WANA (Mar 31) – Donald Trump, as the sitting U.S. president and the man who handed the strategic initiative to Israel and drew Washington into direct confrontation with Iran, now finds himself facing the most difficult phase of the crisis: how to bring the conflict to an end.

 

Following the direct U.S. attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, the American administration initially appeared to believe that a combination of targeted assassinations and limited strikes could deliver a tactical advantage and allow Washington to close the file on the confrontation from a position of strength. But developments on the ground quickly showed that this calculation was far removed from reality.

 

Iran’s pattern of response, the posture of the new Leader of the Revolution, and the emergence of a new generation of commanders who stepped into the war rooms after the assassination of senior military figures all contributed to shifting the trajectory of the conflict. Gradually, the possibility of “victory” slipped out of the hands of both the United States and Israel, and the balance began to tilt in the opposite direction.

 

Iran responded rapidly by targeting American and Israeli bases across the region with precision-guided and heavy missiles. At the same time, Tehran ordered the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—an action that carried not only military implications but also sweeping geopolitical and economic consequences for the wider world. I

 

nside Iran, public support for the political system manifested itself in visible and widespread form, while the country moved quickly to introduce a new national leadership structure, a development that carried both symbolic and operational significance in terms of internal cohesion.

People gather for the funeral of Iranian security chief Ali Larijani and victims of the IRIS Dena warship at Enghelab Square, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 18, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Taken together, these developments deprived America and Israel not only of the prospect of victory, but even of the feeling of victory, transferring that psychological advantage to Iran.

Now, roughly a month into the conflict, the consequences of that strategic shift are becoming increasingly visible. Following the military developments and the human toll of the war, the UN Human Rights Council has formally condemned the U.S.-Israeli attack on Minab.

 

On a broader level, the effects of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are beginning to show up in the global economy and international livelihoods, while Washington has so far demonstrated neither the capacity nor an effective mechanism to reopen it.

 

On the military front, enemy air defense systems have struggled to contain Iran’s missile barrages, and even advanced American aircraft such as the F-35 have reportedly not been beyond the reach of Iranian air defenses.

 

Alongside these developments, the Islamic Republic’s strategy of combining resistance with negotiation has increasingly been presented—both domestically and abroad—as a more rational and defensible approach.

 

The cumulative result of these developments, according to this reading, is that the United States and Israel have not only failed to secure a decisive victory, but have also lost the ability to credibly and cost-effectively claim an “absolute victory.”

 

Under these conditions, Trump faces a fundamental problem: how to exit the conflict without allowing defeat to be formally stamped on the White House.

 

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Two Scenarios Before Trump: From Media Withdrawal to a Dangerous Gamble

Trump is now effectively left with two options for ending the crisis—two scenarios that are both costly from a strategic perspective, though one is clearly less damaging than the other.

 

Scenario One: Declare Victory and End the Conflict Unilaterally

The first scenario, and the less costly option for Trump, would be for the U.S. president to declare an end to the conflict through media and messaging alone, without any meaningful shift on the battlefield, while simultaneously claiming victory.

 

In the eyes of many observers, this is the most likely option currently available to the White House. Under this scenario, Trump would attempt to rely on media framing and narrative management to portray withdrawal not as a retreat, but as the “successful completion of limited objectives.”

 

The problem, however, is that such a claim would be difficult to sustain—even if amplified by the American media apparatus—because it would likely ring hollow in the eyes of both the U.S. public and Washington’s allies.

 

The battlefield reality suggests that America’s entry into a limited confrontation with Iran has produced no clear gains, while generating significant military, economic, and reputational costs. These are costs Trump can neither fully repair nor easily conceal.

An Iranian couple walks near Iranian missiles in a park, amid the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 26, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Scenario Two: A “Big Move” to Manufacture the Image of Victory

The second scenario is far riskier and, in the logic of this analysis, far more reckless. In this version, Trump might seek to escape the current deadlock and create a more tangible image of victory by pursuing a dramatic but costly action—something large enough to offset accumulated setbacks across multiple fronts with a single “major achievement.”

 

That “big bite” could take the form of a high-profile commando raid inside Iran, an attempt to temporarily seize one of Iran’s islands in the Persian Gulf, or a visible but limited strike on critical Iranian infrastructure, especially in the energy sector.

 

Within this framework, some analysts also point to more complex, chaos-driven possibilities—scenarios described in some circles as a “triangle war.” Even so, according to assessments that existed even before the current conflict began, the timing for such plans has not yet arrived, and the United States and Israel appear to have postponed them for another stage.

 

Iran’s Islands: A Potential Trap for an American Gamble

From the perspective of some analytical circles in Iran, if Trump moves toward the second scenario, he will be stepping into risks that extend far beyond the assumptions of the American military and security establishment.

 

In other words, if the idea of seizing an Iranian island pushes Trump toward an impulsive commando operation, what would actually unfold on the ground may bear little resemblance to the victory image the White House hopes to project.

 

In this interpretation, just as Iran’s missile power rapidly imposed itself after the assassinations, Iran’s commando and ground-combat capabilities could also emerge in unexpected fashion in response to any limited U.S. move in the Persian Gulf.

 

Many military analysts stress that Iran is neither Iraq nor Afghanistan. It is a country with accumulated battlefield experience, highly capable special forces, and a layered missile deterrent.

 

Taken together—and reinforced by a societal willingness to resist—these factors make any limited ground or commando operation a gamble with a high probability of failure.

 

For that reason, a plan to seize an Iranian island, or any similar operation, may prove to be less an exit strategy and more the opening chapter of a deeper crisis for the United States.

 

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Striking Infrastructure: An Option That Could Regionalize the Fire

Another version of the second scenario would involve a limited but highly visible attack on Iran’s energy infrastructure and strategic facilities. Yet even this option, according to the same line of analysis, offers no guarantee of shifting the balance.

 

First, if Washington were to move in this direction, it would likely not be seeking an all-out war, but rather a “limited operation” intended to produce psychological shock and media impact.

 

The problem is that Iran’s energy architecture, contrary to the assumptions of some American planners, is neither entirely centralized nor easily crippled. In key sectors, it is built in a diffuse, asymmetric, and recoverable way, which reduces its vulnerability to limited strikes far more than many promotional scenarios assume.

 

Second, Iran’s response options are not confined to defense within its own borders. Tehran could respond by escalating missile strikes on sensitive targets, extending maritime pressure from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab, or activating allied fronts against Israel elsewhere in the region.

 

As a result, even a limited strike on Iranian infrastructure could, rather than creating a “showcase victory” for Washington, expand the conflict and raise its regional costs.

People walk past a huge billboard displaying images of Iranian missiles, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 16, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Trump and the Quagmire of His Own Making

The broader conclusion of this analysis is that under the second scenario, Trump is already in a structurally losing position. Any attempt to manufacture an artificial victory through limited but high-risk operations offers no guarantee of success and may instead drag Washington into a deeper and more dangerous quagmire.

 

In this framework, Trump’s current position resembles that of a man trapped up to his neck in a deep swamp. The only fragile lifeline still within his reach is to pull back from the confrontation with Iran and declare it over in whatever form he can.

 

The alternative—thrashing harder through limited strikes on energy infrastructure or adventurous commando operations—may still remain on the table, but for many observers, its outcome is already predictable: higher costs, a deeper crisis, and a heavier defeat.