WANA (Jul 29) – It appears that the primary reason behind Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hurried trip to Washington on Monday, followed by Tuesday’s joint meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth—the same group that has been at the center of U.S. decision-making during the conflict with Iran—is growing concern within Israel over the prolonged pause in the war.

 

According to the analysis, the interruption has extended beyond what was expected and reflects the U.S. military’s inability to achieve what Israel considers a satisfactory outcome in its confrontation with Iran.

 

Netanyahu and other Israeli officials are deeply concerned that the conflict could ultimately end in one of two scenarios, both of which they view as a strategic victory for Iran and a defeat for the United States, Israel, and the Arab states involved in the conflict.

 

The first scenario is that the war simply comes to an end without any agreement. In that case, the Strait of Hormuz would remain under Iran’s long-term control, symbolizing what the author describes as a major Iranian victory.

 

Meanwhile, the naval blockade imposed on Iran—portrayed as an extension of an increasingly ineffective sanctions regime—would remain fragile and temporary. According to the analysis, such an outcome would amount to a decisive strategic success for Iran, while leaving the United States with only a limited tactical achievement.

 

 

The second possibility is the resumption of negotiations aimed at resolving the issues outlined in the Islamabad memorandum.

 

Such talks could lead either to a permanent end to the war against Iran and Lebanon, with Iran agreeing to discussions over its nuclear program without a predetermined outcome, or to the continuation of the current situation, marked by limited, attritional military operations between the two sides.

 

In the first case, Iran would secure a clear strategic gain by achieving its primary objective—the formal end of the war—while the United States would obtain only a minimal and uncertain outcome regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

 

In the second case, Iran would continue to consolidate its control over the Strait of Hormuz while benefiting from the passage of time.

People walk near a billboard depicting U.S. President Donald Trump on a building in Tehran, Iran, July 27, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Iran’s Yemeni ally could eventually establish lasting control over the Red Sea. Under this scenario, Iran would retain a strategic advantage, whereas the United States would continue pursuing objectives whose achievement would remain uncertain.

 

Such a situation would provide Iran with a powerful source of leverage, enabling it to gradually realize the objectives outlined in the Islamabad framework without reaching a formal agreement with its adversaries.

 

These developments have become a major source of concern for Israeli leaders because they conflict with Israel’s broader objective of consolidating its strategic position after years of military conflict.

 

Suvh an outcome would also jeopardize Israel’s political and security standing and could significantly weaken both Netanyahu and his political party ahead of Israel’s parliamentary elections. Recent commentary in Israeli media, as well as discussions within military, intelligence, and political circles, reflects growing concern that the conflict could ultimately conclude in Iran’s favor.