What Hidden Agenda Lies Behind the New Threats Against Iran?
WANA (Oct 15) – “With the onset of a Gaza ceasefire, Israel and Iran are moving toward war. Given the dizzying speed of Iran’s rearmament and Israel’s preparations for a second round of strikes, the question is no longer whether this will happen but who will deliver the first preemptive blow.”
This is the new message recently posted in Persian by the social-media account “Terror Alarm,” a page widely regarded as a Mossad psychological-warfare arm online.
At first glance that sentence may look like a media warning, but at its core it reflects a larger design: a plan intended to prepare public opinion to “legitimize” a new confrontation with Iran.
The Latest Chapter in Israel’s Threats Against Iran
WANA (Sep 24) – In recent weeks, new signs of escalating tension between Iran and Israel have emerged—signals that resemble a psychological maneuver to manage the battlefield more than the prelude to a full-scale war. Security sources say Tel Aviv is working on a “new surprise,” a plan with clear objectives: striking Iran’s military, economic, […]
Terror Alarm is not merely a news channel; it functions as a format of narrative warfare. When that account asserts that the debate is no longer about whether war will occur but about “who strikes first,” it is doing two things: first, conditioning an international audience to accept the necessity of a “preemptive” action on security grounds; and second, placing the military option within the range of legitimate responses.
In reality, Terror Alarm’s threat is preparing the mental groundwork to justify a subsequent Israeli or U.S. action — just as similar campaigns preceded the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Donald Trump’s recent speech to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) marked the beginning of a new phase in this scenario. He not only hailed the killing of Soleimani as an “achievement,” he also spoke openly of “bombing Fordow” and “targeting Iran’s nuclear installations,” and ended, in a contradictory tone, by promising a “formal peace with Tehran.” The language of threat and humiliation wrapped in talk of peace is a familiar Trump tactic: to provoke a reaction rather than negotiation.
Sharm el-Sheikh Peace Summit on October 13, 2025. Social media/ WANA News Agency
A strike or preemptive operation against Iran — even if tactical and limited — requires legitimacy at two levels:
1. an international/media justification that frames the strike as a security necessity;
2. persuading regional allies to join in or at least look the other way.
Terror Alarm’s messaging and Trump’s remarks in the Knesset are efforts to prepare the first level; Trump’s appearances in Sharm el-Sheikh and at the Gaza peace summit are meant to set up the second.
Sharm el-Sheikh: Peace or a Stage for Power Play?
WANA (Oct 14) – The 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit was less a symbol of America’s return to the Middle East than a reflection of the inner crisis of the Western order itself. What was presented as a “conference for Middle East peace” turned, in practice, into a theatrical — almost comic — display of U.S. […]
Regional and military analysts are now weighing three plausible scenarios:
1. Targeted operations/assassinations: a reprise of the 2019 tactic that used assassination as leverage and to trigger a chain of action–reaction;
2. A blockade or disruption of energy traffic: attempts to close or complicate Iran’s oil routes and induce economic shock;
3. A limited military strike or a coordinated series of attacks on vital infrastructure.
Each of these options carries serious costs and risks, especially in the face of Iran’s asymmetric deterrence: precision drones and missiles, the regional missile capabilities of Iran’s allies, and lessons learned from past successful operations.
An anti-U.S. mural is seen on a building in Tehran, Iran, October 14, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
Tehran’s responses in recent months show that it has adopted a proactive posture: publicizing tanker routes, demonstrating readiness in the Persian Gulf, accelerating air-defense reconstruction, deploying combat aircraft, and advancing missile development. These are signals intended to dispel the notion of an “easy war” from Washington and Tel Aviv’s perspective.
However, Iran’s message must also include a fundamental point: asymmetric deterrence is effective only so long as the enemy’s international allies do not consider the costs of confronting Iran acceptable. If a Washington–Tel Aviv–regional allies coalition concludes that the price of action is tolerable, even the best tactical deterrents may prove insufficient.
One of the key variables in future calculations is Iran’s domestic situation. Over the past two months Tehran has shown that external pressures (such as sanctions or economic strain) have not quickly shattered internal cohesion — but that does not mean Iran is immune. The other side hoped economic pressure and media operations would create internal fissures. Recent experience has shown that:
1) identity-based messaging and support for resistance movements in the Arab world have prevented Tehran’s complete isolation; and
2) smart economic management and market control remain decisive factors that could change the game.
People attend a rally in support of the people of Gaza, after Friday prayers in Tehran, Iran, October 10, 2025. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
Terror Alarm’s message and the Sharm el-Sheikh display should not be read merely as direct threats; they represent a new form of “reverse threat-creation” tactics: first, crafting a narrative that makes an attack appear necessary; next, trying to limit the adversary’s possible response; and finally, if the anticipated retaliation does not materialize, rolling out a “Plan B” of economic pressure or blockade.
Instead of relying solely on conventional deterrence, Tehran can develop its own reverse threat-creation: a policy that synchronizes the identification of the opponent’s vulnerabilities with a public display of the costs of an Iranian response — making any attack not only “expensive” but also “futile.”
If Iran can simultaneously manage field deterrence, domestic cohesion, and reverse threat-creation, the likelihood of full-scale war will diminish — but if Washington and Tel Aviv judge a preemptive strike to be acceptable, the “who strikes first?” game will have a bitter consequence that threatens not only the region but the global order.
