WANA (Jan 04) – To find the answer to the question of why the Venezuelan army handed their President, Maduro, over without a war, different versions of the story must be analysed. A contradictory scene has emerged:

 

The most militarised country in Latin America, which for years had been preparing to repel imperialist aggression, lost its leader in a single night without even one shot being fired.

 

The failure of the air-defence system to act and the passivity of the protective guard indirectly reinforce the hypothesis that the upper layers of the army and security institutions sold out the country’s top leader.

 

If we strip away the official narrative’s outer shell, what could the architecture of this coup look like?

 

First, buying the keys to the sky. The fact that air defenses did not fire at the intruding helicopters may indicate that the transponders of these aircraft had been entered into the friend–or–foe system’s whitelist, or that radar operators were ordered to conduct drills, or that monitoring sections were shut down.

U.S. Attack on Venezuela. Social media / WANA News Agency

U.S. Attack on Venezuela. Social media / WANA News Agency

Key generals controlling the Aerospace Defence Command may have been involved. Most likely, it wasn’t just about money, but also guarantees of personal immunity and the preservation of assets in the new Venezuela.

 

In theory, Maduro’s guards were placed in an information vacuum. They were not warned because the security environment had been opened from within, and the assault operation turned into the extraction of a “cargo” from a pre-prepared site.

 

What could the conspirators’ tactic have been?

From a logical point of view, if a junta (military rule) exists, it should now be executing phase two. Their main task is to prevent radical Chavistas from starting street warfare and guerrilla warfare. It can be assumed that mid-level commanders loyal to Maduro have most likely been cut off from special communications.

 

The orders are contradictory: Stay in the barracks, hand over weapons to prevent provocation, and the like. The hysterical statements by Delcy Rodríguez about Maduro’s disappearance may indicate that the political branch of the Chavistas was unaware of the deal made by the security forces.

 

Now they must be systematically isolated. Some will be arrested; others, like Rodríguez, are needed only as spokespersons to legalise the transfer of power. For example, she may be forced to sign a resignation document, a decree declaring the president’s temporary absence, or something of that kind.

Then, legitimisation through the street is required. They now begin to bring the opposition out of the shadows, but in a limited and controlled way. They do not want a civil war. They want an image of joy.

 

Mobilising opposition supporters now makes more sense if, instead of attacking the presidential palace (which is empty), they are directed to fill the squares to create a backdrop of popular celebration.

 

This allows Washington and the conspirators to claim: “Look, this is not a CIA coup; this is the will of the people that the army has finally listened to.”

 

This is only a preliminary outline of possible developments and an explanation of events from the perspective of process logic.