WANA (Mar 22) – A few hours ago, Donald Trump wrote on his social media platform: “If Iran does not fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz—without any threats—within 48 hours from this moment, the United States will target and destroy their various power plants, beginning with the largest one.”

 

Despite having said just a day earlier that the operation in Iran was nearing its end and that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz was not his concern—arguing that any country using the strait should take action to reopen it—Trump has now assumed responsibility for the issue. This marks a clear shift in his behavior: from indifference and claims that U.S. interests were not involved, to full ownership of the situation.

 

This change in tone and conduct sends a clear message: Trump is deeply frustrated by the situation in the strait and is under intense pressure. Without reopening it, he cannot claim victory in the war or bring it to a close. When viewed alongside his earlier remarks suggesting an end to the conflict, it becomes evident that his plan to conclude the war is tied to an operation that would lead to reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

 

In effect, the key to victory in the so-called Ramadan war lies in the status of the strait. For now, that key remains in Iran’s hands, and from the outset, Tehran has shown readiness to safeguard it. Even the first message from the new Leader of the Revolution emphasized this point. Trump’s recent remarks have only reinforced this reality for Iran, naturally strengthening its resolve to maintain this leverage.

A woman holds a picture of Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, during the funeral of Iranian security chief Ali Larijani and victims of the IRIS Dena warship at Enghelab Square, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 18, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

So far, Trump’s efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz have included:

 

  • Insuring vessels and providing U.S. naval escorts: This option never materialized in practice. Ships were unwilling to take the risk, and the U.S. Navy showed no readiness to escort them.

 

  • Forming an international coalition: Trump made extensive efforts to rally other countries for a military operation to reopen the strait. However, none of these attempts succeeded. Countries firmly rejected his proposals, prompting visible frustration in his statements and posts. Senator Lindsey Graham even noted that he had never seen Trump so angry, attributing it to repeated refusals from other nations.

 

  • Targeting energy infrastructure: This step was taken on the nineteenth day of the war, when parts of the South Pars gas field were hit. In response, Iran targeted various facilities across the Persian Gulf region as well as in Israel, most notably a liquefied gas facility in Qatar. This escalation ultimately led Trump to pull back.

 

  • Seizing an Iranian island and negotiating: This is one of the more widely discussed scenarios, supported by certain on-the-ground movements. The redeployment of naval forces from various parts of the world to the region is a key indicator. There have also been conflicting statements from Trump on this matter. In media discussions, Khark Island has been highlighted as a possible target. This option carries significant risks for the United States and could result in heavy casualties—something Washington is keen to avoid.

 

  • Issuing a deadline and threatening to destroy power plants: This appears to be the latest option. However, Trump’s pattern suggests he does not typically reveal his actual operational plans. His threats often serve as psychological pressure or, at times, deception, and he frequently shifts his positions. Similar patterns were observed both in the 12-day war and in the Ramadan conflict.

 

Recent developments indicate that Iran tends to respond to escalating tensions with even stronger countermeasures, often expanding its response across the region and into occupied Palestinian territories.

 

Therefore, it is unlikely that Trump’s threats will lead to a change in Iran’s behavior—especially now that Tehran sees how significantly the closure of the Strait of Hormuz pressures the United States. In practice, Trump’s deadline and threats may produce the opposite effect.