Why Seizing an Iranian Island Could Backfire?
WANA (Mar 27) – What has become increasingly visible in recent days is the outline of a new phase of escalation by the United States and its regional partners. The signs are not limited to troop movements and military deployments in the Persian Gulf. They are also reflected in Donald Trump’s familiar pattern of deception, ambiguity, and strategic delay.
As discussed before, Washington’s preferred model is not a long war of attrition. It is a series of fast, limited, but decisive blows designed to produce a “visible victory” — one that can be showcased both on the battlefield and in the political and media arena.
Within that framework, several scenarios have been floated: heliborne operations, limited ground incursions, or the seizure of Iranian islands in the south. The heliborne scenario — largely focused on striking key missile facilities or targeting uranium stockpiles — is not the focus here. This assessment is specifically concerned with military scenarios in the Persian Gulf and southern Iran, where the U.S. may seek to shift the course of the war through a limited but highly symbolic operation.
In such a scenario, Washington and its partners would likely pursue three core objectives:
First: reopening the Strait of Hormuz
Second: imposing economic pressure by disrupting Iran’s access to its oil terminals
Third: reducing or halting missile and drone strikes against Arab states and U.S. bases in the region
If those goals are achieved, the United States would gain a tangible victory it could present to allies and domestic audiences alike — while also trying to weaken morale inside Iran.
At the same time, recent statements and signals suggest that some Arab states — particularly the UAE and Bahrain — may not simply be bystanders. In Tehran, the view appears to be hardening that certain regional actors are doing more than hosting American bases. They may also be contributing logistical support, intelligence, and even critical infrastructure for possible offensive operations.
That is the context in which recent warnings from sources close to Iran’s military establishment should be read. One such warning spoke of “special preparations” for the UAE and Bahrain, describing them as “unprecedented” and promising consequences that would be “highly damaging and instructive” if either state played a role in any attack on Iranian islands. In effect, the message was simple: any regional participation in an assault on Iranian territory would carry a direct and painful price.
Members of the Iranian Army take part in an annual drill in the coastal area of the Gulf of Oman and near the Strait of Hormuz, Iran
From an operational perspective, the islands most likely to feature in any limited or symbolic move can be divided by function. Islands such as Kharg and Lavan would matter more in relation to the second and third objectives — energy pressure and disruption of southern support infrastructure. By contrast, islands such as Larak, Hengam, Hormuz, and even Qeshm would be more directly tied to the first objective: shaping the balance of control around the Strait of Hormuz and its critical maritime routes.
Given the political sensitivities of certain Arab states, a scenario involving Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb also cannot be ruled out. Such a move would not be purely tactical. It could also serve as a form of political hostage-taking — a symbolic concession to regional partners and a means of escalating pressure.
Other scenarios, such as a limited push along Iran’s southern coastline, have also been discussed, though there is still not enough evidence to assess them conclusively.
If such an operation were launched, the first phase would almost certainly involve heavy bombardment of coastal lines, ports, support hubs, logistical infrastructure, and command-and-control nodes. As in previous patterns, Israel would likely play a complementary role by attempting to disrupt Iran’s command structure — through targeted assassinations, covert strikes, or efforts to create confusion in the decision-making chain.
Still, several key points stand out in assessing this scenario.
Members of the Iranian Army take part in an annual drill in the coastal area of the Gulf of Oman and near the Strait of Hormuz, Iran
1. Even Seizing Islands Would Not Automatically Mean Success
The first point is straightforward: even if the U.S. were able to temporarily seize some islands in a limited operation, that would not necessarily mean it had achieved its strategic goals.
In fact, escalation in southern Iran could produce the opposite effect. It could make the Strait of Hormuz more dangerous over the long term and push Iran toward harder options. And in such a situation, the issue would not stop at Hormuz. The Bab el-Mandeb could also become part of the equation through the involvement of aligned regional actors.
Likewise, even if direct Iranian fire against certain Arab states were reduced, that would not necessarily mean the pressure had ended. Allied actors in Iraq and Yemen could compensate for any such shift. And as Iran has repeatedly signaled, any serious attempt to cut off Iranian oil exports could trigger disruption across the region’s wider energy flows — turning any supposed American “economic win” into a broader energy crisis.
2. A Ground Scenario Is Exactly Where U.S. Casualties Could Spike
Since the start of the conflict, for a variety of reasons, Iran has not had an easy opportunity to inflict mass casualties on U.S. forces at scale. A ground or semi-ground scenario — especially on islands or along the southern coastline — would change that.
Once American troops are physically on the ground, part of their technological advantage narrows. That is where the potential for rapid manpower attrition rises sharply.
That is why recent Iranian political and media messaging has placed such heavy emphasis on readiness for a “ground war.” In one narrative circulated by sources close to the military establishment, it was said explicitly that “a wave of enthusiasm has emerged among Iran’s ground fighters to build a historic hell for Americans on Iranian soil.”
Some Iranian outlets meanwhile, reported that “more than one million fighters” had been organized for ground combat, adding that “a massive wave of requests from young Iranians” had recently flooded Basij, IRGC, and Army recruitment centers to take part if such a scenario materialized.
Whatever the propaganda value of those numbers or that language, the core message is unmistakable: Tehran wants Washington to understand that crossing the threshold into ground combat would not produce a quick win. It would open the door to a slow, bloody, and expensive fight.
3. If Trump Is Gambling, Iran’s Response Must Break the Logic of the Bet
If this war is moving toward the point where the major cards are finally placed on the table, it is natural that Washington would begin considering riskier options.
Trump’s political instinct matters here. Time and again, he has approached crises like a gambler: he throws a card on the table — no matter how risky — and waits to see whether the other side flinches. If the opponent backs down, he wins. But if he meets resolve and absorbs an unexpected cost, that same move can turn against him.
From that perspective, the key to defeating this pattern lies in absorbing the first blow, regrouping quickly, and escalating in a calibrated but painful way. Up to this point, that is broadly the model Iran appears to have followed.
4. Tehran’s Warning to Regional Backers Has Become Far More Explicit
In recent days, the tone of Iranian officials and media close to the state has become notably sharper toward any regional state seen as enabling a possible operation — especially the UAE and Bahrain.
In one of the clearest warnings so far, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said that “based on some information, Iran’s enemies, with the backing of a regional country, are preparing an operation to occupy one of Iran’s islands.”
He followed that with a direct threat: “All enemy movements are under the surveillance of our armed forces. If they make a move, all vital infrastructure in that regional country will be targeted without limitation by relentless strikes.”
This was more than rhetorical posturing. It marked a shift in deterrent signaling — from warning of retaliation in principle to explicitly threatening the critical infrastructure of any regional facilitator.
That message was reinforced by Yousef Pezeshkian, son and adviser to the Iranian president, who described Ghalibaf’s statement as significant and added: “It seems our armed forces have been preparing for such days for years. Everything is being carried out in a calculated and organized way.”
In the media sphere, the language has been even more direct. Outlets close to the IRGC openly addressed American troops with a blunt message: “To all American soldiers: you are on the verge of facing a true master of ground warfare. Welcome to Iran.”
That kind of rhetoric is not just propaganda. It is meant to shape a psychological frame: if the battlefield shifts to land, it will no longer be a domain of low-cost American superiority.
At the same time, some voices inside Iran have tried to downplay parts of the regional hype. One parliamentary figure, for example, dismissed reports of Emirati readiness for a ground war with Iran as “more of a joke.” That contrast suggests Tehran is pursuing two tracks at once: maximal deterrent messaging while avoiding uncontrolled exaggeration of the American scenario.
Members of the Iranian Army take part in an annual drill in the coastal area of the Gulf of Oman and near the Strait of Hormuz, Iran
5. Even Many in the U.S. View a Ground Invasion as a Dangerous Gamble
Another important point is that even within the United States, a ground invasion of Iran is widely seen as a high-cost and highly uncertain option.
The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan remain deeply ingrained for American military planners and foreign policy analysts alike. Iran’s geography, strategic depth, difficult terrain, and asymmetric capabilities would make such a campaign potentially far more expensive than past wars.
So even if reports about Pentagon planning for ground contingencies are taken seriously, the existence of such plans should not be confused with confidence in success. In many cases, the mere fact that these scenarios are being discussed may reflect the opposite: a narrowing of viable options.
6. Iran’s Pattern So Far: Absorb, Regroup, Escalate
Up to this point, Iran’s operating pattern against fast, surprise attacks has rested on three pillars: absorbing the initial blow, reorganizing quickly, and then responding through layered, escalating tactics.
That pattern is precisely what has prevented the United States and Israel from converting tactical gains into a clear strategic outcome.
In essence, the defining feature of this approach is the same one long associated with the “Axis of Resistance” model: flexibility, adaptation, and endurance. Washington may score tactical hits. It may achieve moments of surprise. It may even secure limited local gains. But what it has repeatedly failed to do is turn those gains into a durable strategic victory.
Taken together, a U.S. move against southern Iran or the islands of the Persian Gulf should be treated seriously — but it should also be understood for what it likely is: a high-risk gamble designed to manufacture the image of victory.
In the short term, the appeal is obvious: seize an island, display force, and present a quick battlefield success to allies and domestic audiences. But if Iran responds in a calibrated and determined way, that same move could quickly backfire — from a wider destabilization of the Strait of Hormuz and energy shocks, to the opening of new regional fronts and a sharp rise in U.S. casualties.
Kharg: The Island Where Iran Is Waiting for America
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