Why Can’t Iran and the U.S. Reach a Deal?
WANA (Aug 22) – Nearly six months have passed since the latest war between Iran and the United States, yet there is still no clear prospect of moving toward an agreement, let alone peace. Fundamentally, an agreement between the two sides does not amount to peace, as the latter has its own specific requirements and conditions.
Nor is the issue here a permanent and comprehensive agreement between the two sides, as the chances of such an agreement are currently close to zero. The question, rather, is why there is not even a clear prospect of a successful interim agreement. The answer lies in the complex deadlock facing the war as a whole.
The reality is that the war has so far failed to achieve its military objectives. However, because neither side has achieved an absolute victory or suffered an outright defeat, the failure of the military campaign to accomplish its goals does not necessarily mean that the American side will back down and readily accept an agreement favorable to Tehran.
Is a New U.S.-Iran War on the Horizon?
WANA (Aug 17) – An assessment of the current military and political landscape suggests that, under present circumstances, the United States has limited incentive to enter a new full-scale war with Iran. Recent confrontations have also shown that targeted and limited strikes do not necessarily lead to a change in Tehran’s strategic behavior and […]
The fact is that Trump currently has no painless way out of this situation. The military option has so far failed to produce the desired results, although that does not necessarily mean abandoning the war or ruling out further attacks.
At the same time, the political and diplomatic option would be extremely costly for Trump, because under the current circumstances he sees little chance of securing a significant diplomatic achievement that he could present domestically as a success. Accepting an agreement similar to the memorandum would amount to a double setback and could create serious problems on the eve of the congressional elections.
In this regard, it was evident that the memorandum itself, which was largely favorable to Iran, immediately became a pretext for harsh attacks on Trump in the United States and Israel as soon as its text was published and signed. At the time, I argued that the American side had not accepted this one-sided memorandum with the intention of actually implementing it.
An Iranian drone and an Iranian missile system are displayed in Azadi Square in Tehran, Iran, July 30, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)
Trump needs an agreement, even if only temporary, that would allow him to exit the war without creating major political problems.
Even if the substance and outcome of such an agreement do not necessarily justify the war itself, they must not create a major political liability for him—one that would both call the war into question and expose him to accusations that his military campaign had produced the opposite result: instead of weakening Tehran, it had granted Iran major concessions and strengthened its position.
Overall, the current situation should be viewed as a complex, multilayered deadlock, accompanied by a chronic, ambiguous, uncertain and potentially dangerous stalemate. Neither the military option has been able to create a definitive way out, nor has the diplomatic track.
At the same time, the obstacle to reaching an agreement with Tehran should not be reduced solely to Trump’s personal and psychological characteristics, such as his narcissism or political pride.
Iran Moves Beyond Islamabad Memorandum as Cost of Any New Deal Rises for Washington
WANA (Aug 12) – Iran’s latest official position, announced by the Supreme National Security Council, signals a broader strategic decision in Tehran to move beyond the framework of the “Islamabad Memorandum.” The new position significantly raises Iran’s demands and sets a higher threshold for any potential agreement. Under the newly stated framework, Iran has […]
Given America’s superpower status, as well as the broader interests of Western actors, any agreement that consolidates Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, lifts sanctions and strengthens Iran’s position would be viewed as a shift in the regional balance of power against Israel and against American and Western interests. From that perspective, such an outcome would run counter to the very purpose of the war.
For this reason, it appears unlikely that the United States, Israel and other Western countries would easily accept the current situation or such an agreement. Consequently, there is little prospect for a temporary compromise in the form of a “successful and implementable agreement”—unless the war reaches a balance in which such an agreement becomes an imposed outcome of the conflict.
Before reaching that point, however, there remains the possibility of limited understandings, albeit ones that ultimately fail to produce a lasting or successful outcome.
For now, the United States appears to be waiting to assess the results of intensified economic warfare, particularly following the UAE’s recent move. Its next steps will depend on its assessment of those results and of Iran’s internal situation. Overall, however, the possibility of a new round of war and attacks in the coming weeks and months remains very serious.
On the other hand, the possibility of preemptive Iranian attacks aimed at disrupting the dynamics of a war of attrition and breaking the encirclement before the U.S. congressional elections is also high.
