset of a gambler convinced that he will inevitably win every wager.