WANA (Jul 27) – In a detailed interview, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, provided new insights into the behind-the-scenes decisions surrounding recent military operations, assassination attempts, ceasefire arrangements with Israel, and negotiations with the United States.

 

Araghchi and the 14th Government’s View on Operation “True Promise 2”

He explained, “When Martyr Haniyeh was assassinated, it was right after Dr. Pezeshkian had taken his oath of office, though the ministers had not yet been selected. I was one of the candidates for the foreign ministry.”

 

“That very evening, the Supreme Leader held a meeting—as he often does when critical issues arise. I was invited, along with members of the Supreme National Security Council, the President, and others, he said.”

 

Araghchi added, “In that session, everyone agreed that a response was necessary. However, there was disagreement among politicians and military commanders regarding the timing and method of retaliation.

 

Interestingly, the main hesitation over the timing came from the military side. The commanders believed that Operation “True Promise 2” should only be carried out when we were certain we could defend the country afterward—because retaliation could escalate into a full-scale war.”

Ismail Haniyeh and Masoud Pezeshkian

Esmail Haniyeh and Masoud Pezeshkian. Social media/ WANA News Agency

“Disagreements about the timing and manner of the operation existed within both the military and political leadership. The session concluded with a decision that military preparations for post-attack defense should be completed first, and then the operation would proceed, he said.”

 

Rumor of Pezeshkian’s Opposition to Operation “True Promise 3”

Iran’s foreign minister stated, “When ‘True Promise 3’ was proposed, one of the attendees criticized the delay, suggesting the President was opposed. At that point, Martyr General Bagheri confronted the individual and asked why he was spreading such claims by stating:

 

“I am responsible for the country’s defense. When I am confident we can withstand the consequences of Operation True Promise 3, I will proceed. I haven’t even asked the President yet.”

 

Araghchi said that General Bagheri fully defended the President. He added, “Both the government and armed forces must be prepared for such a situation.”

 

Iran’s foreign minister also noted that during his time on the National Security Council, he never felt that the government and military were on opposing sides. If disagreements did occur, they happened within the military or within the government—not between them. Decisions were always made collectively.

Major General Mohammad Bagheri, former Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces. Social media/ WANA News Agency

The Assassination Attempt on Araghchi During the War

He explained that he had not been contacted directly by the Israeli regime and, regarding a bombing near his residence during the war, stated: “A bomb was planted in the house across from mine, but it was intercepted by our security forces.”

 

As for the claims of the assassination attempt via drones on the Turkish border, he said: “I didn’t notice anything myself, but on multiple trips to and from Turkey during the war, drones flew over us. Our security personnel, using detection equipment, confirmed their presence. Phones were immediately turned off, and checks were made.”

 

New Details on the Iran-Israel Ceasefire

“Some questioned why the Foreign Minister declared the ceasefire. I told colleagues: “Why don’t they ask themselves—if the Foreign Minister announced it, why did the armed forces listen? Clearly, the decision came from elsewhere, Araghchi clarified.”

 

He added, “Before the ceasefire was announced, the Supreme National Security Council had decided that if the enemy requested an unconditional ceasefire, we would accept. This decision was made around the 8th or 9th day of the war. It was a smart move—and made from a position of strength.”

A security guard stands on a street, early hours of ceasefire, in Tehran, Iran, June 24, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

He further pointed out that all decisions of the Supreme National Security Council must be approved by the Supreme Leader before implementation.

 

Araghchi stated that at 1 AM, he was contacted and informed that Israel was ready to stop attacks at 4 AM and Several countries acted as intermediaries.

 

“I confirmed the matter with the relevant authorities. We did not officially accept a ceasefire. We simply stated: If they don’t strike us, we won’t strike them.”

 

The Misunderstanding Over Ceasefire Timing

He clarified, “A misunderstanding occurred between me and the armed forces. They had thought the ceasefire was effective until 4 AM GMT, which is 7:30 AM Tehran time—so they continued attacking Israeli positions until then.

 

“Another misunderstanding occurred that afternoon, which was resolved with a single phone call. Later that day, the regime claimed that Iran had violated the ceasefire and launched a missile. They sent aircraft in retaliation, he added.”

 

He continued, “I messaged Witkoff and informed that Israel is fabricating excuses and falsely accusing Iran. If they act, we will respond even more powerfully. Iran is not Lebanon—you won’t repeat what you did there.”

 

“You saw what happened afterward—Trump tweeted for Israeli pilots to return. That was the clearest sign that all of this was coordinated with the Americans from the beginning, he said.”

A view of Iranian newspapers, early hours of ceasefire, in Tehran, Iran, June 24, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

How Hopeful Was the Iranian Negotiation Team About Talks With the U.S.?

Araghchi stated, “The logic behind the JCPOA was for Iran to build trust regarding its nuclear program in exchange for lifting nuclear-related sanctions.

 

When Trump’s administration showed interest in talks, we said we were open to negotiation on that basis—as long as the goal was to ensure Iran doesn’t pursue nuclear weapons. We agreed to build confidence but not to shut anything down.

 

They appeared ready to talk about everything—but insisted uranium enrichment must stop. We firmly stood our ground.

 

Mediator countries and others proposed middle-ground solutions, like a consortium—but none succeeded. Once they realized Iran wouldn’t back down, they turned to military options.”

 

Did Iran’s Foreign Ministry Get Deceived in Negotiations?

Araghchi responded: “When the country decides to negotiate, it’s a collective decision. Saying the Foreign Ministry was “deceived” is incorrect. This was a national strategy. The Ministry acted under the direction of the system’s leadership.

 

We didn’t lose anything in negotiations. In fact, we gained a lot—we proved our legitimacy to the Iranian public and the international community.

 

Could someone claim war wouldn’t have happened without talks? It definitely could have—and possibly even sooner.

 

The reason the nation was united during the war was that they saw their government doing everything it could to prevent war, including negotiating. The other side was the one pursuing conflict.

 

Our logic was strong. That’s why more than 120 countries supported us and condemned the attack on Iran.”

Seyed Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Steve Witkoff, the head of the U.S. negotiation team. Social media/ WANA News Agency

Was Iran’s Government in War Mode Over the Past Year?

Iranian Foreign Minister, “The armed forces were in full combat posture—and the government had prepared for war.

 

After the assassination of Martyr Haniyeh, Operation True Promise 2, Syria’s fall, and Trump’s election—we reached the brink of war three times. Both the government and military were ready. Foreign policy worked intensively. Through active diplomacy, we were able to deter a full-scale war.

 

Everyone expected war after Operation True Promise 2. The Israelis sent messages saying our response would be “painful.”

 

To prevent war, I made 17 regional trips. Diplomacy is always the safer and less costly path to achieving goals—and should always be prioritized.

 

I conveyed this message to all countries: If a war breaks out between Iran and Israel, it will not remain limited to these two. Not because Iran wants to expand it—but because others would get involved.”

 

He said that he has also warned the countries that Israel is doing everything it can to drag the U.S. into the conflict. And if America enters, it’s not like our missiles will reach U.S. soil. I told some regional leaders: “Fortunately for us—but unfortunately for you—there are plenty of American bases nearby. We’ll have to target those.

 

 

Araghchi’s Response on Negotiating Post-War

Responding to the question about post-war negotiations, he stated: “When should one negotiate—after defeat, or after victory? You don’t negotiate when you’re defeated. That’s called surrender. You negotiate when you’re victorious—when your flag is raised—so you can assert your demands. Every war ends with arrangements, and those are made through dialogue—not with bombs and bullets.

 

I’m surprised—our flag is raised, we’ve proven our strength. Why shouldn’t we negotiate? Of course, we will negotiate—but we’ll calculate carefully: which talks, where, and about what—based on what benefits us.”

 

They believed they could finish everything in a week by taking out commanders, missile silos, and control centers. They thought the military would collapse, and the people would rise up.”

 

“That didn’t happen. Within hours, we replaced commanders. Our counterattacks began within hours. And the people stood by the system.”

 

“Then they requested a ceasefire—without preconditions. We resisted. We are the real victors—we imposed our will.”

 

“So why do some people think we can’t do the same in negotiations?”

 

“When the flag is up, you go negotiate. Not when it’s on the ground. Now, we hold our heads high, our voice is strong, the world has acknowledged us. Now is the time to negotiate.”