WANA (Sep 30) – One of the main security dilemmas of the Israeli regime at present is the widespread tendency of residents of the occupied Palestine to carry out anti-security actions against this regime, a matter which Hebrew-language experts have warned about.

 

While the security services of the Israeli regime claim significant penetration in Iran and heavily promote this in the media, the Israelis are now facing a major shock from the existence of multiple structures of Iranian spy networks in the occupied territories.

 

The numerous economic problems in the occupied territories, which most Hebrew-language media try to censor or portray as normal, have led to widespread dissatisfaction among residents of occupied Palestine and encouraged them to seek easy sources of income — including engaging in anti-security activities. This was a point noted by Iran’s Minister of Intelligence, Hojjatoleslam Khatib.

 

According to reports published in Hebrew and Western media, Israeli security officials, including Shin Bet (the internal security service) and the regime’s police, have repeatedly emphasized that in many cases, the main motivation for cooperation with Iranian intelligence institutions has been financial problems and the promise of easy income.

 

 

This phenomenon has been described by some officials as an “espionage crisis,” which since 2020 — particularly after the Gaza war and the intensification of tensions with Iran — has seen a sharp increase.

 

Alex Nemirovsky, head of the unit for combating serious crimes and tracking spies in the Israeli regime’s police, regarding the arrest of residents of the occupied territories who cooperated with Iran, said: “We are not dealing with naïve individuals who only took a few pictures or did some graffiti. The matter is much more serious than that.”

 

Based on statements by Israeli officials, the following methods have been cited as means used by Iranian security institutions to recruit spies:

  • Use of online platforms: Recruitment is mainly carried out via messaging apps such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and social networks.
  • Gradual increase in mission level: At first, individuals are asked to carry out simple tasks such as photographing public places, and gradually they are assigned more sensitive missions such as collecting classified information, sabotage, or even assassination.
  • Payment in digital currencies: To complicate financial tracking, payments are mostly made in cryptocurrency.

 

 

Uri Bar-Joseph, professor of international relations at the University of Haifa, said in an interview in October 2024: “In the case of Iran, my guess is that the main driver is not ideology or pressure, but money — something the Iranians are offering. Even FBI and CIA agents in America have mostly spied for money, so it is plausible for Israelis too.”

 

Meir Goren, head of the National Crimes Unit of the Israeli police, stated in May 2025: “All individuals arrested in recent cases were facing financial challenges and were seeking a quick way to pay their debts.” He also noted that the war of this regime with Hamas in Gaza created a suitable opportunity for Iran to recruit individuals for espionage.

 

Also, Yossi Melman, an intelligence affairs analyst, in July 2025, described Iran’s approach as follows: “Iran uses a ‘spray and pray’ strategy; meaning it makes small investments in a large number of individuals, hoping some of them will turn into effective agents. Most of these people are paid for small missions such as photography or graffiti.”

 

Joint statements by Shin Bet and the regime’s police regarding multiple arrests emphasized that these individuals were “ordinary people who betrayed the enemy only for money.”

 

 

In 2025 alone, the security services of the Israeli regime have publicized the following arrests of Iranian spies:

January 2025: Yuri Eliasov and Georgi Andreyev (both 21, reserve soldiers). Their mission: transferring sensitive information about the Iron Dome system.

 

March 2025: Eduard Yusupov (65). His mission: photography and surveillance of IDF bases, the Haifa port, refineries, and the nuclear research center.

 

April 2025: Roy Mizrahi and Almog Atias (both 24, from Nesher). Their mission: gathering information near the home of the Israeli regime’s Minister of Defense, Israel Katz, and security-related missions.

 

May 2025: Moshe Atias (18, from Yavne). His mission: collecting information about Naftali Bennett and his security team at Meir Hospital in Kfar Saba for a possible attack.

 

May–June 2025: Dmitry Cohen (28, from Haifa) and accomplices. Their mission: photographing officials’ houses and military bases.

 

 

June 2025: Denis Lyakhov (30 years old, from Rishon LeZion), his mission: photographing streets and residential buildings in Petah Tikva and Letoni and sharing geographic locations.

 

June 2025: Two unidentified men (19 years old from Sharon, 27 years old from Tel Aviv — names not published), their mission: transmitting confidential information, photographing bases, and writing graffiti.

 

June 2025: Yoni Segal (18 years old) and Omri Mizrahi (20 years old, from Tiberias), his mission: plan to assassinate a senior Israeli figure and filming shopping centers and hospitals.

 

June 2025: Rajab Salah (in his 30s, from East Jerusalem), his mission: photographing sensitive sites, burning IDF property, posting posters, proposing forest arson, and terrorist attacks.

 

June–July 2025: three Israelis (names not mentioned), including a person who was surveilling the fiancée of Netanyahu’s son; their mission: tailing and photographing Netanyahu’s associates and sabotage.

 

 

July 2025: Nisanov and six others (including Jewish immigrants from Azerbaijan), their task: collecting information and carrying out military actions against energy infrastructure, nuclear scientists, and planning the assassination of a security figure. According to one official of the Israeli regime, these individuals had carried out about 600 missions for Iran over two years.

 

July 2025: seven Israelis (19–23 years old, six Israelis, from occupied East Jerusalem whose names were not published), assassination plan for a nuclear scientist and a mayor, car-bombing a police vehicle, and throwing grenades.

 

July 2025: an Iranian-Israeli immigrant (name not published), espionage during the 12-day Israel–Iran war, transmitting confidential details to Iranian agents.

 

July 2025: Three Israelis, including Mark Morgin, their mission: carrying explosive materials, filming missile intercepts, proposing sabotage operations.

 

August 2025: Two unidentified Israelis (names not published), espionage during the war with Iran, and transmitting details of confidential information.

 

 

Ronen Bergman, a prominent Israeli journalist, said on the matter: “Previously such issues were rarely seen, but now Iran, which in the past two years has been seeking revenge on Israel for the assassination of its commanders, has been able to act from third countries such as Azerbaijan or Turkey and even recruit forces on Israeli soil — something previously done only by the Syrians in Jewish villages of the Golan Heights, which was never publicized. For many of these missions, there is no need for a professional spy, but to monitor the movements of an officer at a military base, it is enough for someone to install a camera on a car and remove it 24 hours later.”

 

Ehud Yatom, an Israeli political analyst, wrote in a report in Maariv: The Shin Bet security intelligence organization has so far arrested many spies, many of whom have caused serious harm to Israel’s security. He further added: In my opinion, we are still in the process of espionage scandals, and I would not be surprised to hear more news about the infiltration of foreign spies into Israel in the near future.

 

As is evident, the internal weakness of the Israeli regime in relation to internal management — including helplessness in the face of economic problems — has created conditions in such a way that many residents of the occupied territories, due to the hardships and pressures they endure, are extremely dissatisfied with the current situation, which stems from Netanyahu’s government policies.

 

This issue has turned into a serious security vulnerability in the body of this regime, such that today, according to Hebrew-language experts and media, we are witnessing the formation of extensive Iranian spy networks inside this regime.

 

It may be necessary for the leaders, and especially the Prime Minister of the Israeli regime, to be more concerned with the internal economic situation of this regime and the settlers, rather than worrying about solving Iran’s water problem, so that Israelis will not be willing to submit to espionage and security actions in exchange for relatively small sums of money.

Moodad espionage - WANA