WANA (Jun 02) – According to various Western think tank reports, while Iran possesses the capability to build over ten nuclear warheads, it has – by its own volition and based on the Supreme Leader’s religious decree (fatwa), not under foreign pressure – refrained from pursuing nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, due to its stockpile of enriched uranium, advanced technical expertise, and long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying warheads, Iran maintains what is known as threshold nuclear deterrence—a latent form of nuclear deterrence.

 

This unique position—creating strategic deterrence without actually possessing nuclear bombs—has to some extent solidified Iran’s regional standing. That is why Western officials, including Senator Marco Rubio, have stated that the true aim of pushing for a “zero enrichment” policy in Iran is to dismantle this very threshold deterrence.

 

In threshold deterrence, the key variable is the nuclear breakout time—the period between the decision to build a weapon and its actual production. Recent U.S. proposals not only seek to dismantle Iran’s deterrent infrastructure but aim for an even more critical goal: significantly lengthening Iran’s breakout time.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visits the Iran nuclear achievements in Tehran, Iran June 11, 2023. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei visits the Iran nuclear achievements in Tehran, Iran June 11, 2023. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)

If implemented, such plans would effectively eliminate one of Iran’s most vital levers for ensuring national security and survival amid diverse regional and international threats. Some Western and Israeli officials have repeatedly asserted that once Iran’s deterrent capacity is neutralized, scenarios akin to the Libyan model could be pursued. This could seriously heighten the risk of foreign military conflict—even if on a limited scale.

 

Initiatives like zero enrichment, international consortiums, and transferring enriched materials to third countries are all components of a broader project to erode Iran’s deterrence capability. Such a trajectory would render the country more vulnerable to political, security, and even military pressures, posing serious risks to national stability. In today’s volatile global order, preserving and strengthening both hard and soft power components is the only realistic path to keeping war at bay.

 

A review of Iran’s nuclear negotiations history reveals that the “zero enrichment” project is not a technical proposal but rather a long-term strategy aimed at containing and weakening Iran’s national power. From the Saadabad talks in 2003 to the JCPOA in 2015, Western parties have consistently sought to portray Iran’s peaceful nuclear program as a potential security threat and to impose restrictions on it. Although Iran demonstrated goodwill in the JCPOA by accepting major limits on enrichment levels, centrifuge numbers, and uranium stockpiles, the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and Europe’s failure to meet its commitments revealed that the West’s true aim has been the gradual disarmament of Iran.

 

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Since 2019, in response to these breaches, Iran began scaling back its nuclear commitments, successfully restoring high enrichment capabilities, installing advanced centrifuges, and expanding indigenous knowledge. This shift repositioned Iran from a subordinate actor to one holding the upper hand in negotiations.

 

Starting from Donald Trump’s second term, Washington adopted a dual-track policy of “war or negotiation,” combining maximum pressure with withdrawal from the JCPOA and repeated military threats in an attempt to force Iran into a new, one-sided agreement. Now, with indirect talks between Iran and the U.S. resuming via Oman, that binary has been fundamentally challenged. These behind-the-scenes negotiations, lacking formal commitment but aimed at managing tensions, have become a new model—neither a return to the JCPOA nor a total break from it. This format reflects an ongoing strategic standoff that neither ensures peace nor makes war inevitable.

 

Even within this framework, maintaining nuclear deterrence remains key to preserving Iran’s bargaining power at the table.

 

For this reason, Western powers are no longer seeking to revive the previous deal but are instead pushing for proposals like “zero enrichment” to return Iran to its pre-JCPOA position of weakness. Yet, two decades of negotiation experience clearly demonstrate that unilateral concessions neither guarantee peace nor prevent war; they only disrupt the balance of power in favor of Iran’s adversaries.