Pakistan Negotiations: When Iran Stayed Unified and the US Lost Control
WANA (Apr 14) – The negotiations, which lasted about 24 consecutive hours—partly in trilateral, face-to-face meetings and partly through written exchanges—and extended into technical and expert-level discussions, reflected a high degree of seriousness.
The Iranian delegation consisted of the main negotiators, an expert team, a media team, and security and support units. The diversity of participants, with different areas of expertise and perspectives, reflected a thoughtful strategy aimed at ensuring a strong and professional presence.
Unlike the American side, which arrived in Islamabad with an unusually large 300-person entourage, the Iranian delegation—though smaller at 71 members—was carefully selected to be both sufficient for effective negotiations and free of unnecessary personnel.
According to both supporters and critics, the Iranian delegation appeared both “powerful” and “rational.” On one hand, it demonstrated its commitment to defending Iran’s dignity and credibility, seeking to consolidate battlefield achievements through a diplomatic outcome.
On the other hand, it showed full command of technical details and a clear understanding of the logic required to reach a mutual agreement.
Despite internal diversity, the Iranian delegation acted as a “cohesive and authoritative whole,” and this unity, strength, and expertise generated considerable optimism among the Iranian public.
Although Mr. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had not previously participated in such negotiations with the American delegation, discussions among team members after the talks indicated strong satisfaction with his expertise, authority, and ability to manage the sessions, which they praised.
In contrast, the American delegation appeared to lack decision-making stability and showed notable internal disarray. The negotiators seemingly did not have sufficient authority and were repeatedly forced to coordinate with the White House. Some Western media sources also reported serious internal disagreements and a lack of cohesion within the U.S. negotiating team.
Despite the presence of J.D. Vance, Trump’s vice president, the American approach seemed to resemble “brokerage” or “real estate-style bargaining” more than principled political negotiation. Brokerage itself is a respectable profession when applied appropriately.
The issue is not the profession itself, but when such an approach enters the negotiation room, the nature of the discussions changes. As a result, despite progress in some areas, the talks stalled after a certain point due to excessive demands from the American side, and this round ultimately ended without a result.
The Iranian team, believing it held the upper hand both on the ground and in terms of reasoning, emphasized that it was in no rush to reach an agreement. Time pressure, they argued, rested on the United States, which needed to reach a result within two weeks.
The U.S. has reached a deadlock on the ground and sees diplomacy as its only reasonable path.

No Deal After 21 Hours of Iran-U.S. Talks
WANA (Apr 12) – In one of the most intense rounds of diplomacy between Tehran and Washington, 21 hours of negotiations in Islamabad concluded without an agreement, underscoring deep divisions and what Iranian sources describe as maximalist demands from the United States. According to information, the Iranian delegation was confronted with a set of […]
If it once again chooses an unreasonable route, it will incur heavy costs. Therefore, despite American claims that this was their “final offer” and that Iran must decide, it is in fact the United States that will be forced to accept realities in future rounds.
The U.S. is trying to create the impression that “the ball is in Iran’s court” and that Washington has no interest in continuing if its final proposal is rejected. This is described as a major deception.
If the U.S. had any viable alternative, it would have continued the war. Having already tested other options and seen the results, the reality is that it now needs negotiations more than anything else.
Some believe that the U.S. decision to impose a naval blockade on Iran is a new initiative that might help break its strategic deadlock. In reality, this option existed even before the third imposed war and was repeatedly considered during the conflict.
However, the hard realities on the ground prevented its implementation, and it is unlikely to succeed in the future as well. If this option had been beneficial for the U.S., it would not have turned to negotiations.
Therefore, the appearance of pursuing a blockade seems to be primarily a psychological pressure tactic aimed at extracting concessions at the negotiation table—something the Iranian team is fully aware of.





