Who Is Behind Hezbollah’s Disarmament Push?
WANA (Aug 12) – In recent days, following official Iranian support for the weapons of the Resistance and opposition to their disarmament in favor of the Israeli regime, Takfiri militants, and local collaborators, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, Yousef Rajeh, issued statements far removed from reality, diplomatic etiquette, and the dignity of his office—an ill-considered reaction to Iran’s stance.
Rajeh, who entered Lebanon’s cabinet through foreign-backed quotas and whose political allies have a history of direct military cooperation with the Israeli army on Lebanese soil, accused Tehran of interfering in Lebanon’s political affairs. Such remarks, coming from a former associate and current intermediary for Israel and foreign governments, are unacceptable and carry consequences.
Rajeh and Geagea
Lebanon’s Foreign Minister and those behind him should be far more cautious when directly addressing Iran and its officials.
1. Yousef Rajeh is affiliated with the notorious Lebanese Forces party, led by Samir Geagea, a figure facing serious accusations of political assassinations in Lebanon.
Geagea also has a longstanding and significant case involving Iran: during Lebanon’s civil war, while allied with Israel, his militiamen kidnapped four Iranian diplomats. Some claim they were handed over to Israel; others believe they were executed by Geagea’s forces. Rajeh—and more importantly his leader, Geagea—should know there is blood on their hands. For the sake of higher national interests, this case has not been pursued in a retaliatory manner.

Abduction of four Iranian diplomats in Lebanon—Messrs. Seyed Mohsen Mousavi, Ahmad Motevaselian, Kazem Akhavan, and Taqi Rastegar Moghaddam / WANA News Agency
2. Geagea’s movement, once a direct proxy of Israel in fueling internal conflict and facilitating its military presence in Lebanon, has no legitimacy to speak of “protecting Lebanon’s domestic politics from foreign interference.” Choosing ministers is a delicate matter—especially a foreign minister, who must enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of other governments. Does Lebanon expect to be taken seriously by Iran while its foreign minister belongs to a party that once acted as Israel’s agent?
3. Iran’s most immediate demand—as a state whose diplomats were harmed by the Lebanese Forces—is the disarmament of that group. Their weapons have never been used to defend the country, only to serve occupation and foreign agendas. These arms are entirely different from the Resistance’s weapons; the LF’s military wing should be dismantled, its heavy arms seized, and its fighters placed under supervision. By both domestic and international law, their weapons lack legitimacy.
4. The recent orders foreign governments have given to their Lebanese clients in office aim to turn them into bargaining chips for future deals. Figures like Lebanon’s foreign minister are being groomed with anti-Iran rhetoric so that, in future negotiations with the Axis of Resistance, they can be “cashed in” as expendable assets.

Lebanon: Iran Interfering in Internal Affairs
WANA (Aug 07) – Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement in response to recent remarks made by Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi in support of the resistance. In the statement released Thursday, the ministry rejected and condemned Araghchi’s comments, claiming they constitute a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, unity, and stability, […]
5. While the Lebanese Forces and similar groups are insignificant on their own, reports indicate they may be preparing to take up arms against the Resistance and provoke a civil war. This places them in the danger zone; they must be warned before they trigger consequences they cannot control.
The Lebanese Government
President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam must act in accordance with Lebanon’s national interests, political norms, and international responsibilities.
1. Lebanon should base its relations on clear principles. Israel and the Golan-based regime threaten its territorial integrity, while Saudi Arabia seeks a paternalistic role over the country. By contrast, Iran is structurally positioned to curb Israeli expansionism, block the growth of Golan-aligned terrorists, and resist Saudi’s harmful influence—making it the best option for deepening ties with Beirut.
Ideologically, Iran supports oppressed nations; culturally, Iranians maintain warm relations with the Lebanese people and do not seek to humiliate them, unlike certain Arab states. There is also a deep-rooted connection between Shia families in both countries dating back centuries—at least five hundred years.

Araghchi’s Meeting with Lebanese Foreign Minister / WANA News Agency
2. Lebanon must ensure it does not drift from a government under foreign influence (Saudi, French, or American) into becoming a full-blown proxy tool for them. The foreign minister’s attack on Iran was a textbook proxy move. While some degree of foreign influence may be tolerated, turning Lebanon into an operational arm of outside powers is unacceptable.
Situation Assessment
Small political factions lacking sophisticated military or strategic infrastructure often follow foreign governments for political and financial gain. These groups must develop a real understanding of the situation and its consequences.
1. From supply lines to direct fire support for the Lebanese Resistance
Lebanon’s Resistance once relied heavily on a Syrian supply line that allowed it to amass strength, receive support, and quickly recover from Israeli blows. As long as Syria stood, Israel refrained from violating ceasefires.
After Syria’s collapse, Israeli attacks increased—but the Resistance’s regional supply network actually expanded compared to 2006. Following the October 7 operation, a foreign support front for Gaza emerged: first Lebanon, then Yemen, Iraq, and even Iran began launching direct strikes on Israeli-occupied territories.
Although the Syrian corridor collapsed, post–October 7 saw the birth of direct fire support. This was demonstrated during the Lebanon–Israel conflict through “True Promise 2,” following “True Promise 1” in support of Gaza. Just as the Axis of Resistance defended Lebanon’s Resistance with over a hundred missiles fired into occupied territories, it can again—should Israel, the Golan regime, or Lebanese mercenaries provoke a crisis—open a massive, precise, and impactful missile-and-drone fire line.

The Second Round of Iranian Missile Strikes on Occupied Territories in Day Three of the Iran-Israel War, June 15, 2025. Social media/ WANA News Agency
2. Iran’s decade-long projection of power
In recent years, Iran has targeted U.S. positions in Iraq, Syria, and Qatar; struck Israeli assets inside occupied territories through three True Promise operations; and hit Israeli intelligence facilities in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. It has also targeted Israeli maritime interests, punished Saudi Arabia on its own soil after the Ahvaz military parade attack, and launched missile strikes against terrorists in Pakistan.
In the recent Syrian conflict, Iran came close to directly supporting the Syrian army with long-range missile and drone fire. It has been only a short time since Iran’s missile barrages on occupied territories and the U.S. base at Al-Udeid. For Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s allies, figures like Geagea are far from being more valuable than radar systems or Israeli civilians.

Is the Lebanon Model Applicable to Iran?
WANA (Jul 20) – The prospect of Israel implementing its Lebanon scenario in Iran is a possibility that some analysts are not ruling out — despite the significant differences between the Iranian and Lebanese contexts. The war between Israel and Iran came to a halt after 12 days. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire […]
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh sees the regional picture through a dual lens: first, it believes Iran and the Axis of Resistance have been weakened; second, it believes Iran now seeks Saudi diplomatic support. The first assumption is false; the second is correct. The first could be turned against Saudi Arabia in ways that strengthen the second.
In this latest round, Saudi’s game in Lebanon will not merely “leak air from the ball”—footballers will be pelted with stones; if that is not enough, their coaches will be targeted; and if that still fails, windows will be smashed.
From Al Arabiya to Lebanon’s powerless foreign minister, their strings lead back to Riyadh. If the Saudis deny involvement, they should remember there are many other actors in the region. Saudi moves in the Levant—Lebanon and Syria—are directly tied to Iran’s national security. Riyadh’s ambitions could create air-attack vulnerabilities for Iran on its western flank.





