WANA (May 11) – Hojjatoleslam Seyed Mahmoud Nabavian, an influential member of the Iranian Parliament and a vocal critic of nuclear negotiations with the U.S., recently offered a historically grounded critique of Washington’s contradictory policies toward Iran’s nuclear program. Drawing on historical evidence of past Western cooperation with Iran, Nabavian argues that America’s current opposition to uranium enrichment is driven not by technical concerns but by political motives and hegemonic ambitions.

 

According to Nabavian, the core of Iran’s nuclear issue has never been about centrifuges—it has always been about political independence. The very activities once encouraged and supported by the U.S. in the 1970s are now branded as global threats.

 

As Iran and the U.S. resume nuclear talks in Oman, a familiar question resurfaces in Iranian political discourse: Why is the United States so opposed to Iran’s nuclear program, especially considering it possesses one of the world’s largest nuclear infrastructures? Nabavian, who serves as vice-chair of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, explores the roots of this American stance and the contradictions embedded in the West’s historical approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

 

Nuclear Energy—Only for America’s Allies?

Nabavian challenges a recent argument by Trump’s special envoy, who claimed that “Iran doesn’t need nuclear energy because it has oil.” He dismisses the claim as baseless and emblematic of the double standards the U.S. applies toward independent nations. Citing the fact that America ranks among the top ten countries in oil reserves and leads the world in daily oil production, he asks: “If the U.S. has so much oil, why does it still possess nuclear energy—and even expand its atomic arsenal?”

 

For Nabavian, such comparisons highlight a hegemonic logic: nuclear energy is only acceptable for nations aligned with U.S. strategic interests.

 

A Forgotten Chapter: The 93% Reactor

Nabavian points to a lesser-known chapter in Iran’s history: the time when the U.S. itself spearheaded Iran’s nuclear program. In 1957, Iran signed its first official nuclear agreement with the U.S. Two years later, the University of Tehran proposed building a research reactor—one that the U.S. helped construct. Fueled with uranium enriched to 93%, the reactor became operational in 1967.

 

He questions why 93% enrichment was deemed peaceful then, while 60% enrichment today is labeled dangerous. “Has the science changed?” he asks rhetorically.

 

From Plutonium Gifts to Prohibited Materials

Another historical inconsistency Nabavian highlights is America’s delivery of 112 grams of plutonium to Iran for peaceful purposes—a substance that now represents a red line in today’s negotiations. He refers to memoirs by pre-revolution figures like Hushang Ansary and Reza Etemad, who described how the U.S. not only supported Iran’s nuclear efforts but pressured Tehran into purchasing eight nuclear reactors. Iran even agreed to invest $2.75 billion in a U.S. enrichment facility.

 

France: From Nuclear Partner to Political Opponent

France, too, once played a leading role in Iran’s nuclear development. In 1968, it signed an agreement with the Shah to help establish a nuclear research center, train Iranian specialists, construct a 900-MW light-water reactor, and provide up to 5000 MW of nuclear-generated electricity. Iran bought a 10% stake in the French enrichment company Eurodif and even agreed to conduct reprocessing on French soil—an activity that is now strictly prohibited under the JCPOA.

 

From a Dependent Monarchy to an Independent Republic

Nabavian concludes with a fundamental question: “Is the only difference between then and now the fact that the Islamic Republic refuses to be a servant of the West?” He believes America’s real concern is not nuclear technology but Iran’s political independence. When Iran’s regime was pro-Western, even plutonium was acceptable. Now that the Islamic Republic insists on making decisions based on national interests, every nuclear activity becomes suspect.

 

Nabavian’s arguments aim to show that Iran’s nuclear program is not rooted in defiance but in rightful sovereignty, logic, historical precedent, and future necessity. By revisiting a well-documented past, he exposes what he sees as the contradictions in U.S. policy—one that provided Iran with reactors, sold it plutonium, and encouraged enrichment investments, but now demands total cessation.

 

To Nabavian, the West’s true problem is not with uranium levels—but with a sovereign Iran.