WANA (Jun 21) – Several days have passed since Iran and the United States reached a memorandum of understanding. Despite the implementation of the provision concerning the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the lifting of Iran’s naval blockade, the first clause of the agreement—ending the war in Lebanon—has not only remained unfulfilled, but Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon have continued and even intensified.

 

This is particularly significant because, since the signing of the memorandum, Israel has effectively acted contrary to both its spirit and its provisions. It appears that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has two main reasons for opposing an end to the war in Lebanon.

 

First, he sees the conflict as a tool to derail the agreement with Iran and create a new regional playing field for the United States against Tehran.

 

Second, with the upcoming Knesset elections, ending the war could effectively mark the beginning of the countdown to the end of his political career. In addition, preventing the emergence of Iran’s “unity of fronts” doctrine seems to be another motive behind Israel’s determination to keep the conflict alive.

 

Iran

Islamabad’s MOU Enforcement Challenge in the Face of Israel

WANA (Jun 20) – Article 1 (Iran- U.S. MoU) discusses the end of the war. The text has properly considered this and emphasized the following points: that military operations must cease; it has factored in the distinction between military operations and war.   It has emphasized the halting of any war or military operation, and […]

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This time, however, unlike the aftermath of the April 8 ceasefire—which was never implemented in Lebanon—Iran responded immediately by closing the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, in a noteworthy move, the Iranian negotiating team headed to Geneva. By dispatching its delegation while simultaneously closing the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran appears to be pursuing two objectives: first, containing tensions and demonstrating its willingness to remain on the diplomatic path and continue negotiations; and second, strengthening the Iranian delegation’s leverage in the Geneva talks.

 

In essence, Iran’s swift response is intended to prevent the selective implementation of the commitments contained in the memorandum and to ensure that the other side does not reduce the agreement merely to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz while evading its other obligations.

 

Another objective behind Tehran’s decision to play the Hormuz card once again is to exert implicit pressure on the United States ahead of the sixty-day negotiations over a final agreement.

 

The key question now is how Donald Trump will respond after Iran once again targeted what many consider America’s Achilles’ heel in the Strait of Hormuz, and to what extent this move can compel Washington to honor its commitments, particularly regarding ending the war in Lebanon.