WANA (Jun 25) – Following yesterday’s Senate vote, many commentators have tried to downplay the U.S. Senate’s resolution limiting the president’s war powers against Iran, portraying it as little more than a symbolic gesture. The reason is obvious: if it is acknowledged that Congress has effectively made a new military strike on Iran more difficult, then a key argument often used to justify concessions in the name of avoiding war begins to lose credibility.

 

The reality is that the threat of war is not removed by wishful thinking or by endlessly repeating generalities about negotiations. Politics is ultimately shaped by the balance of power. At a time when some argue that the only way to avoid conflict is through retreat and additional concessions, the U.S. Senate has passed a measure that could significantly increase the political and legal costs of any future military action against Iran. This is precisely why Donald Trump’s reaction was so angry and emotional. The vote was not merely a procedural exercise; it imposed a genuine constraint on the White House’s freedom of action regarding Iran.

 

So what exactly does this resolution say? Does it really limit the president’s ability to launch another attack on Iran, or is it simply political theater in Washington? The answers lie in the details of the resolution and the legal mechanisms behind it:

 

1. The resolution directs the president “to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran unless explicitly authorized by a declaration of war or a specific authorization for the use of military force enacted by Congress.”

 

In practical terms, this means that any future military strike against Iran without congressional authorization would be unlawful under U.S. domestic law.

 

2. Trump’s anger stems from precisely this point. In response, he wrote:

 

«”I had Iran on the ropes. They were ready to give us almost anything, and for the first time in decades they were showing respect for the United States and its President. Then the United States Senate decides to hold an untimely vote on the War Powers Resolution, telling the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism that the United States disapproves of what I am doing with Iran and that I should stop. In doing so, they are giving comfort to the enemy. Four pathetic Republicans joined the Democrats in voting for it…”»

 

 

3. Because the measure is structured as a joint congressional war powers resolution directing the president, it is not sent to the president for approval or signature in the conventional sense. As a result, Trump does not have the ability to veto this congressional directive.

 

4. Although Trump has repeatedly criticized the War Powers framework in recent months, he has simultaneously complied with it. At the outset of the conflict, he formally notified Congress as required by law. At the end of the 60-day period, he again informed Congress through an official letter that, due to the ceasefire, further activation of the War Powers process was unnecessary.

 

5. The resolution makes another military strike against Iran more difficult. Without congressional authorization, such an operation would be unlawful under U.S. law. American officials may often disregard international legal constraints, but they generally pay close attention to domestic legal requirements.

 

6. Military operations require funding, and Congress ultimately controls the federal purse. The same lawmakers who voted on this resolution would also have to approve funding for any future military campaign against Iran. For that reason alone, the measure cannot be dismissed as merely symbolic.

A man walks next to a symbolic mock-up of an Iranian missile, on a street in Tehran, Iran, June 11, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

7. Policymakers should not grant unnecessary concessions to the opposing side under the banner of “removing the shadow of war.”

 

8. Experience suggests that concessions and negotiations alone do not eliminate the risk of conflict. As the late Imam Khomeini argued, “America wants to swallow Iran.” In this view, no concession—regardless of its size—is ever sufficient. Over the past three months, there has been little evidence to challenge that assessment.

 

9. The country’s first priority should be breaking the cycle of attack, ceasefire, negotiation, and renewed attack—not securing wheat or other goods in exchange for Iran’s frozen assets.

 

10. The proper way to remove the threat of war, according to this perspective, is through military deterrence. Iranian authorities should publicly identify critical regional infrastructure that could become targets in the event of another attack on Iran. The objective, it is argued, should be to create a deterrent capable of imposing costs significant enough to alter the calculations of potential adversaries.

 

Supporters of this view argue that limited retaliation does not create sufficient deterrence. In their assessment, extensive damage to critical infrastructure would have broader economic consequences and therefore a greater deterrent effect. If U.S. policymakers became convinced that Iran would respond in such a manner, they would be less likely to authorize another military strike—particularly after the passage of the congressional resolution described above.