WANA (Jun 12) – “They’ve taken a hard hit; they want a deal much more than before.” Donald Trump made that remark just hours before Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei announced: “Most of the text is nearly finalized, but Iran has not yet reached a final conclusion regarding the agreement.”

 

At first glance, the two statements appear unrelated. Yet when viewed together, they offer a different picture of the ongoing negotiations. Contrary to common assumptions, the main disagreement between Tehran and Washington no longer seems to be about the text of the agreement itself. Instead, it is increasingly about the narrative surrounding the agreement.

 

In recent weeks, every sign of progress in the talks has been accompanied by two completely different interpretations. Trump insists on portraying any potential deal as the result of American military and political pressure. According to his narrative, Iran moved closer to an agreement only after suffering “hard blows.” In Tehran, however, a very different story is taking shape.

 

Reports emerging from the negotiations—including claims that Washington has returned to understandings reached two weeks earlier—suggest that after introducing new demands and contributing to a deadlock in the talks, the United States was ultimately forced to retreat from some of its positions.

People walk on a street near a mural featuring an image of the late Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in Tehran, Iran June 8, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Perhaps that is why Baghaei, when describing the current state of the negotiations, focused not on disagreements over the text itself but on what he called America’s “shifting and contradictory positions.” He emphasized that “most of the text was nearly finalized,” but that U.S. officials repeatedly disrupted the process by introducing new demands or changing their positions.

 

That statement reveals an important point: if the text has progressed this far, then the principal obstacle must lie elsewhere.

 

According to speculation surrounding a reported 14-point draft understanding, sensitive issues such as the release of part of Iran’s frozen assets, the suspension of oil sanctions, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under agreed arrangements, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas surrounding Iran, and the launch of follow-up negotiations have all been placed on the agenda.

 

Regardless of whether these details ultimately prove accurate, the striking feature is that nearly all the reported provisions focus on immediate and tangible actions rather than long-term promises.

 

This is precisely where a potential new agreement differs from the JCPOA.

 

The JCPOA was built on the assumption that gradual confidence-building could reduce tensions and narrow differences. Today’s prospective agreement, however, appears to rest on a fundamentally different assumption: neither side trusts the other.

 

 

Under such conditions, Tehran is seeking immediate and verifiable gains, while Washington is trying to preserve at least some of its leverage. In other words, these negotiations are not aimed at building trust; they are designed to manage distrust.

 

Trump’s media strategy can also be understood within this framework. A review of his statements since the war began shows that the U.S. president has repeatedly spoken of Iran’s “defeat,” the country’s “complete destruction,” an “imminent deal,” and the continued openness of the Strait of Hormuz. Many of these claims were made even as developments on the ground appeared to point in a different direction.

 

This pattern has led some analysts to argue that Trump is conducting a parallel psychological campaign alongside the negotiations—a campaign aimed not at changing the agreement’s text but at shaping public perceptions of the deal. In this narrative, the United States must emerge as the winner, even if it has quietly moderated some of its demands in practice.

 

That may be why the most important question today is not whether an agreement will be signed. The more significant question is: if a deal is reached, who will succeed in imposing their narrative on public opinion?

People walk past a billboard depicting the late leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the late Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on a street in Tehran, Iran June 6, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Tehran argues that after months of pressure and threats, Washington has returned to frameworks acceptable to Iran. Trump argues that Iran came to the negotiating table only after enduring intense pressure. Both sides appear to be preparing to declare victory.

 

The reality, however, likely lies somewhere between these competing narratives—a place where neither Iran has capitulated nor the United States has secured all of its objectives.

 

Perhaps the clearest indication of this is that despite Trump’s repeated claims that an agreement is close, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman continues to stress: “As of this moment, we have not reached a final conclusion.”

 

That statement suggests that what is currently under review in Tehran is not merely a legal document. Iranian decision-makers are grappling with a larger question: do the benefits contained in the proposed agreement justify bringing this phase of confrontation to an end?

 

Until that question is answered, the agreement will remain in a peculiar state—a text that is largely written, yet whose ultimate fate remains uncertain.