WANA (Apr 25) – “Pakistan is a nuclear country and capable of defending itself.” These were the words of Pakistan’s foreign minister amid rising tensions with India following a terrorist attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s defense minister added, “Islamabad, as a nuclear power, will respond in kind to any Indian action to protect its national interests.”

 

Not a word was uttered by any global power, the United Nations, or the IAEA about why a senior official was making nuclear threats.

 

It’s the same old story. When the U.S. was asked why it invaded Iraq, it said, “Because they were building weapons of mass destruction.” But when asked why it doesn’t attack Russia, the answer was: “Are we foolish? You don’t attack a nuclear-armed state.”

 

In 2003, Muammar Gaddafi gave up Libya’s underdeveloped nuclear program—and paid the price with the collapse of his regime and his death in a drainage pipe. Years later, Ukraine, which had voluntarily handed over its nuclear arsenal to Russia, was invaded by the very same country—while the world merely expressed “concern.”

 

North Korea, on the other hand, built the bomb—and no one dared to attack it.

Iran has watched all of this closely.

 

European Union and the United States flags -WANA

Europe, the “Bad Cop” of Nuclear Talks, Sidelined

WANA (Apr 23) – In contrast to previous years, Europe’s role in the recent Iran-U.S. negotiations has diminished significantly. The European representative—once a key intermediary—has been largely pushed to the margins.   This sidelining appears to be the result of a combination of Europe’s waning global power, its failure to uphold commitments after the U.S. […]

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That’s why, when the U.S. insists “we will never let Iran acquire a nuclear weapon,” it’s not really about the bomb. It’s about the precedent. If Iran remains at the nuclear threshold and refuses to back down, it could become a model—for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, even Venezuela. That would mean the end of nuclear monopoly, the collapse of the post-WWII order, and the unraveling of the doctrine that “deterrence is only for our allies.”

 

Pakistan’s foreign minister, representing a country with twice as many fighter jets and superior military capabilities compared to Iran, didn’t rely on hypersonic missiles. He referred to just one thing: nuclear power.

 

And that’s precisely why, despite the constant threats and deep tensions, there will likely never be a full-scale war between India and Pakistan.

 

Western media has long talked about Iran being “on the threshold of the bomb,” but what’s often left unsaid is this: Iran has never chosen to build a bomb. Not due to pressure, but due to strategic calculation. The cost of acquiring a bomb is high—and only meaningful if it serves deterrence, not war.

 

Instead, Iran has leveraged its “threshold status” as a strategic tool—one that is intolerable and unstoppable for its adversaries.

 

When a country can complete enrichment in a matter of weeks, it essentially has access to the ultimate weapon. And according to American strategists, that’s “worse than having the bomb.” Because it offers deterrence—without being containable.

For the U.S., Iran is not just about uranium enrichment. This case is a litmus test for international credibility, domestic political unity, and the global order. If America fails to stop Iran, what message does that send to the rest of the world?

 

President Biden once declared, “Iran will never get the bomb.” Backtracking on that would be political suicide. That’s why, even amid the war in Ukraine, war crimes in Gaza, and crises with India and Pakistan, Iran remains a top priority. A nuclear-capable Iran would shatter America’s deterrence prestige.

 

 

What is Israel afraid of?

Officially, Israel sees Iran as an “existential threat.” But in practice, its greater fear lies elsewhere: a shift in regional strategic balance. Israel remains the only nuclear power in the Middle East. This monopoly underpins its deterrence and regional dominance. If Iran reaches the threshold—even without a bomb—a mutual deterrence dynamic will emerge.

 

A 2023 Mossad report acknowledged that Iran “has not yet decided to build a bomb,” but warned that its enrichment level was “sufficient to produce a weapon.” That contradiction is precisely the fear: if Iran decides to act, there would be no time left to stop it.

Why won’t Iran back down?

Over the past decade, the Islamic Republic has built its power structure and regional strategy on the foundation of steadfastness. Retreating on the nuclear issue—especially after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and Europe’s inaction—would be conceding defeat in a game Iran itself designed.

 

Iranian officials have repeatedly stated: “We will not return unless sanctions are lifted.” In a meeting with state officials, Ayatollah Khamenei said, “We’re not pursuing a bomb, but even so, they don’t want us to have nuclear knowledge.”

 

For Iran, nuclear energy is no longer just a technology—it’s a symbol of national power. Abandoning it would mean submitting to external domination.

 

Completely and permanently dismantling Iran’s nuclear program is unrealistic. As a member of the NPT, Iran insists on its right to peaceful enrichment. Moreover, the knowledge it has gained over the past six years—especially regarding advanced centrifuges and uranium production—is irreversible.

What happens if Iran holds out?

Exactly what the U.S. fears: a new global model of deterrence. Any country that withstands Western sanctions and threats, and reaches the threshold through indigenous capacity, could become a template for others.

 

North Korea is the pessimistic version of that model; Iran is crafting a resistance-based, non-war version.

 

Some in Washington have said, “Iran is building a domestic doctrine of deterrence without the bomb.” And that represents a greater threat than any single weapon—because such a doctrine can be replicated.