WANA (Oct 01) – The signs are hard to miss: a confidential meeting in Germany between senior U.S., Israeli and Arab military commanders, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security-focused visit to Abu Dhabi, and a renewed rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Taken together, these developments point to an important possibility: regional actors are preparing for a new phase of the Iran crisis, although it remains unclear whether that phase will lead to negotiations or further pressure.

 

The significance lies not in any one of these meetings, but in their timing and convergence. On September 15, senior military commanders from the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt met in Germany to discuss the war and its consequences. Such a gathering suggests that concerns over the future of the Iran crisis are no longer limited to Tehran and Washington, and that regional states are also coordinating for different possible scenarios.

 

Days later, Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Abu Dhabi and met with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. The UAE officially confirmed the visit, with Iran and regional developments among the issues discussed. Full details of the confidential talks have not been made public, so it would be premature to speak of any specific agreement or joint decision. But the meeting itself is significant given the current regional environment.

 

 

Abu Dhabi had previously sought to balance its close relationship with Israel with a degree of distance from Netanyahu’s policies. That caution now appears less visible. This does not necessarily mean a complete shift in the UAE’s policy, but it does suggest that the country’s security calculations have changed over the past seven months.

 

At the same time, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appear to be easing some of their differences. The Saudi defense minister’s invitation to Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed and his subsequent visit to Riyadh came as Iran once again emerged as one of the Gulf’s most pressing security concerns. The disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in recent years have been real and significant, but shared security concerns can sometimes push regional rivals toward closer coordination.

 

This matters for one reason: the Iran crisis is not only reshaping Tehran’s relations with Washington and Tel Aviv; it is also affecting relations among regional rivals themselves.

Iranian missiles are displayed next to a banner with a picture of Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, on a street in Tehran, Iran, September 27, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

During the early months of the war, the main concern for Arab states was largely the risk of the conflict spreading. Attacks on energy infrastructure, disruptions to trade and insecurity along maritime routes could directly damage their economies. But as the crisis has dragged on, some of these countries appear to have moved from simply trying to stay out of the conflict toward preparing for its consequences.

 

That shift should not be interpreted as a definite decision to pursue another war. Some of these consultations may be intended precisely to prevent surprises and contain the crisis. Either way, one point is becoming clearer: the region is no longer simply waiting for Tehran, Washington or Tel Aviv to decide the future on their own.

 

For Netanyahu, the Abu Dhabi visit is also more than a routine diplomatic engagement. Israel’s elections and domestic political considerations are certainly part of the broader context, but the visit cannot be reduced entirely to electoral calculations. Iran remains one of Israel’s central security concerns, and closer coordination with Arab states could become important for Tel Aviv under a range of future scenarios.

 

From this perspective, what matters most is the direction of the overall trend: more military contacts, broader security consultations, renewed engagement between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and a more active Israeli presence within this emerging network.

 

 

The key question is therefore not whether these moves will inevitably lead to another war; the available evidence is not sufficient to draw such a conclusion. The more important question is why regional actors increasingly feel the need to coordinate more closely than before as they prepare for the next phase of the crisis.

 

The Iran issue is once again becoming a central driver of the region’s security architecture. If this trend continues, decisions made in Tehran and Washington will not take place in isolation. Each move by the two sides could reshape the calculations and alignments of the actors around them.

 

These developments should therefore be viewed as more than a series of routine visits and meetings — not as definitive evidence of an impending war, but as a sign that the region is preparing for a more consequential phase ahead.